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INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff appeals a decision by the district court granting summary judgment in 
favor of defendants on her claim for defamation. Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit after she 
was allegedly "forced to resign" her employment as the KTVX Channel 4 Health 
Reporter. At the time of her resignation, Plaintiff was an at will employee who could 
have been terminated for any reason, with or without cause under Utah law. 
Plaintiff was given the choice of resigning or being terminated after she revealed 
to KTVX management that she had, without obtaining prior permission as required by 
station policy, approached the Huntsman Cancer Institute (one of the health care 
organizations on whom she routinely reported) and solicited the Institute's monetary and 
other support for a non-profit foundation she desired to establish. 
This obvious conflict of interest with her duties as the station's health reporter 
resulted in her termination by defendant Jon Fisher, the KTVX news director. Because of 
Plaintiffs concern that her being "fired" might adversely affect her previously 
undisclosed employment discussions with a competing TV station, KUTV, Channel 2, 
Fischer agreed to allow Plaintiff to "resign" and take two weeks "vacation" so she could 
conclude her discussions with her prospective employer before her departure became 
public. During this "vacation" period, there was speculation and gossip among some in 
the KTVX newsroom staff about the reasons for her absence, such speculation being 
fueled, in part, by Plaintiff's own comments and actions to her fellow workers. 
Defendants Jon Fischer and Patrick Benedict, the KTVX assistant news director, 
made no comments about the reasons for her departure from the station. This was in 
keeping with the station policy to not comment on terminated employees and consistent 
586546.1 1 
with a commitment Jon Fischer made to Plaintiff when he terminated her that he would 
not discuss the reasons for her departure in the newsroom. 
Following her termination, Plaintiff filed suit asserting claims for breach of 
contract, defamation, intentional interference with economic relations and injunctive 
relief. She subsequently amended her claims and narrowed them to wrongful termination 
and defamation. After discovery showed no basis for her wrongful termination claim, 
she amended her complaint to assert a single claim for defamation. In search of factual 
support for her defamation claim, Plaintiff deposed seventeen current and former KTVX 
employees and other interested parties. Tellingly, Plaintiff could not find a single witness 
who heard the Defendants make any of the allegedly defamatory statements. 
Given Plaintiff's lack of any direct evidence, as well as the applicability of legal 
privileges that protect the type of speech allegedly made in this case, Defendants moved 
for summary judgment. In opposing summary judgment, Plaintiff relied on inadmissible 
double and triple hearsay, conjecture, speculation, and circumstantial evidence; none of 
which was sufficient to withstand dismissal. The district court correctly rejected 
Plaintiff's novel, yet incorrect legal arguments, and in the absence of any material factual 
dispute, granted summary judgment. For the numerous reasons outlined below, any of 
which alone would require affirmance, this Court should uphold the decision of the 
district court. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3)(j) (2004) (appeals from judgments over which Court of Appeals lacks original 
jurisdiction). 
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Appellees Clear Channel Broadcasting, Inc., dba KTVX Channel Four, Jon 
Fischer, and Patrick Benedict (collectively "Appellees" or "Defendants") offer the 
following statement of issues in lieu of that contained on page viii of Appellant's 
Opening Brief (hereinafter, uBr. of Appellant"). This formulation of the issues more 
accurately captures the arguments presented to the district court, the basis for the court's 
decision below, as well as an additional basis for affirming the district court's judgment. 
Each of the following issues was raised before the district court both in Defendants' 
memoranda in support of their motion for summary judgment (R. 248-265; R. 450-460.) 
and at oral argument on the motion. 
ISSUE # 1 
Was the district court correct to grant summary judgment in Defendant's favor on 
Ms. Wayment's defamation claim on the basis that Ms. Wayment was a public figure 
who was required to show actual malice on the part of Defendants to overcome the 
privilege protecting speech related to public figures? 
Defendants agree with Ms. Wayment that summary judgment is an issue of law, 
which is to be reviewed for correctness. Additionally, the applicability of the privilege is 
a legal issue to be reviewed for correctness. See Price v. Armour, 949 P.2d 1251, 1254 
(Utah 1997) ("The existence of a privilege is a question of law for the court, which we 
review for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's determination."); Russell 
v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896, 900 (Utah 1992). 
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ISSUE # 2 
Was the district court correct to grant summary judgment in Defendants' favor on 
Ms. Wayment's defamation claim on the basis that there was no admissible evidence 
linking Jon Fischer to any of the allegedly defamatory statements? 
Defendants agree with Ms. Wayment that generally summary judgment is an issue 
of law, which is to be reviewed for correctness. However, even at summary judgment, a 
trial court's decision to exclude evidence is reviewed for both correctness and abuse. 
Utah v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708, 713-14 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993) (excluding affidavit on hearsay 
grounds and photograph for lack of authentication); In re: Gen. Determination of Rights 
to Use of All Water, 982 P.2d 65, 71-72 (Utah 1999) (excluding affidavits made without 
first hand knowledge). First, it is determined if the trial court was correct in its selection, 
interpretation, and application of a rule of evidence. Horton, 848 P.2d at 714. Next, an 
abuse of discretion standard is applied to whether the trial court reasonably determined 
that the excluded evidence failed to satisfy evidentiary requirements. Id. 
ISSUE # 3 
Was the district court correct to grant summary judgment in Defendant's favor on 
Ms. Wayment's defamation claim on the basis that none of the alleged statements made 
by Patrick Benedict are the defamatory statements Ms. Wayment pled in her Amended 
Complaint? 
Defendants agree with Ms. Wayment that summary judgment is an issue of law, 
which is to be reviewed for correctness. 
ISSUE # 4 
Should this Court affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment on Ms. 
Wayment's defamation claim on the alternative basis that she failed to offer any evidence 
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of common law malice on the part of Defendants which is required to overcome the 
qualified privilege attached to employer-to-employee communications? 
Defendants agree with Ms. Wayment that summary judgment is an issue of law, 
which is to be reviewed for correctness. Additionally, the applicability of the privilege is 
a legal issue to be reviewed for correctness. See Price, 949 P.2d at 1254; Russell, 842 
P.2d at 900. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS ON APPEAL 
This appeal turns upon issues of constitutional and common law rather than the 
upon interpretation of statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations. However, the 
determination of this appeal could involve interpretations of Rule 801(c), Rule 
801(d)(2)(B), and Rule 801 (d)(2)(D) of the Utah Rules of Evidence as well as Rule 
8(a)(1) and Rule 9(b) pf the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Proceedings Below 
On July 26, 2002, Plaintiff filed a Verified Complaint in this matter. In that 
Complaint, Plaintiff sued Defendants asserting four claims for relief: breach of contract, 
defamation, intentional interference with economic relations and injunctive relief. 
On November 13, 2002, Plaintiff subsequently filed an Amended Complaint 
which eliminated the contract and injunctive claims and added a wrongful termination 
claim. After discovery demonstrated that her intentional interference with economic 
relations and wrongful termination claims were without merit, Plaintiff filed a Second 
Amended Complaint on February 6, 2003, leaving a single claim for defamation. 1 
1
 The Second Amended Complaint purports to set forth a second cause of action for 
"Malice." However, this claim does not constitute an independent, substantive cause of 
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On April 22, 2003 Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and 
supporting memorandum and exhibits. (R. 237-304.). Plaintiff filed an Opposition 
Memorandum on May 28, 2003. (R. 305-446.) On June 16, 2003 Defendants filed a 
Reply Memorandum and Notice to Submit for Decision. (R. 447-464.) 
On August 15, 2003, the matter came before the Court for hearing and, after oral 
argument, was taken under advisement. (R. 470.) On August 25, 2003, a Memorandum 
Decision issued from the Court granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
(R. 484-489.) On September 12, 2003, the Court entered an Order of Dismissal with 
Prejudice. On October 29, 2003, the Court entered final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) 
URCP. (R. 495-496.) On October 9, 2003, Plaintiff filed her Notice of Appeal. 
B. Statement of Facts 
The Parties 
1. Plaintiff is an experienced journalist, having received a Masters Degree in 
journalism from Northwestern University and having been employed in the TV news 
profession for 9 years. (Supplemental Record "Sup. R." at 561; Resume of Holly 
Wayment, attached as Exhibit 7 to Plaintiff's deposition.) Plaintiff was the KTVX 
Health Reporter from March, 1999 until her termination in May of 2001. (Id.) Plaintiff 
was an at-will employee at the time of her termination and a well known public figure in 
Salt Lake City and the State of Utah. (R. 268 f 7.) 
2. Defendant Jon Fischer is an experienced journalist, having worked in the 
TV news profession for 25 years. (R. 267-68 at f 2.) Fischer has been the news director 
action. The claim merely alleges that Defendants acted with malice toward Plaintiff in 
making their alleged defamatory statements, thus entitling Plaintiff to an award of 
punitive damages if she recovers on her defamation claim. 
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of KTVX from October of 2001 to the present. (R. 268 at f 4.) Fischer was Plaintiffs 
boss and had regular contact with her during her employment at KTVX. (IdL at ff 5, 6.) 
3. Defendant Patrick Benedict was the assistant news director at the time of 
Plaintiffs termination, although he had been employed at KTVX for only approximately 
one month prior to Plaintiffs termination. (R. 275 at f 1.) 
4. Defendant Clear Channel Broadcasting, Inc. does business in the State of 
Utah as KTVX Channel 4, having acquired KTVX in October of 2001. (R. 268 at f 3.) 
Plaintiff's Termination for Conflict of Interest 
5. KTVX has a policy that requires its reporters and anchors to obtain prior 
management approval before undertaking any significant or publicly visible involvement 
or contact with community or charitable organizations. (R. 268-69 at % 10.) 
6. Plaintiff was terminated in May of 2002 after she revealed to Defendant 
Fischer in a meeting on May 3, 2002 that she had approached, without prior approval of 
Mr. Fischer, the Huntsman Cancer Institute ("HCI") (one of the healthcare organizations 
she routinely covered as a reporter) and solicited HCFs support for a non profit 
organization she wanted to establish to help kids with cancer. (R. 268-69 at ff 8, 12.) 
7. Fischer believed such actions (a) were in violation of the KTVX policy 
described above and (b) constituted a conflict of interest with her duties as the KTVX 
Health Reporter, even if no final agreements had yet been reached between HCI and 
Plaintiff regarding her foundation. (R. 269-70 at <H 16,17.) 
8. At Fischer's request, Plaintiff sent Fischer a memorandum describing her 
contacts with HCI after Fischer expressed his shock and concern in the May 3, 2002 
meeting about what she had done. (R.269 at f 13.) 
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9. The requested memorandum (R. 278.) was prepared by Plaintiff and was 
truthful and accurate in its contents. (R. 243 at f 12, uncontested at R. 309.) 
10. Dr. Joseph Yost (the primary person at HCI with whom Ms, Wayment 
discussed her proposal) had detailed conversations with Plaintiff in which HCFs support 
of the foundation, both monetary and in other ways, was discussed. (R. 279-83.) 
However, Dr. Yost was advised by the Senior Director of Public Affairs at HCI that his 
dealings with Ms. Wayment raised a serious concern regarding a conflict of interest 
because as a health reporter, Ms. Wayment regularly covered HCI and other health care 
organizations. (R. 281-82 at f 9.) 
1L Plaintiff was terminated by Fischer on May 14, 2002. (R. 270-71 at f 19.) 
Because of Plaintiffs expressed concern that her being "fired" might adversely affect her 
previously undisclosed discussions she had been having about employment with KUTV, 
Channel 2, Fischer gave Plaintiff the option to "resign" and allowed her to take two 
weeks "vacation" to finalize her discussions with Channel 2 before her departure became 
public. (Id.) Plaintiff submitted a letter of resignation dated May 14, 2002 which letter 
was accepted by Fischer. (Id.) 
12. Because of Plaintiffs expressed concern to Fischer that her being fired for 
a conflict of interest might adversely affect her future in the broadcast news business, 
Fischer promised Plaintiff he would not discuss or comment on the reasons for Plaintiffs 
departure. (R. 271 at 121.) 
The Alleged Defamatory Statements 
13. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Jon Fischer and Pat Benedict made certain 
defamatory statements regarding Plaintiff following Mr. Fischer's decision to terminate 
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Plaintiff's employment. The alleged statements made are that Plaintiff was terminated 
because: 
(a) "She was taking money from the Huntsman Cancer Institute"; 
(b) "Was in bed with the Institute"; and 
(c) "Had used her reporting contacts to try to set up a foundation for her 
benefit." 
(R. 228 at f 48; Sup. R. 557 at lines 7-20.) 
14. Plaintiff is very specific in pleading her defamation claim based only on 
these three statements. (R. 228 at f f 45, 48.) No other statements, either generally or 
specifically, are alleged to have been made by the Defendants. (Id.) 
15. The corporate Defendant, KTVX, is alleged to have defamed Plaintiff 
through the statements of its agents—Fischer and Benedict. No other basis for liability 
against KTVX is asserted. (R. 228-29 at ff 47-54.) 
16. The Second Amended Complaint does not allege which statements were 
made by which Defendant or to whom the statements were allegedly made. (R. 288-29 at 
1147-54.) 
17. Discovery demonstrated the following: 
(a) Plaintiff admits that neither Fischer nor Benedict made any of the alleged 
defamatory statements to her. (Sup. R. 558 at lines 3-25; 559 at lines 1-5.) 
(b) Plaintiff admits that she never personally overheard Jon Fischer or Pat 
Benedict make any of the alleged defamatory statements to others. (Id.) 
(c) Fellow employees reported to Plaintiff that there was newsroom gossip and 
speculation about the reasons for her termination. (Sup. R. 559-60, 562.) 
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(d) Of the 17 current and former KTVX employees deposed by Plaintiff none 
of them (including Adam Rodriguez and Jeremy Castellano) have first hand 
knowledge that Jon Fischer made any of the challenged statements. 
(Compare R. 245-46 to R. 308-11; Plaintiff does not contest this fact.) 
(e) Of the 17 current and former KTVX employees deposed by Plaintiff only 
one person, Jeremy Castellano, purports to have first-hand knowledge of 
what Defendant Pat Benedict said about why Plaintiff was terminated. 
(Compare R. 245-46 to R. 308-311; Plaintiff does not contest this fact.) 
(f) Castellano testified that he approached Benedict to find out "what 
happened" with Plaintiff and the only statements he heard Mr. Benedict say 
were: (1) "she abused her contacts as a reporter to start this foundation;" (2) 
"she was in charge of a large sum of money;" (3) "it's unethical" (4) "you 
can't do stories on a place that you receive money from" and (5) "The 
worst thing is that she doesn't even understand what she did was wrong." 
(R. 336 at pp. 10,35-36.) 
Plaintiffs Public Figure Status 
18. Ms. Wayment was an on-air TV news personality for over three years at 
KTVX Channel 4. (R. 286 at 14.) During that time, Plaintiff was the KTVX Health 
Reporter where she appeared in news broadcasts almost every day doing either live or 
taped news stories on health-related topics. (IdL at fj[ 5 and 6.) Plaintiff produced and 
presented at least one health report five days a week. Her reports included a two-minute 
"4 Utah Health Headlines" presentation and/or a "health package," which was a longer, 
more in-depth story on health issues. (Id at % 7.) 
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19. Plaintiff's stories (which often aired on all three KTVX newscasts each 
day) would run between one minute, 30 seconds and four minutes in length. (R. 286-87 
at M 8-10.) 
20. In addition to her daily health stories, Plaintiff was also featured in several 
half hour Special Reports regarding health matters and public safety issues. She was part 
of an award-winning, highly promoted special titled "The Truth About Tobacco" which 
aired twice in 2001. (R. 287 at f 13.) 
21. Ms. Wayment also reported live from various highly promoted special 
events in the Utah community, including Utah AIDS Foundation's annual Oscar Night 
Gala benefit which was attended by hundreds of people. Ms. Wayment would report live 
from the celebration during the evening newscast directly following the Oscars, a 
newscast that is watched by tens of thousands of viewers. (R. 287 at f 14). 
22. Plaintiff did 63 stories about the HCI or its employees during her 
employment at KTVX. (R. 288 at f 16.) 
23. KTVX's geographic broadcast coverage area extends to the entire State of 
Utah and to portions of five neighboring states. Ms. Wayment's weekday health reports 
during the years 1999-2001 were seen by an average of 49,000-59,000 viewers during the 
KTVX 5:30 p.m. evening news program; an average of 38,000-50,000 viewers during the 
KTVX 6:00 p.m. evening news program and an average of 51,000 to 75,000 viewers 
when her stories were rebroadcast in the 10:00 p.m. evening news. (R. 288 at f 17.) 
24. On occasion, Plaintiff's stories broadcast on KTVX would be picked up by 
the ABC Network and broadcast nationally or by other ABC affiliates around the 
country. (R. 287 at f 15.) 
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25. Plaintiff was the subject of various KTVX promotions in 2000 and 2001 
during each of the four annual ratings periods or "sweeps." During these sweeps periods, 
Plaintiff and her stories were promoted on KTVX and other television stations in 15-30 
second commercials prior to the broadcast of her particular story. These commercials 
totaled over 500 in number. (R. 291-92 at If 3-4.) 
26. Ms. Wayment maintained a highly visible public presence in the greater 
Salt Lake area through extensive community and volunteer work. She was a member of 
the Board of Directors of the Candlelighters for Childhood Cancer, a Utah non-profit 
organization. She acted as the celebrity Master of Ceremonies for the Utah Diabetes 
Center Annual Gala in March of 2002. She was the March of Dimes WalkAmerica 
Spokesperson in the spring of 2001 and she was a celebrity runner in the Race for the 
Cure Fun Runs in 2000 and 2001. (R. 312 at f 4.) 
27. Ms. Wayment was featured in a fashion segment of Oprah Winfrey's 
Magazine "O", which included a full body photograph and reference to her as a TV 
reporter in Salt Lake City. (Sup. R. 560 at lines 10-24.) 
28. Ms. Wayment described herself as a "local celebrity." (R. 278 at last 
paragraph.) 
29. The local media did stories about the filing of her lawsuit against 
defendants. See, e.g., Deseret News Story dated July 27, 2002, titled "Former KTVX 
Reporter Sues Company" (R. 293-94.) 
Plaintiff's Lack of Evidence Regarding 111-Will or Hostility 
30. Defendant Benedict had never spoken to Ms. Wayment before beginning 
his employment at KTVX only two weeks prior to Plaintiff's termination. (R. 275 at 
fft 1-3.) Benedict believed Ms. Wayment was a competent employee, had a pleasant 
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working relationship with her and harbored no ill will or animosity towards her. (Id. at 
54.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In this case, there are three compelling basis for affirming the summary judgment 
granted by the district court. 
First, (as addressed in Sections I and II of this brief), the undisputed evidence 
establishes Plaintiff was a "public figure." Plaintiff failed in her effort to affirmatively 
produce any evidence (let alone the clear and convincing evidence the law requires) to 
prove that Defendants made the alleged statements with the "actual malice" required to 
overcome the privilege protecting speech about public figures. 
Second, (as set forth in Section III herein), despite extensive discovery, including 
the depositions of 17 current and former KTVX employees, Plaintiff has discovered no 
admissible evidence that the alleged defamatory statements were made by Defendant 
Fischer (as opposed to idle gossip and speculation by others whom she has chosen not to 
sue). Similarly, Plaintiff has produced only one witness that purports to have heard 
Patrick Benedict make any statements about her. These statements (as discussed in 
Section IV herein), are not the ones Plaintiff has sued upon in her Second Amended 
Complaint. 
Third, (as set forth in Section V herein), Plaintiff has failed to produce any 
evidence that Defendants Fischer or Benedict (even if one assumes they made the alleged 
defamatory statements) acted with the requisite "common law malice" to overcome the 
protections afforded employer-to-employee communications (or communications to a 
interested third parties). 
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Any one of these reasons, standing alone, is sufficient grounds for affirming 
summary judgment. All together, they provide overwhelming justification for dismissal 
of the case and impose an insurmountable barrier to Plaintiff's claims on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT 
PLAINTIFF WAS A PUBLIC FIGURE WHO WAS REQUIRED TO 
PROVE ACTUAL MALICE ON THE PART OF DEFENDANTS IN 
ORDER TO AVOID DISMISSAL OF HER DEFAMATION CLAIM. 
The District Court was correct in determining that Plaintiff was a public figure 
who needed to prove actual malice on the part of defendants in order to avoid dismissal 
of her defamation claim. Despite Plaintiff's arguments on appeal that she was not a 
public figure, her position lacks any factual or legal support and must be rejected for the 
following reasons: 
A. A Public Figure Is One Who Has Assumed a Role of Prominence in 
Society, Occupies a Position of Influence, or Who Has Invited Public 
Attention And Comment, 
Under both U.S. and Utah constitutional law, persons attain public figure status in 
one of three ways. They are persons who either have "assumed roles of especial 
prominence in the affairs of society" or who occupy "a position of persuasive power 
and influence" or who "invite attention and comment." Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc., 626 
P.2d 968, 972 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S. Ct 2997, 41 L. 
Ed. 2d 789 (1974)) (emphasis added); see also Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., 
627 F.2d 1287, 1294 n. 15 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (public figure's broad influence allows [her] 
to capitalize on general fame by lending [her] name to products, candidates and causes) 
(emphasis added). To achieve public figure status, Ms. Wayment's prominence or fame 
need not have been gained on a national basis, but merely within her community. Gertz, 
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418 U.S. at 351-52 (general fame and notoriety in community or among local population 
is required); Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1295 n. 22 (D.C Cir. 1980) ("We therefore conclude 
that nationwide fame is not required"). See also SARO Corp. v. Waterman Broad. Corp., 
595 So.2d 87, 89 (Fla. Ct. App. 1992) (only fame or notoriety in community required for 
general purpose public figure). 
Further, this Court has noted that a person who ". . . forsakes the anonymity of 
private life and enters the limelight of the public arena . . . must accept the attendant 
personal risks." Seegmiller, 626 P.2d at 974; see also Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1294-95 
("When someone steps into the public spotlight . . . [s]he must take the bad with the 
good"); San Antonio Express News v. Dracos, 922 S.W. 2d 242, 255 ("As a journalist 
and self-described public commentator, [Plaintiff] cannot hold himself out as a popular 
television personality and yet deny he is a public figure for purposes of the New York 
Times standard and the First Amendment"). Consistent with these pronouncements, the 
voluntary nature of a person's ascent into the limelight will be a determinative factor in 
finding her a public figure. Seegmiller, 626 P.2d at 972 (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342, 
345) (vigor and success with which person seeks public attention is one determinative 
factor in achieving public figure status). 
As set forth in Section C below, the record before the trial court unequivocally 
demonstrates that Plaintiff meets not one, but all three criteria for public figure status — 
she was "prominent" within our state, she occupied a position of "influence" and she 
voluntarily sought "public attention." 
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B. Reporters, Journalists and Media Personalities Such As Plaintiff Are Public 
Figures. 
Plaintiff fails to cite a single case where a news reporter, journalist or other media 
personality was not found to be a public figure. In contrast, there are numerous cases 
holding that media personalities, such as Ms. Wayment, are public figures. See, e.g., 
Dracos, 922 S.W.2d 242, 253 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996) (finding defamation Plaintiff, a 
television reporter, was a public figure and citing ten additional cases where journalists, 
authors, columnists, publishers, and radio personalities were found to be public figures); 
Cole v. Westinghouse Broad. Co., Inc., 435 N.E.2d 1021, 1024-25 (Mass. 1982) (finding 
defamation Plaintiff, a television reporter, was a public figure in lawsuit against his 
former station for statements made regarding the reasons for his termination; "the 
circumstances surrounding his dismissal were a matter of public interest, as evidenced by 
the newspaper articles published concerning his dismissal").2 
In Dracos, a case very similar to the instant one, a television reporter sued a 
newspaper for defamation arising out of a column regarding the reasons for his 
termination from his station. 922 S.W.2d 242. The court found that Plaintiff was a 
public figure, stating: "[W]e note that journalists and television reporters like Dracos, as 
well as other individuals who regularly comment on public affairs, have often been 
considered public figures." IcL at 252. The court continued, "Like other journalists, 
reporters, and media personalities, [Plaintiff] has vigorously sought and achieved 
publicity for his journalistic efforts" Id, at 253 (emphasis added). 
2
 See also Stolz v. KSFM 102 FM, 30 Cal. App. 4th 195, Cal. Rptr.2d 740, 745-46 (1994) 
(general manager and owner of radio station found to be general purpose public figure 
based, in part, on his "voluntary exposure to public scrutiny"). 
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In the instant case, and as demonstrated in the following section, the situation is no 
different for Plaintiff. 
C. As a Well Recognized Health Reporter for KTVX News Who Reported 
Daily on Health Issues of Vital Importance to the Public and Who Covered 
the Activities of Major Health Care Providers and Insurers Throughout the 
State, Plaintiff Attained Public Figure Status. 
Plaintiff's extensive local and national news broadcasts on matters of public 
importance, her public appearances in support of charities and local causes, and her own 
admitted celebrity status evidence her status as a public figure for all purposes, or at least 
for purposes related to her termination as a reporter. Tellingly, Plaintiff never disputed at 
the summary judgment stage any of the material facts establishing her "prominence," her 
"influence" or the fact she "invited public attention" in the Salt Lake community.3 Nor, 
on appeal, is she able to marshal any evidence negating her public figure status. 
Some of the many undisputed facts demonstrating her public figure status include 
the following: 
Plaintiff was the KTVX Channel 4 Health Reporter for three years (R. 286 at f 4) 
and was featured in daily health reports as well as several half-hour segments regarding 
health matters and public safety issues. (R. 246 at f 18; 286 at f 5-7.) During this time, 
she broadcast more than a thousand news stories and other TV specials. (R. 287 at f 11-
12.) Ms. Wayment often reported live from highly promoted special events such as the 
Utah AIDS Foundation Annual Oscar Night Gala benefit. (R. 287 at f 14.) Some of her 
stories were picked up by the ABC Network and broadcast nationally or by other ABC 
3
 In Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment, her Statement of 
Material Facts admits paragraphs 18-29 of Defendants' Statement of Facts by not 
disputing them. (R. 308-317.) These undisputed paragraphs (18-29) all relate to 
Plaintiffs status as a public figure. (R. 246-248.) 
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affiliates around the country. (R. 287 at f 15.) Her stories were seen by over a hundred 
thousand viewers each evening. (R. 288 at f 17.) Ms. Wayment reported on the 
activities of Utah's major health care providers, such as the Huntsman Cancer Institute, 
various hospitals, etc. (R. 268 at f 8.) These facts, alone, demonstrate that Ms. Wayment 
was "prominent" throughout the state, occupied a "position of influence" in our 
community and "invited public attention and comment." 
Additionally, Ms. Wayment herself, acknowledged that she was a "local 
celebrity." (R. 278—last paragraph.) In fact, she voluntarily utilized her celebrity status 
by lending her name to many high-profile charities and events. (R. 247 at f 21; R. 248 at 
f 26; R. 312.) For example, she acted as the celebrity Master of Ceremonies for the Utah 
Diabetes Center Annual Gala in March of 2002. (R. 248, 312, 413.) She was the March 
of Dimes WalkAmerica Spokesperson in the spring of 2001 and she was a celebrity 
runner in the Race for the Cure Fun Runs in 2000 and 2001. (R. 248, 312, 412.) She was 
a member of the Board of Directors of the Candlelighters for Childhood Cancer, a Utah 
non-profit organization. (R. at 248, 312, 406.) Further indicative of Plaintiff's public 
figure status is the fact that the filing of her lawsuit generated stories in the Utah media. 
(R. 248, 293.) As such, the record is clear that the district court made the correct 
determination that Plaintiff was a public figure. 
D. Contrary to Plaintiff's Arguments, the Defendants' Media or Non-Media 
Status and the Medium Through Which the Challenged Statements Were 
Made Does Not Negate Her Status As a Public Figure And She Had 
Sufficient Access to the Media As a Public Figure. 
Rather than dispute the fact of her prominence, influence or notoriety, Plaintiff 
seeks to strip herself of her public figure status by asking the Court to adopt a novel and 
never-before-recognized approach. Plaintiff argues misguidedly that she is not a public 
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figure because: (1) no media of any sort was involved in publishing the allegedly 
defamatory remarks about her so there are no "freedom of the press" issues (Br. of 
Appellant at 11-12); (2) the controversy between the parties was a "private employer-
employee" issue (Br. of Appellant at 11, 13-14); and (3) she lacked access to the media 
and did not intentionally invite attention or comment (Br. of Appellant at 15). 
1. The Relevant Inquiry for Determining A Public Figure Is Not Based 
on the Status of Defendants or the Medium Through Which the 
Alleged Defamation Is Published. 
Plaintiff's principal rationale for challenging her public figure status is premised 
on two inconsequential factors. First, Plaintiff contends that Defendants were not true 
"media defendants" since her case involves a private employment dispute. Second, 
Plaintiff argues that the alleged defamatory statements were not published through the 
channels of media news. (Br. of Appellant at 12.) As such, Plaintiff posits that all of the 
cases relied upon by Defendants, in which media personalities were found to be public 
figures, are inapplicable because such cases involved actual media defendants and the 
challenged statements in those cases were published through the media. (Id.) In other 
words, Plaintiff does nothing to distinguish these cases or challenge the underlying legal 
principles. Rather, she argues that since they involved media defendants and defamatory 
statements published through a media outlet they are irrelevant. 
Plaintiff patently misunderstands the relevant inquiry for analyzing public figure 
status. In direct contradiction to Plaintiff's position, it is always the status of the 
Plaintiff, and never the status of the defendants or the medium, that determines if the 
Plaintiff is a public figure. See e.g., Van Dyke v. KUTV, 663 P.2d 52, 54-55 (Utah 
1983) (analyzing public official status of Plaintiff without any consideration of 
defendants' status or the nature of the medium); Cox, 761 P.2d at 556, 559-61 (same). 
586546 1 19 
Beyond that, Plaintiff has failed to cite a single case, within Utah or any other 
state, that predicates public figure status on whether or not the speaker of the alleged 
defamatory statement was acting as a media entity. Likewise, Plaintiff has provided no 
cases which adopt her novel argument that public figure status turns on whether the 
media was the medium for publication. The whole notion that Plaintiff can somehow 
avoid being a public figure merely because the alleged defamation was not published in 
print or on-air is nonsensical. Accepting Plaintiff's argument would lead to the illogical 
and undesirable result of increasing protection to libelous statements which are widely 
distributed through a paper, on radio or television. By taking this position, Plaintiff is 
effectively arguing that the challenged statements about her would be granted more 
protection had Mssrs. Fischer and Benedict broadcast a story about the reasons for her 
termination rather than allegedly make the statements within the KTVX newsroom. 
A final reason Plaintiff's argument must fail is the well-established doctrine that 
application of public figure status is not limited to cases where the defendants are media 
entities. Dun & Bradstreet Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 784,105 S. Ct. 
2939, 2958, 86 L. Ed. 2d 593 (1985); Cox, 761 P.2d at 560. In fact, one state supreme 
court overruled a trial court's decision to treat a non-media defendant differently from a 
media defendant on issues related to public figures. Anderson v. Low Rent Hous. 
Comm'n of Muscatine, 304 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 1981).4 As such, it is irrelevant whether 
or not the speakers of the alleged defamatory statements are considered "media 
defendants" or the alleged defamation took place in the context of an employment 
4
 See also Anderson v. Low Rent Housing Commission of Muscatine,304 N.W.2d 239 
(Iowa 1981) (citing Iowa law and several cases from other states recognizing there is no 
distinction between media and non-media defendants). In Anderson, the court overruled 
the lower court's distinction between media and non-media defendants. 
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dispute. Plaintiff's status, not the status of the defendant, is the controlling 
determination. 
2. Plaintiff Had Access to the Media And Sought Attention Through 
Her Job As a Television Journalist. 
Another reason Plaintiff contends that she should not be considered a public figure 
is that she lacked sufficient access to the media and never thrust herself into the forefront 
of the public eye. (Br. of Appellant at 15.) As addressed previously, Plaintiffs fame and 
prominence as a television reporter were clearly voluntary. Thus, to say that she did not 
welcome her notoriety is disingenuous. Moreover, the record contradicts Plaintiff's 
assertion that she did not have sufficient access to the media to counteract the challenged 
statements. For example, a local newspaper published an article regarding the filing of 
her lawsuit. 
In that article, Plaintiff had a chance to express her perspective on the alleged 
statements had she chosen to do so. Under similar circumstances, the Dracos court noted, 
"As a successful and well-known journalist, [Plaintiff] enjoyed access to the media—and 
the self remedy of rebuttal—which is not available to the ordinary citizen." 922 S.W.2d 
at 253. In this case, that Plaintiff chose not to seek rebuttal more actively in a public 
forum does not diminish the access she had to the media even after her termination. 
In summary, once a person such as Ms. Wayment becomes a public figure, they 
cannot escape, for their own convenience, the highly visible status they sought out to 
begin with. This is true regardless of whether Defendants acted as "media defendants" or 
whether the allegedly defamatory statements were made through the media. 
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E. Plaintiff Was Not a Limited Purpose Public Figure, But Even If She Were, 
The Public's Interest in Reporter Bias, Conflicts of Interest or Misconduct 
Requires Plaintiff to Show Actual Malice on the Part of Defendants to 
Avoid Dismissal of Her Defamation Claim. 
Plaintiff, alternatively, argues that a public controversy is required to establish 
public figure status and there was no public controversy at issue in this case. As set forth 
below, a public controversy analysis is only applicable where an otherwise private 
individual gains notoriety regarding a limited issue of public interest. Seegmiller, 626 
P.2d at 972. That person then becomes a "limited-use" or "limited-purpose" public 
figure. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352. Plaintiffs two-page analysis of this subject is 
unnecessary because the undisputed facts already demonstrate that Ms. Wayment was a 
general purpose public figure. However, even if Plaintiff were not a general purpose 
public figure, she would still qualify as a "limited purpose" public figure. 
1. Plaintiff Also Qualifies As a Limited-Purpose Public Figure. 
Even using the criteria outlined in the Brief of Appellant for determining a 
limited-purpose public figure (Br. of Appellant at 13-14), Plaintiff satisfies each relevant 
requirement to be considered as such. See Waldbaum, 627, F.2d 1287, 1296-1298 
(Plaintiff is a limited-purpose public figure if he voluntarily thrusts himself into a public 
controversy, or involuntarily finds himself in public controversy but does not reject his 
role, and the alleged defamation relates to his role in the public concern). To begin with, 
the alleged defamation relates precisely to what Plaintiff is publicly famous for (her 
reporting). Next, there were two specific public controversies or concerns in which 
Plaintiff became involved; namely, the caring for terminally ill children with cancer and 
reporter bias or conflict of interest. 
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a. Because Plaintiff Voluntarily Thrust Herself to the Forefront 
of the Public Concern over Assisting Children with Cancer, 
She Qualifies as a Limited-Use Public Figure. 
Plaintiff is a limited-use public figure because of the public interest in assisting 
children who were terminally-ill with cancer. To Plaintiff's credit, much of the local 
public interest and concern was generated by her own stories and reports over a three 
year period detailing the plight of these children and their families. With regard to 
helping them, Plaintiff clearly "thrust herself to the forefront" of the issue by: (a) airing 
numerous stories about these children, including her own efforts to support one young 
cancer victim, (b) by joining the Board of Candlelighters for Childhood Cancer, and (c) 
by trying to establish her own foundation for assisting these children. Given her position 
as a high-profile health reporter at a major television network, she achieved "special 
prominence" in this public concern. Finally, the alleged defamation is directly related to 
Plaintiff's proposed foundation and the issue of caring for children with cancer. 
b. Because Plaintiff Voluntarily Injected Herself into Activities 
Constituting a Conflict of Interest, the Public Concern over 
Reporter Ethics Qualifies Her as a Limited-Use Public Figure. 
Plaintiff is also a limited-purpose public figure because of the great public interest 
in news reporter conduct. One need not look too far back in time to realize the firestorm 
of local and national concern over the media's ability to report fairly and without bias. 
For example, Utah's local media came under much public scrutiny after the terminations 
of Salt Lake Tribune reporters Michael Vigh and Kevin Cantera for selling false 
information to a tabloid regarding the Elizabeth Smart ordeal. Likewise, on a national 
level, the public interest in media bias and reporter ethics has been extremely high after 
the resignation of New York Times editors over the plagiarism scandal surrounding their 
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reporter, Jason Blair, and after New Republic reporter Stephen Glass revealed he 
fabricated entire news stories. 
Based on Plaintiff's own written explanation to Jon Fischer of her actions which 
led to her termination (See R. 278), it is undisputed that KTVX had the right to fire 
Plaintiff for a conflict of interest. Indeed, Ms. Wayment could have been terminated for 
any reason, with or without cause, as she was an employee at will. (R. 268 at f 7.) By 
voluntarily engaging in the acts which led to her termination (and which are undisputed), 
it was at least foreseeable that she or the station would come under public scrutiny or 
criticism. Indeed, public attention was drawn to the issue of media ethics by the filing of 
her lawsuit, which was subsequently covered in local newspapers and detailed the 
reasons for her termination. Finally, the alleged defamation is directly related to the 
perception of Plaintiff's ability to report fairly and the public's concern over media ethics 
and misconduct. 
2. Plaintiff Is Not a Private Figure Like the Plaintiffs in the Firestone 
and Seegmiller Cases. 
Plaintiff is not a true "private figure" who enjoyed anonymity and who no one 
would listen to in the press if she wished to challenge what was supposedly being said 
about her. In her Opening Brief Plaintiff likens her case to that of the Plaintiff in Time, 
Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 457, 96 S. Ct. 958, 966, 47 L. Ed. 2d 154 (1976), whom 
the court found to be a private figure (Br. of Appellant at 16.) However, the Firestone 
Plaintiff was an otherwise private person who was drawn involuntarily into the public eye 
due to her well-publicized divorced proceeding. Id. at 96 S. Ct. 967. The same 
absolutely cannot be said about Plaintiff in this case. Unlike the Firestone Plaintiff, Holly 
Wayment for years sought out the limelight and the attendant benefits of being a 'local 
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celebrity" and public figure. She cannot now turn back the hands of time and arbitrarily 
label herself a private figure for the purposes of this litigation after she has enjoyed the 
fruits of her popularity for many years. 
Similarly, Ms. Wayment is not at all like the Plaintiff in Seegmiller who was 
found to be a private figure. In Seegmiller, the Plaintiff was a resident of a small-town 
who, without seeking any attention, became the subject of a television reporter's 
investigative piece. 626 P.2d at 970-71. In that report, Plaintiff was blamed for 
mistreating certain horses he was raising. IcL The unflattering report caused his other 
businesses in the small town to suffer. Id. at 971. In finding Plaintiff a private figure, 
this Court noted that he did not occupy a position of persuasive power or influence and 
"was plucked from the anonymity of private life and thrust against his will into the 
limelight." IcL at 972. 
In contrast, Ms. Wayment occupied a position of great persuasive power and 
influence in the community as a well known television journalist and was not thrust 
against her will into the public eye. Indeed, it was Plaintiffs own conduct (soliciting 
financial support for her private foundation from an organization she regularly reported 
on as part of her newsbeat) which resulted in her termination and her own decisions 
(filing a lawsuit with detailed allegations without sealing portions of the complaint) that 
brought the specific alleged defamatory statements to the public's attention. Thus, 
neither the Firestone nor the Seegmiller cases, relied upon by Ms. Wayment are 
applicable to the instant case. 
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II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS APPROPRIATE BECAUSE PLAINTIFF 
FAILED TO OFFER ANY EVIDENCE, MUCH LESS THE REQUISITE 
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, OF ACTUAL MALICE TO 
OVERCOME THE PROTECTIONS ATTACHED TO SPEECH 
PERTAINING TO PUBLIC FIGURES. 
Plaintiff has failed to offer any evidence, much less the requisite clear and 
convincing evidence, of actual malice to overcome the constitutional privilege protecting 
speech related to public figures.5 Where a defamation Plaintiff is either a "public 
official" or a "public figure" the Plaintiff must show that the defendant published the 
false statement with a state of mind known as "actual malice." Russell v. Thomson 
Newspapers, Inc. 842 P.2d 896 (Utah 1992); Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 559 (Utah 
1988). Both at summary judgment and in her appeal, Plaintiff misconstrues the type of 
malice required to overcome the protections related to speech regarding public figures as 
well as her burden of proving such malice with clear and convincing evidence.6 
A. Actual Malice Defined. 
Actual malice is not to be confused with common law malice or malicious or evil 
intent. Masson v. The New Yorker Magazine, 501 U.S. 496, (1991).7 Actual malice 
focuses on the state of mind of the defendant and whether the defendant had a subjective 
awareness the defamatory statements were false. Bose Corp. v. Consumer Union of U.S., 
5
 Limited-use public figures must also establish actual malice. Waldbaum, 627 F.2d 
1287, 1298 (Plaintiff is limited use public figure and cannot establish actual malice; thus, 
summary judgment was appropriate). 
6
 The malice Plaintiff tries to establish is actually for her exemplary damages claim. (R. 
321.) 
7
 Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556 (Utah 1988). As the United States Supreme Court has 
noted, "the phrase 'actual malice' is unfortunately confusing in that it has nothing to do 
with bad motive or ill will." Harte-Hanks v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 105 L. Ed. 2d 
562, 576 fn. 7. "We have used the term actual malice as a shorthand to describe the First 
Amendment protections for speech injurious to reputation." Masson, 501 U.S. 496 
(1991). Some courts and commentators have referred to the heightened standard as 
"constitutional malice." See, e.g. Cox, 761 P.2d at 560. 
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Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968). In the seminal 
case of New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the Supreme Court defined 
actual malice as the publication of a statement "with knowledge of its falsity or with 
reckless disregard of its truth or falsity."8 Thus, actual malice has two prongs: (a) 
knowledge that a statement is false; or (b) reckless disregard for whether a statement is 
false or not. 
The actual malice standard is a subjective, not objective, standard and requires an 
inquiry into the speaker's state of mind at the time of publication. As noted by the Tenth 
Circuit in Hardin v. Santa Fe Reporter, Inc., 745 F.2d 1323, 1325 (1984), the standard is 
"difficult" to satisfy. Only where the defendant "actually knew" the statement was false 
or "subjectively entertained serious doubts" as to its truth or "purposefully avoided" the 
truth, can the actual malice standard be met. Id at 1326. This constitutional hurdle is 
made even more difficult to overcome by virtue of the high burden of proof a Plaintiff is 
required to meet in establishing actual malice. Appellate Courts conduct independent 
appellate review to determine whether sufficient evidence of actual malice exists. Bose. 
B. Clear And Convincing Evidence of Actual Malice Is Required. 
In a series of decisions following New York Times v. Sullivan, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has held that the importance of a free press requires that proof of actual malice be 
made by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., Bose, 466 U.S. 485 (1987); Masson, 
501 U.S. 446, supra. This high burden of proof is necessary because "our profound 
national commitment to the free exchange of ideas, as enshrined in the First Amendment, 
demands that the law of libel carve out an area of breathing space." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 
8
 The Utah Supreme Court adopted the New York Times definition of actual malice in 
Seegmiller, 626 P.2d 968; See also Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d at 559 (same). 
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342 (quoting NAACP v. Bulton, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)). This requirement of "clear 
and convincing evidence" extends to state courts as well.9 Utah has not yet expressly 
adopted the "clear and convincing standard." As such, Defendants respectfully request 
this Court to do so consistent with the decisions of the United States Supreme Court and 
other states. 
C. Summary Judgment Is Appropriate in the Absence of Clear and Convincing 
Evidence. 
In 1986, the United States Supreme Court, in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 
U.S. 242, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986), settled a long-standing dispute over 
the proper role summary judgment should play in libel cases. The Court held that a 
Plaintiff in a public figure case could not defeat a defendant's motion for summary 
judgment without affirmatively producing clear and convincing evidence of actual 
malice. The Court held that: 
Thus, where the factual dispute concerns actual malice, 
clearly a material issue in a New York Times [public figure] 
case, the appropriate summary judgment question will be 
whether the evidence in the record could support a reasonable 
jury finding—either that the Plaintiff has shown actual malice 
by clear and convincing evidence or that the Plaintiff has not. 
Id. at 2514. 
Actual malice is thus a question of law in the first instance, Hernandez v. New 
York, 500 U.S. 352, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395 (1991). On appeal, courts will 
independently review the record to determine whether clear and convincing evidence of 
9
 See e.g., Anderson v. Low Rent Hous. Comm'n of Muscatine, 304 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 
1981) (citing many other states' adoption of the clear and convincing standard). The 
Anderson court further noted: "In New York Times the Court held that the provisions of 
the first amendment apply to the states through the due process clause of the fourth 
amendment, and, consequently, state laws must require clear and convincing evidence 
of actual malice" when a public figure is involved. Id (citing New York Times, 376 U.S. 
254 at 276-77, 283-86, 84 S. Ct. at 724, 727-29, 11 L. Ed. 2d at 704, 708-10). 
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actual malice existed. Bose, 466 U.S. at 508; see also Piper v. Mize, 2003 WL 
21338696, *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (stating '[I]t is incumbent on this Court, in 
reviewing this grant of summary judgment as to the issue of actual malice, to determine, 
not whether there is material evidence in the record supporting Plaintiffs, but whether or 
not the record discloses clear and convincing evidence upon which a trier of fact could 
find actual malice"). 
This independent search for clear and convincing evidence assures that First 
Amendment rights are protected. Bose, 466 U.S. at 508 ("We must make an independent 
examination of the whole record, so as to assure ourselves that the judgment does not 
constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.") (internal citations 
omitted).10 Given this heightened evidentiary standard, appellate courts routinely affirm 
summary judgment dismissing public figure defamation claims for failure to 
affirmatively produce evidence of actual malice by clear and convincing evidence.11 In 
fact, this Court has recognized that even in non actual malice cases, there exists " . . . a 
First Amendment interest in disposing of libel cases on motion and at an early stage when 
it appears that a reasonable jury could not find for the Plaintiffs." Cox, 761 P.2d at 561. 
10
 Eastwood v. National Enquirer, 123 F.3d 1249, 1252 (9m Cir. 1997) ('The purpose of 
[this Court's] review is to satisfy ourselves that plaintiff proved malice by clear and 
convincing evidence, which we have described as a heavy burden, far in excess of the 
preponderance sufficient for most civil litigation") (internal citations omitted). 
11
 See, e ^ , Peterson v. New York Times Co., 106 F.Supp.2d 1227 (D. Utah 2000) 
(applying Utah law); Revell v. Hoffman, 309 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2002); Cobb v. Time, 
Inc., 278 F.3d 629 (6tn Cir. 2002); Worrell-Payne v. Gannett, 49 Fed. App. 105 (9m Cir. 
2002); Carafamo v. Metrosplash, 207 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (CD. Cal. 2002); McFarland v. 
Sheridan Square Press, Inc., 91 F.3d 1501 (D.C.Cir. 1996); El Deeb v. Univ. of Minn., 60 
F.3d 423 (9th Cir. 1995); Underwager v. Salter, 22 F.3d 730 (7th Cir.), Cert, denied, 513 
U.S. 943 (1994); Meisler v. Gannet Comp., 12 F.3d 1026 (11th Cir.), cert, denied, 512 
U.S. 1222 (1994). 
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D. Plaintiff Has Not and Cannot Establish Actual Malice By Clear And 
Convincing Evidence Based on Fischer's Inaction Nor Circumstantial 
Evidence (Based on Double And Triple Hearsay). 
The trial court properly rejected Plaintiff's argument that she could establish 
actual malice by clear and convincing evidence based on Fischer's inaction or on 
circumstantial evidence that consists of double and triple hearsay. Plaintiff argued in the 
court below that Fischer's refusal to quell the newsroom rumors about her and the 
testimony of witnesses who allegedly heard Fischer's secretary make some of the 
challenged statements, were sufficient proof for establishing actual malice. (See R. 322.) 
Plaintiff's reliance on these facts is misplaced. Fischer's silence does not establish 
a subjective awareness in his mind that the statements he is accused of making were false 
and Plaintiff offers no case authority where silence has been so applied. Indeed, Fischer 
testified that he did not respond to any rumors or speculation about why Plaintiff had 
been terminated because (i) it was station policy not to discuss personnel matters (R. 271 
at 122.) and (ii) Plaintiff had requested Fischer not divulge the reasons for her 
termination (R. 271 at 121.) Neither does the purported fact that Fischer's secretary 
made some of the challenged statements establish any improper state of mind as to 
Fischer. This is underscored by Plaintiff's failure to cite a single case that allows such 
marginal, circumstantial evidence to defeat summary judgment on the actual malice 
issue. Plaintiff's evidence is insufficient to raise a material dispute at any level of proof, 
much less at the heightened clear and convincing evidentiary standard applied to 
determining actual malice. 
In sum, Plaintiff is a public figure who failed to meet the heightened constitutional 
and evidentiary burden of showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that defendants 
made the allegedly defamatory statements with "actual malice." Plaintiff's failure to 
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meet her burden of proof is a sufficient and independent basis for this Court to affirm the 
decision of the District Court. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT 
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PRODUCE ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE THAT 
LINKED DEFENDANT JON FISCHER TO ANY OF THE STATEMENTS 
ALLEGED IN PLAINTIFF'S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT. 
The District Court correctly determined that Plaintiff failed to produce admissible 
evidence that Defendant Jon Fischer made any of the statements alleged in Plaintiff's 
Second Amended Complaint. 
A. Plaintiff Must Establish Defamation with Facts That Would Be Admissible 
in Evidence. 
Under well-established Utah law, a witnesses' testimony offered in opposition to 
summary judgment must set forth facts that be would be admissible in evidence. Norton 
v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983) (finding Plaintiffs affidavit insufficient for 
opposing summary judgment where it lacked specificity required to be admissible). To 
be admissible, this evidence must be based on the personal knowledge of the witness. In 
Re: Gen. Determination of Rights to Use of All Water, 982 P.2d 65, 72 (Utah 1999) 
(affirming exclusion of affidavit testimony in opposition to summary judgment where 
many facts asserted in affidavit were not based on personal knowledge and contained 
hearsay).12 
B. Double Hearsay Statements Are Not Admissible to Establish Defamation 
on the Part of Defendants. 
Double or multiple hearsay cannot support a defamation claim. A witness' 
testimony that merely re-states what another individual has said is inadmissible hearsay 
12
 See also GNS P'ship v. Fullmer, 873 P.2d 1157, 1164-65 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
(affidavits not based on personal knowledge were properly stricken). 
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that cannot be relied upon in opposition to summary judgment. Western States Thrift & 
Loan Co. v. Bloomquist, 504 P.2d 1019, 1020-21 (Utah 1972) (affirming summary 
judgment where non-moving party based his opposition on his own affidavit; affidavit 
excluded because it contained hearsay testimony merely recounting what another witness 
told affiant).13 
Utah courts have not specifically addressed this evidentiary issue in the context of 
a defamation claim. However, it is well accepted in other jurisdictions that a Plaintiff 
opposing summary judgment on a defamation claim cannot rely on testimony that merely 
recounts what another person allegedly heard regarding a challenged statement. See, 
Starr, 54 F.3d at 1555 (finding summary judgment appropriate on defamation claim 
where the only evidence was deposition testimony of witness recounting what a third 
person allegedly heard from defendant; testimony amounted to inadmissible hearsay); 
Molenda v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 60 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1303 (S.D. Flor. 1999) (citing 
5th and 11th Circuit authority and granting summary judgment on former employee's 
defamation claim because he offered no more than his "double-hearsay" testimony of 
13
 Accord Starr v. Pearle Vision, Inc., 54 F.3d 1548, 1555 (10m Cir. 1995) (adopting 
"unanimous weight of authority" from other jurisdictions that a court may not consider 
hearsay evidence in depositions submitted to defeat summary judgment; citing U.S. 
Supreme Court, 5th Circuit, 9th Circuit, and 7th Circuit law as well as legal commentators). 
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what others had allegedly witnessed); Dull v. St, Lukes Hospital of Duluth, 21 F. Supp. 
2d 1022, 1028 (D. Minn. 1998) (citing 8th Circuit precedent and holding that former 
employee's defamation action could not survive summary judgment when she offered 
merely her own testimony that another witness overheard allegedly defamatory 
statements; her testimony constituted inadmissible "double hearsay").14 
14 See also Hauteur v. Cowles Publ'g Co., 811 P.2d 231, 239 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991) 
(granting summary judgment on libel claim because "inadmissible hearsay evidence 
cannot be considered in ruling on a motion for summary judgment"); Franzon v. Massena 
Mem'l Hosp., 89 F. Supp. 2d 270, 276-77 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (granting summary judgment 
and finding affidavit of plaintiff's wife inadmissible hearsay when it only related another 
woman's testimony of what she overheard); Marshall v. Planz, 13 F. Supp. 2d. 1246, 
1255-56 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (holding that defamation plaintiff cannot survive summary 
judgment by relying upon his own deposition testimony that others informed him of what 
defendant said; such testimony constitutes inadmissible hearsay); Bush v. Barnett Bank 
of Pinellas County, 916 F. Supp. 1244, 1256 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (granting summary 
judgment in defamation action where only evidence proffered was affidavit of a manager 
that she was told by another manager that an announcement was made accusing plaintiff 
of theft; affidavit constituted inadmissible hearsay); Baker v. McDonald's Corp., 686 F. 
Supp. 1474, 1485 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (granting summary judgment on defamation claim 
because plaintiff's deposition testimony was inadmissible hearsay when it consisted of 
what his brother-in-law heard from defendant); Barber v. Daly, 185 A.D.2d. 567, 570 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (finding summary judgment warranted where plaintiff's assertion 
that other witnesses personally told him of slanderous statements made by defendant is 
mere hearsay and insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact); Land v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 
250 S.E.2d 188, 189 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978) (summary judgment on defamation claim 
affirmed where plaintiff relied solely on her own deposition testimony that she was told 
by a third person that defendant had made defamatory statement; statement constituted 
inadmissible hearsay); Humiston v. ATOTECH USA, Inc., 1995 WL 708660, 4 (D. 
Mass. 1995) (granting summary judgment on defamation claim because plaintiff's only 
evidence was his deposition testimony that another person told him that a third person 
had heard challenged statement by defendant; statement is double hearsay and fails to 
show existence of genuine issue of material fact); Martinez v. U-Haul Co. of Illinois, 
2001 WL 648637, 17 (N.D. 111. 2001) (finding plaintiff's defamation claim cannot 
survive summary judgment when her only evidence that defamatory statements were 
made constituted inadmissible double hearsay); Interstate Commercial Bldg. Serv. v. 
Bank of America Nat'l Trust and Sav. Assoc, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1176 (D. Nev. 1998) 
(granting summary judgment on defamation claim where plaintiff relied on testimony 
that defendants' representatives made allegedly defamatory statements to others who in 
turn repeated them to vendors that finally reiterated such words to plaintiff; such 
testimony is inadmissible "double hearsay"); Albert v. Loksen, 239 F.3d 256, 267 (2nd 
Cir. 2001) ("When challenged on a motion for summary judgment a plaintiff may not 
rely solely on hearsay or conclusory allegations that slanderous comments were made"); 
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In defamation cases, this type of inadmissible hearsay testimony, sometimes 
referred to as "double or multiple hearsay," is inherently unreliable in contrast to the 
testimony of a first-hand witness who directly hears publication of an allegedly 
defamatory statement. See Martinez v. U-Haul Co. of Illinois, 2001 WL 648637, 17 
(N.D. 111. 2001) (recognizing potential admissibility of witness' own first-hand testimony 
if such evidence had been presented; but defamation claim could not survive summary 
judgment because only evidence presented was "double hearsay"); Molenda, 60 F. Supp. 
2d at 1303 (same). 
In the Molenda case, which is strikingly similar to the case at bar, the court 
granted summary judgment on a defamation claim brought by a former sales employee. 
The court held: 
In this case, Plaintiff has failed to present any evidence, other 
than his own deposition testimony, that the alleged 
defamatory statements were in fact made. As to all of the 
alleged statements, however. Plaintiff concedes that he has 
no personal knowledge as to the statements—he only 
learned of the comments from others. Clearly, Plaintiff's 
testimony constitutes double-hearsay and, as such, cannot be 
used to defeat summary judgment." 
Snyder v. Sony Music Entm't, Inc., 252 A.D.2d 294, 299 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (finding 
summary required where plaintiff relied on inadmissible hearsay testimony that 
slanderous comments were made); Schwartz v. Soc'y of New York Hosp., 232 A.D.2d. 
212, 213 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (defamation claim dismissed summarily; evidence 
constitutes inadmissible hearsay); Davis v. Household Int'l, 1991 WL 110042, *2 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 1991) (affirming summary judgment where witnesses' statements relied upon by 
plaintiff were no more than inadmissible double hearsay that related what another 
individual allegedly heard from defendant); McMillian v. Johnson, 88 F.3d 1573, 1583-
85 (11th Cir. 1996), ajfd 520 U.S. 781, 117 S. Ct. 1734, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1997) 
(deposition testimony constituting double hearsay cannot defeat summary judgment); 
Courtney v. Canyon Television & Appliance Rental Inc., 899 F.2d 845, 851 (9th Cir. 
1995) (affirming summary judgment against defamation claim where only evidence that 
defamatory statements were made was inadmissible hearsay). 
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Id. at 1303 (emphasis added). Similarly, as one court explained, a description of another 
person's testimony "is not suitable grist for the summary judgment mill." Gross v. 
Burgraff Const. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1546 (10th Cir. 1995) (internal cites omitted). 
C. It Is Undisputed That Plaintiff Failed to Produce A Single Witness That 
Heard Jon Fischer Make Any of the Challenged Statements. 
In the instant case, Plaintiff has failed to produce any admissible evidence that 
Defendant Fischer uttered any of the three claimed defamatory statements. These alleged 
statements were that Plaintiff was terminated because: (a) "She was taking money from 
the Huntsman Cancer Institute;" (b) "Was in bed with the Institute"; and (c)"Had used 
her reporting contacts to try to set up a foundation for her benefit." (R. 228 at f 48.) 
Plaintiff, herself, admits she never heard any defamatory statements made by Mr. 
Fischer. (See Sup. R. 557 line 7 through 559 line 5.)15 Moreover, of the seventeen 
witnesses Plaintiff deposed in this case, not a single one personally heard any defamatory 
statements uttered by Mr. Fischer. (R. 245.) Plaintiff argues on page 23-24 in her 
Opening Brief that several statements from various individuals (including Ms. Degering, 
Ms. McKane, Ms. Miller and Mr. Hertzke) are proof of Fischer's culpability. (Br. of 
Appellant at 23-24.) However, these statements are all merely re-statements of "rumors" 
overheard by these witnesses who, during their depositions, could not remember or 
identify either the persons from whom they heard the rumor or to whom the source(s) of 
the rumor was attributed. (See e.g., Degering Depo.; Sup. R. 551 lines 7-9.) More 
15
 Plaintiffs own testimony provides no support for her claim. In her deposition, she 
initially identifies seven individuals who reported to her hearing defamatory statements 
from "the Defendants." (Sup. R. 559 at lines 21-25.) On its face, such testimony 
constitutes inadmissible "double hearsay." Moreover, after an examination regarding 
each of the seven individuals, Plaintiff admits that none of them actually heard Mr. 
Fischer make a single defamatory comment. (As evidenced by her crossing out the 
initials "JF" next to each purported witness; see Sup. R. 560 lines 1-9 and Sup. R. 562.) 
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importantly, every one of these witnesses testified definitively in their depositions that 
they never heard Jon Fisher make any of the allegedly defamatory remarks.16 In the 
absence of any direct evidence linking Fischer to the challenged statements, Plaintiff 
attempts to meet her burden based on three impermissible sources. 
1. Plaintiff Relies on Improperly Vague Testimony. 
Plaintiff first attempts to rely on improperly vague testimony. In her opening 
brief, she cites statements from KTVX employee Jeremy Castellano17 who states, "They 
made up the story about how she was receiving money and how she was unethical when 
it wasn't true," and "A lot of management pushed the story she was taking money from 
Huntsman. . . Like Pat Benedict." (Br. of Appellant at 18 )18 Likewise, at summary 
judgment, Plaintiff cited former employee Christina Flores-McKane as saying, 
"Everybody was talking about it." (R. 318.) 
Even assuming these statements were intended to refer to Fischer, they are 
insufficient on their face to establish that he published them. Testimony attributing 
challenged statements to unspecified persons or groups is inadmissible. See e.g., Glenn 
v. Scott Paper Co., 1993 WL 431161, 10 (D.N.J. 1993) ("where declarants are identified 
as 'they' and 'several people' the Court is simply not satisfied that the trustworthiness 
16
 See (Hunsaker Depo. at Sup. R. 546 line 6 through 547 line 11); (Degering Depo. at 
Sup. R. 552 line 3 through 553 line 4); (Flores-McKane Depo. at Sup. R. 543 lines 14-
25); (Rodriguez Depo. at Sup. R. 540 lines 16-23); (Miller Depo. at Sup. R. 537 lines 3-
10); (Castellano Depo. at Sup. R. 534 lines 1-7); (Smith Depo. at Sup. R. 531 lines 3-7). 
17
 Mr. Castellano, aside from being a close friend of Plaintiff, is a disgruntled employee 
who quit employment at KTVX, a Clear Channel television station, on his own and due 
to unsatisfactory working conditions. This occurred sometime after Plaintiff's 
termination. 
18
 Plaintiff tries to improperly bootstrap the testimony of Clear Channel Executive Steve 
Minium who, in a totally different context, defined management as including Fischer and 
Benedict. (Br. of Appellant at 22, 23.) 
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requirements are being met); see also Etzel v. The Musicland Group, 1993 WL 23741, 10 
(D. Kan. 1993) (summarily dismissing defamation claims because allegations do not 
"state with specificity which agents made what statements to whom"). 
2. Plaintiff Relies on Improper Double Hearsay Testimony. 
Plaintiff also tries to establish publication by Fischer through inadmissible double 
hearsay testimony. For instance, Plaintiff offers the testimony of KTVX employee Adam 
Rodriguez who testified that Jon Fischer's secretary, Melissa Holt, purportedly told him 
that Fischer allegedly communicated one of the defamatory remarks to her. As set forth 
above, this statement by Mr. Rodriguez violates fundamental hearsay rules because his 
testimony is being offered for the truth of the matter asserted (specifically, that Ms. Holt 
heard Jon Fischer make the purported statement). 
Plaintiff tries to justify Rodriguez's testimony by embarking on a lengthy 
summary of hearsay law. (Br. of Appellants at 18, 19, 23-25.) While Plaintiff fairly 
accurately sets forth general hearsay principles, she misconstrues their application to this 
case. Ultimately, her recitation of hearsay cases and authorities is to no avail. All the 
supporting authorities she cites recognize simply that testimony is admissible where a 
person witnesses, by first hand knowledge, an allegedly defamatory utterance even if that 
testimony is hearsay. (See, Id.) In other words, had Adam Rodriguez overheard Jon 
Fischer, first hand, make a defamatory comment, Mr. Rodriguez's testimony of that fact 
could be admissible (in contrast to his double hearsay testimony of what Ms. Holt 
allegedly overheard Fischer say). However, Rodriguez admits that he did not hear 
Fischer make any of the claimed defamatory statements (Sup. R. 540 at lines 16-23.) 
The only statement offered by Plaintiff that is made with first hand knowledge is 
that of Barbara Smith, a co-worker of Plaintiff's at KTVX. Ms. Smith testified that, 
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when she inquired of Jon Fischer why Plaintiff was gone, Mr. Fischer told her it was due 
to a "conflict of interest."19 (R. 399 at p. 20 lines 8-12.) This statement, although 
admissible by hearsay standards, fails to establish publication of any of the disputed 
statements. In fact, this statement is entirely consistent with the very reason Fischer told 
Plaintiff she was being terminated—for a conflict of interest. Thus, none of the 
statements, including Ms. Smith's, are admissible for establishing publication of the 
claimed defamatory statements. 
3, Plaintiff Relies on Improper and Insufficient Circumstantial 
Evidence. 
Plaintiff also tries to use insufficient circumstantial evidence to prove defamation 
against Fischer. For example, Plaintiff cites as circumstantial evidence of Fischer's 
defamation, the testimony of Adam Rodriguez and his accusation that Ms. Holt attributed 
her knowledge of Plaintiff's termination to Jon Fischer. Plaintiff also uses a quote from 
Jeremy Castellano to create the perception that Ms. Holt made similar remarks to others, 
"If Jon Fischer the News Director's Secretary is going around telling people that Holly 
was receiving a salary. . .she obviously knows." (Br. of Appellant at 22.) Plaintiff goes 
on to argue that this statement, along with Rodriguez's creates sufficient circumstantial 
evidence of defamation by Fischer. (Br. of Appellant at 21-22.) 20 
However, what Plaintiff fails to explain is that Castellano, himself, never heard 
Fischer or Holt make any such statements. In fact, Castellano based his whole statement 
about Ms. Holt on what Rodriguez had told him. (R. 341.) In any case, neither 
19
 Smith also testified that despite her inquiries, Fischer would not give her any details 
about the termination out of respect to Plaintiff. If Fischer were being vindictive, he 
could easily have cast aspersions at Ms. Wayment during this dialogue. 
20
 Holt testified that Fisher told her Plaintiff's departure was due to a "conflict of interest" 
and not due to any of the allegedly defamatory statements. (Sup. R. 524 at lines 1-16.) 
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Rodriguez's statement nor Castellano's, as only the most attenuated circumstantial 
evidence, can impute liability to Fischer. Without a single person who directly heard Jon 
Fischer make any of the disputed statements, Plaintiff's circumstantial evidence (that 
Fischer failed to stop rumors and that his secretary purportedly published a defamatory 
comment) amounts to no more than conjecture and speculation which cannot defeat 
summary judgment. See e^g., Corum v. Farm Credit Services, 628 F. Supp. 707, 717 (D. 
Minn. 1986) (without direct evidence, a discharged employee's mere suspicions and 
conjectural assertions are not sufficient to withstand summary judgment on his 
defamation claim).21 
Thus, under Utah law and the great weight of persuasive authority cited above, 
Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that Mr. Fischer made any of the allegedly defamatory 
statements. Based on this factor alone, this court should affirm summary judgment as to 
Defendant Jon Fischer. 
D. In the Absence of Direct Evidence, Plaintiff Cannot Link the Challenged 
Statements to Jon Fischer by Characterizing Fischer's Silence as an 
"Adoptive Admission." 
Plaintiff alleges that Fischer's failure to quell the rumors about Plaintiff's 
termination, in addition to providing circumstantial evidence of defamation, constitutes 
an admissible admission that he made the defamatory statements. There is no dispute 
that gossip circulated in the newsroom after Plaintiff's termination. Perhaps Mr. 
21
 See also Dunlap v. Wayne, 716 P.2d 842, 847 (Wash. 1986) (suggested inferences do 
not qualify as evidence. "A party must provide affirmative factual evidence to oppose 
summary judgment on defamation claim"); Jackson v. Boeing Co., 1992 WL 42913, *7 
(D. Kan. 1992) (summary judgment must be granted where plaintiff, a terminated 
employee of the defendant, failed to produce admissible direct evidence of defamation by 
defendant); Cf Gildea v. Guardian Title Co. of Utah, 970 P.2d 1265, 1270 (Utah 1998) 
(upholding summary judgment because, without direct evidence that defendant 
communicated disputed information, conclusions of pure speculation and conjecture are 
not sufficient). 
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Fischer's decision to honor Plaintiff's request for silence may not have been the best 
policy from a standpoint of employee morale.22 However, it is by no means a sufficient 
basis for a defamation claim. In support of her adoptive admission argument, Plaintiff 
cites a single Utah case taken woefully out of context. Utah v. Carlsen, 638 P.2d 512 
(Utah 1981) 
In Carlsen, the defendant was accused of threatening, out of court, a witness who 
was going to testify against him. Id. at 513-514. While at a shopping mall, a defendant 
in a criminal trial and his accomplice crossed paths with the witness. Id. Urged by the 
defendant to call the witness offensive names and threaten him if he showed for court, the 
accomplice verbally threatened the witness that if testified the next day, "We'll kill you." 
Id. at 514. While the threats were being made, the defendant stood silently next to his 
accomplice. Id At trial, on a charge of tampering with a witness, the judge allowed the 
witness to testify as to what the accomplice said as evidence against the defendant. Id. 
Carlsen is completely distinguishable form the instant case. First, it is a criminal 
case and not a civil defamation case. More importantly, the Carlsen court allowed the 
limited hearsay testimony, in large part because there was clear evidence that in warning 
the witness not to testify, the accomplice was carrying out defendant's instructions. IdL at 
514. In this case, there is no similar evidence that people were spreading rumors at 
KTVX or anywhere else at the behest of Jon Fischer. 
Another reason the Carlsen court allowed the hearsay testimony was that the 
defendant was present at the time his accomplice purported to speak on behalf of both 
22
 Fischer asserts that he remained silent at the request of Plaintiff. (R. 271 at f 21.) This 
is corroborated by testimony from Barbara Smith, a co-worker of Plaintiff, who explained 
that Fischer would not tell her the details surrounding the termination because of his 
commitment to Plaintiff. (R. 399 at p. 20 lines 8-12.) In addition, it was station policy 
not to talk about the details of such decisions. (R. 271 at f 22.) 
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himself and defendant using terms such as "us" and "we." Id In the instant case, there is 
no evidence that Fischer was ever present when any potentially defamatory statements 
were made, much less that some person, in his presence, made defamatory remarks on 
behalf of Fischer impliedly or otherwise. Finally, applying use of the "adoptive 
admission" doctrine in a libel case as Plaintiff has suggested here carries terrible policy 
implications. Specifically, all who heard or read defamatory statements (whether in the 
form of gossip from another individual or stories in print or broadcast) would potentially 
be liable for defamation if they did nothing to stop or correct the statements. While this 
doctrine may apply in other contexts, it does not belong in a defamation case such as this. 
E. The Alleged Statement By M'Lissa Holt Is Similarly Not Admissible as 
The Basis For Plaintiffs Defamation Claim. 
Plaintiff improperly attempts to establish liability against Defendants based on an 
alleged statement from M'Lissa Holt, wherein she purportedly told Adam Rodriguez that 
Plaintiff "was getting paid by the Huntsman Institute." (Br. of Appellants at 18, 19.) 
According to Rodriguez, when he asked Holt who had told her that, she responded "Jon 
told me."23 Like the other hearsay statements addressed above, Ms. Holt's alleged 
statement to Adam Rodriguez about what Jon Fischer supposedly said is inadmissible 
double hearsay. 
1. Ms. Holt's Statement Cannot Be Used to Establish Liability on the 
PartofKTVX. 
On appeal, and for the first time, Plaintiff argues that Ms. Holt's testimony, itself, 
should bind KTVX because she was an employee of the company. However, this 
argument is unavailing for several reasons. First, nowhere in the Second Amended 
23
 Holt denies making the statement. (Sup. R. 527 line 25 through 528 line 14; Sup. R. 
528 lines 18-21.) 
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Complaint does Plaintiff allege defamation against KTVX based on the statements of 
M'Lissa Holt. Plaintiff had a chance to amend her Complaint after discovery and chose 
to limit the basis of her defamation claim to the purported statements of Defendants 
Fischer and Benedict. In fact, it is an undisputed material fact that Plaintiff's defamation 
claim is based solely on the purported statements by Defendants Fischer and Benedict. 
(R. 228 at ^[45, 48.) This fact alone is dispositive of this issue. 
Second, Plaintiff failed to even raise this argument at the trial court. The only 
reference to M'Lissa Holt in the summary judgment briefs was in the context of trying to 
establish what Jon Fischer said by way of double hearsay (what others claimed Ms. Holt 
told them that Jon Fischer said). Plaintiff cannot now, on appeal, raise new arguments 
that were never preserved at the District Court level. Smith v. Four Corners Mental 
Health Ctr., Inc., 2003 UT 23, f 19, 70 P.3d 904, 911 (Utah 2003) (Supreme Court will 
not address any new arguments raised for the first time on appeal"). 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT 
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO LINK DEFENDANT PAT BENEDICT TO THE 
STATEMENTS ALLEGED IN PLAINTIFF'S SECOND AMENDED 
COMPLAINT. 
The District Court correctly determined that Plaintiff failed to link Defendant Pat 
Benedict to the statements alleged in Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint. As a 
threshold matter, since the actual malice standard applies in this case, the Court already 
has a sufficient basis for upholding dismissal of the case and need not consider this issue. 
Nonetheless, this issue is similarly dispositive because Plaintiff failed to link Pat 
Benedict to the three statements alleged in her Second Amended Complaint. 
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A. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint Lacks the Requisite Specificity for 
A Defamation Claim Against Benedict. 
On its face, Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint lacks the requisite specificity 
as to pleading a claim against Benedict. For example, the Complaint does not specify 
when, where or to whom any defamatory statements were allegedly made by Benedict. 
See Boisioly v. Morton Thiokol 706 F. Supp. 795, 800 (D. Utah 1988) (finding portions 
of defamation complaint insufficient for lack of specific details). Indeed, the Complaint 
does not properly distinguish with particularity between Fischer or Benedict as the source 
of any of the alleged defamatory statements. See Herbert v. Lando, 603 F. Supp. 983, 
991 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (when a public figure Plaintiff sues the media for libel, he must 
allege the actionable words with precision or be non-suited). 
B. The Allegedly Defamatory Statements Set Forth in Plaintiff's Second 
Amended Complaint Do Not Match What Mr. Castellano Allegedly Heard 
Pat Benedict Say. 
The statements alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint do not match what Mr. Castellano 
allegedly heard Pat Benedict say. The Second Amended Complaint states that Fischer 
and Benedict "made false accusations that (a) she was terminated because she was taking 
money from the Huntsman Cancer Institute, (b) was in bed with the institute, and (c) had 
used her reporting contacts to try and set up a foundation for her benefit." 
It is undisputed that there is only one witness, Jeremy Castellano, who purports to 
have heard Pat Benedict make any of the challenged statements. Taken from the Brief of 
Appellant, Benedict purportedly made the following statements to Castellano about 
Plaintiff: (1) that she abused her contacts as a reporter to start the foundation; (2) that she 
was in charge of a large sum of money; (3) that it is unethical; (4) That Holly was 
receiving money from Huntsman and that she was on their payroll; (5) that she was 
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receiving a salary; (6) she was unethical; and (7) that she abused her contacts." (Id. at 
17-18.) 
There is no allegation in the Complaint about Plaintiff being "unethical," "abusing 
her contacts" or being in charge of a large sum of money. Thus, statements 1, 2, 3, 6 and 
7 cannot be the basis for Plaintiff's defamation claim. As to statements, 4 and 5, while 
they are closer to the allegations contained in the Complaint, they are not exactly what is 
pled in the Complaint. While Plaintiff argues that the "words or words to that effect" 
language of Dennett v. Smith, 445 P.2d 983, 984 (Utah 1968) and Williams v. State Farm 
Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982) applies here, a more careful reading reveals that 
such language only applies to the adequacy of pleading the Complaint. It does not 
prevent a finding that the words, though adequately plead in the Complaint, do not match 
the testimony upon which Plaintiff bases her defamation claim. 
V. AN INDEPENDENT BASIS FOR AFFIRMING THE DISTRICT COURT'S 
DISMISSAL OF THIS ACTION IS PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO 
PRODUCE EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANTS ACTED WITH COMMON 
LAW MALICE SUFFICIENT TO OVERCOME THE PROTECTION FOR 
EMPLOYER-TO-EMPLOYEE COMMUNICATIONS. 
Plaintiff's failure to produce evidence that defendants acted with the "common 
law malice" required to overcome the privilege protecting employer-to-employee 
communications is a separate and independent basis for affirming summary judgment. 
Although this issue was briefed below, it was not addressed in the District Court's 
Memorandum Decision (ostensibly, because the court found the other reasons for 
dismissal sufficient). Nevertheless, this Court may affirm the District Court's summary 
judgment order on any ground appearing in the record, whether relied on by the District 
Court or not. Salt Lake County v. Bangerter, 928 P.2d 384, 386 (Utah 1996). 
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A. Any of the Alleged Defamatory Statements, Even If Made By Fischer or 
Benedict, Are Protected By the Qualified Privilege Attached to Employer 
to Employee Communications And Plaintiff Must Show Common Law 
Malice on the Part of Defendants to Avoid Dismissal of Her Defamation 
Claim. 
All of the challenged statements, even if made by defendants, are protected as 
privileged employer-to-employee communications. Consequently, the alleged statements 
are non-actionable unless Plaintiff provides some evidence of "common-law malice" on 
the part of Defendants. 
Under Utah law, a "qualified" or "conditional" privilege attaches to a 
communication between an employer and employee. Brehany v. Nordstrom, 812 P.2d 
49, 58 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).24 This is especially true when, as in this case, the 
communication relates to the reasons for termination of the Plaintiff. See Id. at 58, 59; 
Dubois v. Grand Central 872 P.2d 1073, 1079 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (recognizing 
privilege for employer to employee communication regarding reasons for Plaintiff's 
termination); Combes v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 228 P.2d 272 (Utah 1951) (same). 
To overcome this common law, qualified privilege, a defamation Plaintiff must 
demonstrate that a defendant was motivated to make the allegedly defamatory statement 
by common law "malice" toward the Plaintiff. Brehany, 812 P.2d at 59; Dubois, 872 
P.2d at 1079. "Common law malice" (as distinct from constitutional or "actual malice") 
is defined as "ill-will" or hostility" toward a person. Brehany, 812 P.2d at 59; Cox, 761 
P.2dat559n. 1. 
The recent Utah case of Dubois is instructive on this issue. 872 P.2d 1073. In 
Dubois, the defamation Plaintiff sued her former employer, a Fred Meyer department 
store, based on remarks the store manager made to two of Plaintiff's non-supervisory co-
24
 This common law privilege has also been codified in Utah Code Ann.§ 45-2-3(3). 
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workers regarding the reasons for her termination. The court found a qualified privilege 
existed as to these statements and cited the Utah Supreme Court pronouncement that: 
This qualified privilege protects an employer's 
communication to employees and to other interested parties 
concerning the reasons for an employee's discharge...This 
privilege is recognized at common law and applies generally 
in defamation cases. 
872 P.2d at 1079 (quoting Brehany, 812 P.2d at 58) (emphasis added).25 
In assessing whether the Plaintiff created a disputed factual issue regarding the 
existence of malice, the Dubois court held Plaintiff's allegations that Fred Meyer acted 
hastily and on incorrect information in terminating her did not demonstrate the hostility 
or ill-will required to overcome the qualified privilege. IdL at 1079. Consequently, the 
court upheld dismissal of her defamation claim. IdL 
In the instant case, the circumstances surrounding Mr. Benedict's alleged 
statements to Jeremy Castellano are nearly identical to those involving the manager in 
Dubois. Both situations involved Plaintiffs who had not followed company procedures 
and who were terminated for exercising poor judgment. As the assistant news director of 
KTVX, any statements Benedict made to Castellano, an employee of KTVX, regarding 
the reasons for Plaintiff's termination would be covered by the privilege. Moreover, at 
summary judgment, the Plaintiff did not dispute that the common law privilege applies to 
25
 The law also recognizes a statement to be privileged if made to: (a) protect a legitimate 
interest of the publisher, (b) protect a legitimate interest of the recipient or a third party, 
or (c) to advance a legitimate common interest between the speaker and recipient. 
Brehany, 812 P.2d at 58. Plaintiff has intimated that Defendants made defamatory 
statements to others outside KTVX. Tellingly, Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint 
has not specifically alleged any such conduct and Plaintiff has produced no evidence 
supporting that notion. However, even if statements were made to persons outside 
KTVX, the statements are protected under the qualified privilege as long as they were 
made to protect the legitimate interests of KTVX, the third party, or a mutual interest. 
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this case.26 Because it applies, Plaintiff was required to provide some evidence of "ill 
will" or "hostility" on the part of Defendants in order to avoid summary judgment. 
B. Plaintiff Failed to Produce Evidence of Any "111-Will or Hostility" That 
Would Constitute Common Law Malice. 
Ms. Wayment failed to provide evidence that Defendants made any of the 
challenged statements about her with "ill-will or hostility." At the trial court, Plaintiff 
argued that she established the requisite malice to go forward on her claim. (Opposition 
at p. 22.) However, Plaintiff based her conclusion on an erroneous definition of malice 
that was not sufficient to overcome the qualified privilege in this case. Specifically, 
Plaintiff argues that the malice she was required to demonstrate "consists of the same 
proof that Defendants knew the utterances were false."27 (Id.) This definition is close to 
the definition of constitutional actual malice, but has absolutely nothing to do with 
common law malice or ill-will. 
Plaintiff confuses the definitions of "common law malice," and "constitutional or 
actual malice." Common law malice is the type of malice required to overcome the 
26
 Citing a single, out-of-state case, plaintiff implies that this qualified privilege should 
only extend to persons on a "need to know" basis. (R. 326-27.) However, this is not 
consistent with Utah law. For example, in Dubois v. Grand Central, the court recognized, 
without interjecting any "need to know" requirement, a blanket privilege protecting 
employer-employee communications concerning the reasons for an employee's 
discharge. 872 P.2d 1073, 1079 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); see also Brehany v. Nordstrom, 
812 P.2d 49, 58 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (also recognizing qualified privilege for employer-
employee communications without additional "need to know" requirement). In fact, in 
Dubois, the two employees to whom the disputed statements were made, were non-
supervisory co-workers of the plaintiff who were most likely not on a "need to know" 
basis. 872 P.2d at 1079. In any case, Plaintiff ultimately retreats from her suggestion of 
a "need to know" requirement, relying instead on her assertions that the allegedly 
defamatory statements were made with malice. (R. 326-27.) 
27
 Here Plaintiff erroneously argues that the same alleged proof that defendants knew the 
utterances were false (for the actual malice standard) overcomes the common law malice 
standard. However, the cases to which she cites do not stand for that proposition. See 
Combes v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 228 P.2d 272, 276-77 (Utah 1951); Johnson v. 
Cmty. Nursing Serv., 985 R Supp. 1321 (D. Utah 1997). 
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employer-employee privilege in this case. Dubois, 872 P.2d at 1079, Brehany, 812 P.2d 
at 59. It is defined as "ill-will or hostility" toward a person. Brehany, 812 P.2d at 59; 
Cox, 761 P.2d at 559 n. 1. Common law malice is distinct from actual malice, discussed 
in Section II above, and not subject to the same analysis as actual malice. Id, Suspicion, 
surmise and accusation are not enough to establish common law malice. See e^ g, Harris 
v. Mean, 91 A.D.2d 830, 831 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982). Thus, under cases like Harris Ms. 
Wayment fails to overcome the employer-employee privilege if she "has not 
demonstrated that a history of hostility existed which would have precipitated a decision 
by the defendant to fabricate an excuse to terminate [her] employment... "Id at 831. 
In an effort to establish some factual basis for a showing of malice (albeit the 
wrong type), Plaintiff emphasized only two points to the trial court. First, she alleged 
that Jon Fischer told Plaintiff he was going to bat for her with "corporate" regarding her 
job even though he had purportedly made up his own decision to fire her. (R. 327.) Even 
if true (though Fischer denies he offered to intervene), this demonstrates, at most, that 
Fischer did not want to be perceived as a "bad guy" by Plaintiff. Clearly though, no "ill 
will or hostility" toward Plaintiff is evidenced by such conduct and Plaintiff made no 
argument to that effect beyond simply concluding that malice existed. 
Second, Plaintiff alleged that Fischer did not take an active role in quashing the 
speculation and newsroom rumors about her departure. (R. 327.) Here, Plaintiff attempt 
to decry Fischer's silence as sinister simply because she had no direct evidence that he 
published any defamatory statements about her. The fact that Fischer followed company 
policy not to discuss personnel matters and honored his separate promise to Plaintiff that 
he would not discuss the reasons for her departure is insufficient evidence to establish 
586546 1 48 
any type of malice, much less the "history or hostility" required here to overcome the 
conditional privilege.28 
Because Plaintiff has provided no facts from which a reasonable person could 
conclude that either Fischer or Benedict acted with ill will or hostility toward her, she 
cannot overcome the qualified privilege that protects their purported statements. As such, 
the qualified privilege protecting employer to employee communications is a separate 
and independent basis for this Court to affirm the District Court's decision.29 
CONCLUSION 
The district court properly dismissed Plaintiff's Complaint in its entirety because 
Plaintiff is a public figure who failed to demonstrate a material issue of fact that would 
show by clear and convincing evidence Defendants acted with actual malice. The district 
court's dismissal order was also correct because: (a) Plaintiff failed to put forth 
admissible evidence that Jon Fischer made any of the allegedly defamatory statements 
and (b) the statements Jeremy Castellano allegedly heard Patrick Benedict make do not 
match those alleged in Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint. Finally, the district 
court's decision was correct because Plaintiff offered no evidence to prove that the 
Defendants, even if they made the allegedly defamatory statements, did so with the 
common law malice required to overcome privileged communications between employer 
28
 Tellingly, in purporting to set forth the definitive facts establishing malice, Plaintiff 
cites no facts and makes no legal arguments regarding Patrick Benedict in her opposition 
to summary judgment. (See R. 327.) Except for one conclusory statement that 
"Defendants knew the utterances were false," Plaintiff apparently concedes that Benedict 
did not possess the requisite "ill-will or hostility" to constitute common law malice. To 
the contrary, Benedict, who had worked with plaintiff less than two weeks before her 
termination, believed she was a competent employee, had a pleasant working relationship 
with her and harbored no ill-will or animosity towards her. (R. 275 at f 4.) 
29
 The qualified privilege protecting employer-to-employee communications would also 
protect any communications made by Jon Fischer, although there is no evidence any such 
communications occurred. 
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and employees (or interested third parties). Each of these grounds, standing alone, is 
sufficient to require affirmance and this Court should affinn the judgment below in all 
respects. 
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
PATRICK F KELLY, District Judge 
*1 This matter is before the court on 
defendants' motion for summary judgment 
In this employment discrimination case, the 
plaintiff, Elsancho Jackson, asserts claims 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
42 U S C § 2000e et seq, against the 
defendant, The Boeing Company (Boeing), 
alleging racial discrimination and 
harassment, wrongful discharge and 
retaliation In addition, plaintiff asserts a 
breach of contract claim against Boeing and a 
claim against the defendant, Rex Hessee, for 
tortious interference with his employment 
contract Plaintiff further asserts violations 
of 42 U S C ^ 1985(3) by both defendants for 
conspnacy to mterfeie with his civil rights, 
and against Boeing for failure to prevent such 
a conspiracy in violation of 42 U S C § 1986 
Plaintiff alleges Boeing violated 42 U S C § 
1981 in failing to rehire him when he 
reapplied for employment with Boeing in 
1990 Finally, plaintiff asserts a claim 
against both defendants for defamation 
Copr © West 2004 No Claim 
Page 1 
Summary judgment is proper where the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with affidavits, if any, show there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact, and 
that the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law Fed R Civ P 56(c) In 
considering a motion for summary judgment, 
the court must resolve all disputed facts in 
favor of the party resisting summary 
judgment White v General Motois Cotp , Inc 
908 F 2d 669, 670 (10th Cir 1990), cert denied 
59 U S L W 3441 (1991) Summary judgment 
shall be denied if the moving party fails to 
demonstrate its entitlement beyond a 
reasonable doubt Norton v Liddel, 620 F 2d 
1375, 1381 (10th Cir 1980) 
The moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law when the nonmoving party fails 
to make a sufficient showing of an essential 
element of the case to which the nonmoving 
party has the burden of proof Celotex Corp v 
Cattett, 411 U S 317, 322 (1986), cert denied 
484 U S 1066 (1988) In resisting a motion 
for summary judgment, the nonmoving party 
may not rely upon mere allegations, or 
denials, contained in its pleadings or briefs 
Rather, the party must come forward with 
specific facts showing the presence of a 
genuine issue for trial Abeicrombie v Cit\ of 
Catoosa, 896 F 2d 1228, 1230 (10th Cir 1990) 
One of the principal purposes of summary 
judgment is to isolate and dispose of factually 
unsupported claims or defenses, and the rule 
should be interpreted in a way that allows it 
to accomplish this purpose Celotex, All U S 
at 323 24 
Plaintiff is a black male who began working 
for Boeing in March, 1987, as a sheet metal 
worker in the door shop On May 27, 1989, 
defendant Hessee, manager of the door shop, 
informed plaintiff that he was discharged for 
excessive absenteeism Plaintiff does not 
dispute the dates and times of his absences but 
contends the absences were excusable for 
medical reasons He alleges that during his 
employment with Boeing his supervisor, 
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Hessee, treated him differently than other 
employees and was prejudice against plaintiff 
because he was black and living with a 
Caucasian woman. Plaintiff claims he was 
wrongfully discharged as a result of racial 
discrimination. In addition, plaintiff claims 
the alleged racial discrimination of Hessee 
constituted a tortious interference with his 
employment contract with Boeing and caused 
a breach of that employment contract by 
Boeing. Hessee's alleged racial prejudices are 
the basis for plaintiffs claims of violations of 
42 U.S.C. § 1981, § 1985(3), and § 1986. 
Finally, plaintiff claims he can not obtain 
satisfactory employment since his discharge at 
Boeing because the defendants have made 
defamatory remarks regarding his 
employment. 
Title VII Claims 
*2 Plaintiffs first claim under Title VII is 
that he was wrongfully discharged for 
discriminatory reasons. Title VII prohibits 
discrimination by an employer "against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual's race, 
color, religion, sex or national origin...." 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e- 2(aXl) (1982). 
In order to establish a prima facie case of 
discriminatory discharge, the plaintiff must 
produce evidence of the following elements: 
1) plaintiff is a member of a racial minority; 
2) plaintiff is qualified for the job he was 
performing; 
3) despite plaintiffs qualifications he was 
discharged; and 
4) after his discharge the position remained 
available and the employer sought people with 
plaintiffs qualifications to fill the job. 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 
792, 802 (1973); Pitre v. Wester Elec. Co., Inc., 
843 F.2d 1262, 1265-66 (10th Cir.1988); 
Friends v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 37 FEP Cases 
1153, 1159 (D.Kan.1983). Once the plaintiff 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim 
establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, 
the burden shifts to the employer to articulate 
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for 
the employee's termination. Texas Dept. of 
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 
(1981). If the employer sustains this burden, 
the plaintiff may prevail only if he can show 
the reasons offered by the employer were not 
the real reasons for his discharge, but were a 
pretext for discrimination. Id.; McDonnell 
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. 
In the instant case, plaintiff was discharged 
for excessive absenteeism. As a member of 
the International Association of Machinists 
and Aerospace Workers (IAM) plaintiffs 
employment was governed by the collective 
bargaining agreement between IAM and 
Boeing. Under the collective bargaining 
agreement, employees were paid for absences 
charged to their accumulated sick leave and 
were not penalized for such absences as long 
as they were reported to Boeing. Once an 
employee used all of his sick leave, Boeing's 
attendance policy allowed absences without 
penalty for verifiable medical reasons as long 
as the employee presented a note from the 
treating physician upon his return to work. 
Plaintiff does not dispute he had an 
attendance problem, but argues that the 
absences attributed to him were caused by 
medical reasons and therefore were excusable. 
The facts reveal that when plaintiff provided 
notes from his physicians to his supervisors, 
his absences were excused. However, on July 
22, 1987, plaintiff was orally warned that his 
attendance record was unacceptable and that 
further action would be taken if his 
attendance did not improve immediately. 
During the first half of 1988, plaintiff accrued 
25 unexcused absences, was issued two 
corrective action memos, and was required to 
attend counseling sessions on ways to improve 
his attendance problem. In July, 1988, 
plaintiff received written notice that further 
occurrences of unexcused absence would result 
in his termination. During the final six 
months of 1988, plaintiff accrued an additional 
20 unexcused absences and numerous 
unexcused absences in the first five months of 
1989. Finally, on May 10, 1989, Boeing told 
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works ^ -
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plaintiff he would be terminated if he did not 
produce, by May 12, physician notes for his 
absences on March 24, April 21 and April 27. 
Plaintiff failed to meet the May 12 deadline 
and was terminated for excessive absenteeism 
on May 27, 1989. 
*3 In order to establish a prima facie case of 
discriminatory discharge, the plaintiff must 
show he was qualified for the job he was 
performing when discharged. In Mitchell v. 
Safeway Stores, Inc., 624 F.Supp. 932 
(D.Kan. 1985), the court recognized that 
excessive absenteeism may render an 
employee unqualified for the purpose of 
establishing a prima facie case of 
discrimination. Thus, the court concluded 
that plaintiff's excessive absenteeism, as 
defined by the employment manual, prevented 
her from showing a prima facie case of racial 
discrimination and her claim was dismissed. 
Id. a t 935. 
Likewise, in this case, there is some doubt 
plaintiff has shown he was qualified for the 
position from which he was terminated based 
upon his undisputed numerous absences. 
Nevertheless, assuming plaintiff has met his 
burden of establishing a prima facie case, the 
court finds that Boeing has articulated a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for 
plaintiffs discharge. Plaintiff was repeatedly 
warned that his poor attendance would cost 
him his job and he was required to attend 
counseling for the problem on several 
occasions. Boeing's attendance policy allowed 
for absences in excess of an employee's sick 
leave if an absence was due to a medical 
reason and the employee presented a 
physician's verification to his supervisor. 
Whether Boeing's policy is good or bad, Title 
VII does not prohibit employment decisions 
based on that policy, provided the policy is 
applied equally to all employees. Gilchrist v. 
Bolger, 733 F.2d 1551, 1553 (11th Cir.1984). 
Since Boeing has presented a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for terminating 
plaintiff, plaintiff can prevail on his Title VII 
claim only if he shows the reason articulated 
is a pretext for discrimination. Plaintiff has 
produced no evidence to show Boeing's 
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attendance policy was applied differently to 
other employees. Thus, no genuine issue of 
fact remains for trial and summary judgment 
of this claim is appropriate. 
Plaintiff also claims he was racially harassed 
by his supervisor, Hessee, in violation of Title 
VII. Plaintiff contends Hessee yelled at him, 
spoke to him in a demeaning fashion, caused 
him embarrassment and humiliation by such 
treatment, called him "boy", and generally 
showed less respect for plaintiff than shown 
the white employees working in the same 
area. Plaintiff asserts he was treated 
differently by Hessee because he was black 
and lived with a white woman. 
It is well established that a black employee 
forced to work in an environment dominated 
by racial hostility and harassment has a valid 
claim for a Title VII violation. Hicks v. Gates 
Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1412 (10th 
Cir.1987); Gilbert v. City of Little Rock, Arkansas, 
722 F.2d 1390, 1394 (8th Cir.1983), cert, 
denied, 466 U.S. 972 (1984). To establish a 
racially hostile work environment, however, 
the plaintiff must prove that more than a few 
isolated incidents of harassment occurred. 
Moore v. Norfolk and Western Ry. Co., 731 
F.Supp. 1015, 1020 (D.Kan.1990). Casual 
comments or accidental or sporadic 
conversation will not trigger equitable relief 
pursuant to the statute. Snell v. Suffolk Co., 
782 F.2d 1094, 1103 (2d Cir.1986). Instead, 
there must be excessive and opprobrious racial 
comment. Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1412. Thus, 
Title VII is violated only where the work 
environment is so heavily polluted with 
discrimination as to destroy the emotional and 
psychological stability of the minority 
employee. Id. a t 1413. 
*4 In this case, plaintiff has related several 
incidents wherein Hessee yelled at him and 
called him "boy". However, plaintiff has not 
offered any evidence to show Hessee's 
comments were made with racial animus. 
Nor does the evidence show that plaintiff 
suffered psychological problems from racial 
harassment. Since the record is devoid of any 
evidence to demonstrate the alleged incidents 
of harassment were racially motivated, the 
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court must find plaintiffs claim is insufficient 
to withstand defendants' motion for summary 
judgment. 
Finally, plaintiff contends he was denied a 
transfer out of Hessee's department because of 
the supervisor's racial prejudices. In order to 
establish a prima facie case of disparate 
treatment as a result of an employer's failure 
to transfer an employee, the plaintiff must 
show (1) that he applied for an available 
position; (2) that he was qualified for an 
available position; and (3) that he was 
rejected under circumstances which gave rise 
to an inference of unlawful discrimination in 
that his failure to be transferred or promoted 
was more likely than not based on 
considerations of impermissible factors. Texas 
Dep't of Community Affairs v. Bur dine
 y 450 U.S. 
248, 253 (1981); Payne v. General Motors Corp., 
731 F.Supp. 1465, 1470 (D.Kan.1990). 
Here, the evidence unequivocally shows 
plaintiff did not apply for an available 
position. Boeing has no record of a transfer 
request by plaintiff and plaintiff admits he 
never submitted such a request. Plaintiff 
asserts he did not officially request a transfer 
because it would not have done any good. This 
argument is mere speculation. Plaintiff 
cannot claim he was denied a transfer for 
racially motivated reasons when he never 
requested a transfer or gave Boeing a chance 
to consider the request. Accordingly, 
summary judgment on this issue is granted. 
Breach of Employment Contract 
In his second cause of action, plaintiff 
contends Boeing breached its employment 
contract with him by discharging him for 
racially discriminatory reasons. Plaintiffs 
claim fails for the following reasons. 
Plaintiffs claim for breach of his employment 
contract is preempted by § 301 of the Labor 
Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(3) 
The collective bargaining agreement 
between Boeing and plaintiffs union, the 
I AM, defines the terms of plaintiffs 
employment and his employment contract 
Since plaintiffs claim for breach of contract 
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requires interpretation of the collective 
bargaining agreement, it is preempted by § 
301. 
Subsequent to his discharge, plaintiff filed a 
grievance with the IAM according to the 
exclusive grievance procedure of the collective 
bargaining agreement. The IAM investigated 
plaintiffs grievance and asked that he be 
reinstated. Boeing refused to reinstate 
plaintiff and the IAM notified plaintiff of that 
decision on June 30, 1989. At the same time, 
the IAM informed plaintiff that it would not 
pursue his grievance further. 
*5 In general, an employee is bound by the 
result of a grievance procedure according to 
the finality provisions of the collective 
bargaining agreement. DelCostello v. 
International Broth, of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 
164 (1983). This is because the employee's 
rights are protected by the union's duty of fair 
representation. United Food & Com. Workers 
Local No. 7R v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 889 F.2d 
940, 944 (10th Cir.1989). However, when the 
union has breached its duty of fair 
representation by acting arbitrarily, 
discriminatorily, or in bad faith, the employee 
can bring a suit against the employer and the 
union, notwithstanding the outcome or 
finality of the grievance procedure. 
DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 164. 
In this case, plaintiff claims the IAM 
breached its duty of fair representation 
because its representative gave him the "run 
around" and didn't pursue his grievance after 
Boeing refused to reinstate him. Plaintiff has 
failed, however, to produce any evidence to 
support his allegations of bad faith. Although 
the IAM was not successful in getting plaintiff 
reinstated at Boeing, the facts show that it did 
assist plaintiff in recovering unemployment 
benefits when Boeing opposed the action. The 
facts of this case reveal an ordinary situation 
wherein the union abandons or rejects an 
aggrieved employee's claim. Thus, without 
more, plaintiffs claim against the IAM for 
breach of the duty of fair representation must 
fail. Accordingly, plaintiff's claim for breach 
of his employment contract is barred. 
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Tortious Interference with Employment Contract 
PlaintifFs third claim is that his former 
supervisor, Hessee, intentionally, negligently 
and wrongfully interfered with plaintiffs 
employment contract with Boeing. This 
claim is preempted by federal law and, 
alternatively, fails under state law. 
Whether or not Hessee, an agent of Boeing, 
improperly interfered with plaintiffs 
employment contract requires an examination 
of the rights of the parties under the collective 
bargaining agreement. Magerer v. John Sexton 
& Co., 912 F.2d 525, 530 (1st Cir.1990). As 
the court noted above, any interpretation of 
the collective bargaining agreement is 
preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management 
Relations Act, 42 U.S.C. § 185(3). Claims 
which arise under § 301 are subject to the 
requirement of exhaustion of the grievance 
procedure as provided in the collective 
bargaining agreement. Allis- Chalmers Corp. v. 
Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 219 (1985). In the case at 
hand, there is no evidence that plaintiff 
submitted his claim against Hessee for 
tortious interference to any grievance or 
arbitration procedure, and therefore he is 
barred from raising the claim for the first time 
here. Mergerer, 912 F. 2d at 531. 
In addition, the court notes that plaintiffs 
claim fails substantively. An essential 
element to any claim for tortious interference 
with a contract is interference by the 
defendant, who must be an outsider to the 
contract. Dow Chemical Corp. v. Weevil-Cide 
Co., Inc., 897 F.2d 481, 488-89 (10th Cir.1990); 
Professional Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Roussel, 528 
F.Supp. 391, 403 (D.Kan. 1981). Hessee, as an 
agent for plaintifFs employer, was a party to 
plaintifFs employment contract and could not 
interfere with the employment contract. 
Thus, because it was legally impossible for 
Hessee to interfere with plaintiffs 
employment contract, the claim fails 
substantively. 
Conspiracy Claims 
*6 PlaintifFs fourth cause of action alleges 
that Hessee, the union, and employees in the 
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decision-making chain of command at Boeing 
conspired to deprive him of his civil rights in 
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and that 
Boeing's failure to prevent the conspiracy 
violated 42 U.S.C. § 1986. He contends 
Boeing employees, in cooperation with the 
union, conspired to prevent plaintiffs transfer, 
to have him discharged, and in such a manner 
also retaliated against him for complaining 
about the alleged discriminatory conduct. 
To successfully state a claim under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1985(3), the plaintiff must allege and prove 
that the defendants (1) conspired; (2) to 
deprive, directly or indirectly, any person or 
class of persons of the equal protection of the 
laws, or of equal privileges and immunities 
under the laws; and (3) acted in furtherance of 
the conspiracy; (4) whereby another was 
injured or deprived of having and exercising 
any right or privilege of a citizen of the United 
States. Griffin v. Brechenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 
(1971). 
In Great American Sav. & Loan Ass 'n. v. Novotny, 
442 U.S. 366, 372 (1979), the United States 
Supreme Court determined that § 1985(3) 
created no substantive rights, but provided a 
remedy only for the violation of rights it 
designated. The Court further found that a 
claim for Title VII violations asserted through 
§ 1985(3) bypassed the administrative 
processes crucial to the scheme of Title VII. 
Id. at 375. Thus, in order to protect the 
overall scheme of Title VII, the Court ruled 
that § 1985(3) could not be invoked to redress 
violations of Title VII. Id. at 378. 
Pursuant to the ruling in Novotny, the court in 
Drake v. City of Fort Collins, 927 F.2d 1156 
(10th Cir.1991), held that plaintiffs request 
for relief under § 1985(3) and § 1986 was not 
independent of his Title VII claims for racial 
discrimination, and therefore failed. 
Similarly, in the present case plaintifFs claim 
for request under § 1985(3) and § 1986 is 
based upon the identical facts he asserts as a 
basis for alleged Title VII violations. 
Plaintiffs claims that the defendants 
conspired to have him wrongfully discharged 
and prevented his transfer to another 
department are precisely the claims he raised 
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in his Title VII cause of action. Furthermore, 
claims for retaliation are not actionable under 
§ 1985(3). Long v. Laramie County Community 
College District, 840 F.2d 743, 752 (10th Cir.), 
cert, denied, 488 U.S. 825 (1988). 
Plaintiff has failed to show that his claim of 
conspiracy under § 1985(3) is sufficiently 
independent of his Title VII claims and 
therefore is barred. In addition, since 
plaintiffs § 1985(3) claim fails, his claim 
under § 1986 is also barred. Drake, 927 F.2d 
at 1163. 
Refusal to Contract Claim 
In plaintiffs fifth cause of action, he alleges 
Boeing violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981 in failing to 
rehire him upon his application in December, 
1990. 
42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibits racial 
discrimination in the making and enforcement 
of contracts. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 
491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989); Trujillo v. Grand 
Junction Regional Center, 928 F.2d 973, 975 
(10th Cir. 1991). Section 1981, however, 
cannot to be construed as a general 
proscription of racial discrimination in all 
aspects of contract relations, for it expressly 
forbids discrimination only in the making and 
enforcement of contracts. Patterson, 491 U.S. 
at 176. Thus, the statute does not apply to 
conduct which occurs after the formation of a 
contract and which does not interfere with the 
right to enforce established contract 
obligations. Id. a t 171. Failure to renew an 
employment contract or failure to rehire an 
employee in the same position from which he 
was vacated does not violate § 1981 where a 
new and distinct employment relation is not 
created. Hull v. Cuyahoga Valley Bd. of Educ., 
926 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir.) cert, denied, 111 
S.Ct. 2917 (1991); Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant 
Hosp., 765 F.Supp. 461, 470 (N.D.I11.1991); 
Eklof v. Bramalea Ltd., 733 F.Supp. 935, 937 
(E.D.Pa.1989). 
*7 After his discharge, plaintiff reapplied at 
Boeing for the same position from which he 
had been terminated. Plaintiff exchanged 
correspondence with the personnel department 
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at Boeing but was not hired. He asserts that 
Boeing refused to rehire him because of his 
race. Plaintiff, however, provides no factual 
support for his claim. Instead, the evidence 
shows that Boeing did not hire any new 
employees in its sheet metal department after 
plaintiffs discharge, although it did recall 
certain employees previously laid off. 
Plaintiffs claim under § 1981 must fail as a 
matter of law. Plaintiff seeks reemployment 
with Boeing in the same position from which 
he was discharged with the same rights, 
duties, and obligations as under the old 
employment contract. Reinstatement of the 
identical employment relationship is not a 
new contract, and therefore is not actionable 
under §1981. 
Defamation Claim 
Plaintiffs final claim is for defamation. He 
contends direct evidence of defamation is 
contained in Boeing's termination documents 
and in the records from his unemployment 
compensation proceedings. He alleges 
circumstantial evidence of defamation in his 
inability to get a job when Boeing is listed as 
a reference. 
In order to successfully assert a claim for 
defamation the plaintiff must prove (1) false 
and defamatory words; (2) communicated to a 
third person; and (3) which resulted in harm to 
the reputation of the person defamed. Gobin 
v. Globe Pub. Co., 232 Kan. 1, 6, 649 P.2d 1239 
(1982). Publication of the defamatory words 
must be proven by direct, and not 
circumstantial, evidence. Hall v. Hercules, Inc., 
494 F.2d 420, 434 (10th Cir. 1974). 
Clearly, plaintiffs claim of defamation based 
upon alleged blacklisting by Boeing and 
Hessee is mere speculation. Furthermore, 
plaintiffs claim which relies upon 
circumstantial evidence for support fails as a 
matter of law. Id. 
Plaintiff has also failed to produce admissible 
direct evidence to support his claim of 
defamation. First, plaintiff relies upon a 
referee's written decision in plaintiffs 
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unemployment compensation hearing to 
demonstrate defamation. In the opinion, the 
referee determined there was no misconduct 
by plaintiff and held that plaintiff was 
entitled to the compensation. Plaintiff 
alleges the reference to misconduct 
demonstrates that Boeing falsely accused him 
of misconduct. 
The statements which plaintiff attribute to 
Boeing cannot be relied upon by him as 
evidence of defamation because they are 
privileged. Statements given in the course of 
litigation which otherwise might serve as a 
basis for action in slander or libel are 
privileged communications. Clear Water Truck 
Co., Inc. v. M. Bruenger Co., Inc., 21A Kan. 139 
Syl. 1,519 P. 2d 682 (1974). 
Further, communications between 
managerial employees about the reasons for 
an employee's discharge are also privileged. 
Turner v. Halliburton Co., 240 Kan. 1, 8-10, 722 
P.2d 1106 (1986). Thus, statements made or 
documents generated internally at Boeing for 
management's use are privileged and 
inadmissible evidence. Accordingly, since 
plaintiffs claim of defamation is not 
sufficiently supported by fact, the cause of 
action is subject to summary judgment. 
*8 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED this 10 
day of February, 1992, that defendants' 
motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 20) 
on each and every claim raised herein by 
plaintiff is granted. 
1992 WL 42913, 1992 WL 42913 (D.Kan.) 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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< KeyCite Citations > 
Only the Westlaw citation is currently 
available. 
United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, 
Eastern Division. 
Candida MARTINEZ, Plaintiff, 
v. 
U-HAUL COMPANY OF ILLINOIS, INC. 
an Illinois corporation and Arlester 
Webster 
Defendants. 
No. 99 C 8066. 
June 6, 2001. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
PALLMEYER, J. 
*1 Plaintiff Candida Martinez brings this 
action against her former employer, 
Defendant U Haul Company of Illinois, Inc. 
("U Haul") and her former supervisor, 
Defendant Arlester Webster ("Webster"), 
alleging that Webster sexually harassed her 
and, after she complained about the 
harassment, retaliated against her in 
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964. Additionally, Plaintiff brings a state law 
claim for defamation against both Defendants, 
contending that after she left U-Haul, Webster 
falsely told several prospective employers that 
Plaintiff was a thief. [FN1] Defendant U- Haul 
now moves for summary judgment, contending 
Plaintiff has not established that she suffered 
severe and pervasive harassment, nor has she 
established a prima facie case of retaliation. 
In addition, both Defendant U Haul and 
Defendant Webster seek summary judgment 
on Plaintiffs defamation claim, arguing that 
Plaintiff has not proffered any admissible 
evidence to sustain this count. For the 
following reasons, Defendant U Haul's motion 
for summary judgment is denied in part and 
granted in part, and Defendant Webster's 
motion for summary judgment is granted. 
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FN1 Plaintiffs complaint also contained a count ot 
intentional infliction of emotional distress against 
both Defendants and an assault and battery count 
directly against Webstei This court dismissed 
Plaintiffs intentional infliction of emotional distiess 
claim against U-Haul on May 18, 2000 and against 
Webster on January 9, 2001 Because Webstei has 
not moved tor summary judgment on the assault and 
battery claim, that claim will not be addiessed in this 
opinion 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
A. Plaintiff's Employment at U-Haul 
Plaintiff was employed at the U-Haul moving 
center in Park Forest, Illinois, as a customer 
service representative from late 1997 until 
January 1998 and then again from August 
1998 until she quit her job in May 1999. (U 
Haul Co. of Illinois' Rule 56.1 Statement of 
Uncontested Facts (hereinafter "Def.'s 56.1 
Statement") fl 1, 30.) From August 1998 until 
May 1999, Defendant Arlester Webster was 
Plaintiffs supervisor. (Id. 1 3.) 
Plaintiffs job duties as customer service 
representative included: (1) assisting with 
retail, taking reservations, and selling items 
out of the store; (2) light cleanup, including 
mopping and sweeping the storage area; (3) 
"trailer hookup" -consisting of hooking dollies 
up to the cars or trucks; and (4) displaying 
storage areas to customers. (PL's Dep., at 35-
37.) From early 1999 until she left U-Haul, 
Plaintiff was the only full-time customer 
service representative at the Park Forest 
facility. (Def.'s 56.1 Statement 1 36.) 
On the day Plaintiff was hired at the Park 
Forest facility, she received a publication 
entitled "Welcome Aboard" which, among 
other things, describes U- Haul's sexual 
harassment policy. (Def.'s 56.1 Statement fl 
10, 12.) That publication instructs employees 
who feel they have been sexually harassed to 
report these incidents and identifies a variety 
of avenues for reporting any perceived 
harassment. (Id. ] 11.) Additionally, to educate 
employees about this policy, U Haul provides 
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its managers with a policy bulletin that 
contains more written information concerning 
sexual harassment. (Id. \ 17.) That bulletin 
includes such information as a definition of 
sexual harassment, a set of procedures for 
responding to and investigating complaints of 
sexual harassment, suggested corrective 
actions that may be taken in response to such 
complaints, and other guidelines for 
conducting investigations. (Id. % 18.) The 
bulletin also notes that the EEO and Human 
Resources staff at U Haul are available to 
provide guidance regarding sexual 
harassment. {Id. ^ 19.) Attached to that 
bulletin is another internal publication of U-
Hauf s Policy prohibiting sexual harassment. ( 
Id. 1 21.) According to U-Haul, a copy of this 
policy is posted at every U-Haul moving 
center, and identifies the person(s) to whom an 
employee is to report any incidents of 
harassment. {Id. fl 13, 14.) Plaintiff denies 
that any such policy was posted at the moving 
center where she worked, but she admits that 
she herself had a copy of the policy and, 
further, admits that she had the toll free 
number to call to report incidents of sexual 
harassment. (Plaintiffs Response to U-Haul 
Co. of Illinois Rule 56.1 Statement of 
Uncontested Facts (hereinafter "PL's 56.1 
Response") fl 13, 16,41.) 
B. Alleged Incidents of Sexual Harassment 
*2 Plaintiff testified that while Webster was 
her supervisor, he asked her out on dates "just 
about every day." (PL's Dep., at 80, 95.) She 
also claims that other employees, including 
Donald Williams, Torino Terry, Vivian 
Shegog, and Greg Flores, witnessed Webster 
acting flirtatiously with her. {Id. at 160-162.) 
Plaintiff contends that Webster did not treat 
other employees this way. (Id.) She admits, 
however, that she did not complain to U-Haul 
about Webster acting flirtatiously towards her 
and also admits that his flirtatious behavior 
bothered her only "sometimes." (Id. at 162.) 
Additionally, she testified that she did not 
consider Webster's requests for dates to be 
sexual harassment, nor did those requests 
bother her. (Id. a t 80, 95.) 
Along with the requests for dates and the 
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flirtatious behavior, Plaintiff alleges that 
Webster improperly touched her at work on 
two separate occasions. The first such incident 
occurred in late January 1999 at a time when 
Plaintiff and Webster were alone in the store. 
(PL's Dep., at 67-68, 72.) According to 
Plaintiff, she was standing at the store 
counter counting her receipts when Webster 
came up behind her and put his hands on her 
upper thighs, a little below the waist line, and 
rubbed there, above the clothing, for about 30 
seconds. (Id. at 67-69, 70.) Because he came up 
from behind her, she did not know at first that 
it was Webster who was touching her. (Id. at 
70.) When Plaintiff turned her head and saw 
that it was Webster, she told him, "Don't 
touch me/ ' and he walked away. (Id . a t 69-71.) 
Plaintiff went home immediately after the 
incident. (Id. at 73.) 
The second such incident occurred a month or 
so later, sometime in late February 1999. (Id. 
at 75.) Again, Plaintiff was at the counter 
counting her receipts when Webster came up 
behind her and put his hands in her front 
pockets and began to rub her thighs for about 
five seconds, until Plaintiff hit him in the 
stomach and he walked away. (Id. at 75-77.) As 
with the first such incident, there were no 
other workers or customers in the store at the 
time. (Id. at 77.) Plaintiff contends that she 
went home directly after the incident and told 
her mother what happened. (Id. at 78-79.) 
Defendant tells a very different version of his 
treatment of Plaintiff and of the two alleged 
incidents of touching. According to Webster, 
he never rubbed Plaintiffs thighs in either 
incident, but merely removed a set of keys 
from her back pocket on two occasions. 
(Webster Dep., at 69.) As he explained it, the 
first time this occurred, he asked Plaintiff for 
the cash drawer keys so he could ring up a 
customer and give him his change. (Id. a t 72.) 
Plaintiff was eating lunch at the time and she 
turned to indicate he should just take the key 
from her back pocket. (Id. a t 104.) He then 
grabbed the portion of the key ring that was 
sticking out of her pocket and, therefore, never 
had to reach into her pocket or touch her 
person. (Id. at 74-75.) According to Webster, 
the second incident occurred in much the same 
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works _ 
2001 W L 648637 
(Cite as: 2001 W L 648637, *2 (N.D.I11.)) 
P a g e 3 
way; Plaintiff gave him permission to take the 
keys out of her pocket and he took them out 
without touching her body. (Def.'s 56.1 
Statement 1 57.) 
*3 On March 11, 1999, Webster was arrested 
for the second touching incident after 
Plaintiffs uncle, Andre Martinez, called the 
police about the matter. (PL's Dep., at 145.) 
[FN2] Plaintiff points out that, at this time, 
Webster signed a written statement in which 
he stated, in relevant part, "I put my hand in 
[Plaintiffs] pocket just as a joke, she got mad, 
I pulled it out and left her alone." (PL's 56.1 
Additional Facts % 17.) Webster asserts, 
however, that he did not read over the 
statement before he signed it and specifically 
denies that he told the police he put his hands 
in Plaintiffs pockets. (Webster Dep., at 142-
45.) 
FN2 Plaintitt testified that she did not know whether 
Webstei was eventually chaiged with any criminal 
conduct (PI 's Dep , at 149 ) 
Plaintiff herself did not testify to any other 
incidents of touching or any other harassing 
behavior by Webster. Plaintiffs cousin, Vivian 
Shegog, however, who worked with Plaintiff 
and Webster at the same U-Haul moving 
center, testified to a number of incidents in 
which she claims to have observed Webster 
harassing Plaintiff. (Plaintiffs Rule 56.1(b) 
Additional Statement of Contested Facts 
(hereinafter "PL's 56.1 Additional Facts") fl 
6-14.) For example, Shegog testified that on 
several occasions, she witnessed Webster 
attempt to reach around Plaintiff and, while 
reaching, he would "[pat] her up." (Shegog 
Dep., at 22; PL's 56.1 Additional Facts 1 6.) 
She also saw Webster go out of his way on a 
daily basis to brush up against Plaintiff. 
(Shegog Dep., at 43; PL's 56.1 Additional 
Facts 1 7.) She named several additional 
occasions, apart from the two incidents 
Plaintiff related, where Webster touched 
Plaintiff. (Id. H 10.) She also testified that she 
saw Webster stare at Plaintiff, and if Plaintiff 
bent over, heard him make comments about 
her. (Id % 12.) On several of the occasions 
when Webster touched Plaintiff or moved close 
to her, Shegog witnessed Plaintiff push 
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Webster away, kick him, make facial 
expressions at him and ask him directly, 
"what are you looking for?" (Id. fl 25-28, 31.) 
Shegog testified that Plaintiff told her that 
this behavior bothered her and Shegog 
recalled that, at one point, Plaintiff was on the 
brink of tears as a result of these incidents. 
(Shegog Dep., at 78.) 
Defendant U-Haul points out, however, that 
Plaintiff herself admitted that there were only 
two instances of physical contact with 
Webster. (Def.'s 56.1 Response % 6.) In 
addition, Plaintiff did not testify to any of the 
events that Shegog related and, in fact, 
testified that Webster never made any 
comments about her anatomy. (Id. 1 12; PL's 
Dep. at 213.) 
C. U-Haufs Investigation of Plaintiffs 
Complaint 
On February 23, 1999, shortly after the 
second incident of touching had occurred, 
Plaintiff called the 800 number listed in her 
"Welcome Aboard" book to report the 
perceived sexual harassment and spoke to Jim 
Cody at U-Haul International's Human 
Resources Department in Phoenix. (Def.'s 56.1 
Statement 1 45; PL's Dep. at 64, 96.) [FN3] 
She told Cody that on two separate occasions 
Webster had come up behind her and touched 
her thighs with his hands. (Id. at 65 67.) She 
also told him that Webster continually asked 
her out on dates. (Def.'s 56.1 Statement ^ 46.) 
After her call, U-Haul International's Human 
Resources Department informed U-Haul 
Marketing Company President Chris 
McDermott of Plaintiffs complaint. (Id. 1 48.) 
Two days later, on February 25, 1999, 
McDermott went to the Park Forest facility to 
investigate. (Id. 5 49.) 
FN3 Plaintiff actually says that she first called the 
800 number during the fust week ot Match 1999 
(PI 's Dep , at 63.) Because Defendant itself claims 
she called the number even eaihei (and, therefore, 
closer to the incident of haiassment), for the sake ol 
this motion the court will assume Plaintiff made the 
call on February 23, 1999 
*4 Plaintiff and Defendant dispute whether 
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works _ 
W^stMw 
2001 W L 648637 
(Cite as: 2001 W L 648637, *4 (N.D.I1L)) 
P a g e 4 
McDermott followed U-HauFs guidelines for 
conducting a proper sexual harassment 
investigation. (Def.'s 56.1 Statement 1 50; 
PL's Response 1 50.) According to Defendant, 
McDermott began his investigation by 
interviewing Plaintiff to determine the details 
of her complaint, at which point Plaintiff 
reiterated what she had reported in her call to 
the 800 number: that Webster had asked her 
out on dates and had, on two occasions, 
touched her. (Def.'s 56.1 Statement 11 51, 52.) 
According to McDermott, Plaintiff said 
Webster had been taking keys from her back 
pocket on those occasions and Webster 
admitted that he had in fact removed keys 
from her back pocket on two occasions, but 
said he had done so only with Plaintiffs 
permission and without touching her body. (Id. 
11 52, 57.) 
McDermott said he interviewed everyone on 
the active payroll at the Park Forest facility 
during the relevant time frame. (Def.'s 56.1 
Statement 1 54.) This included Webster and a 
number of Plaintiffs co-workers: Julie Solis, 
Jovan Blount, Darney Rife and Torino Terry 
(who is Plaintiffs boyfriend). (Id. 1 54.) 
McDermott did not interview Plaintiffs cousin 
Vivian Shegog because she was on a short 
medical leave of absence during the time of 
the incidents of touching. (Def.'s 56.1 
Response 1 101.) McDermott determined that 
none of Plaintiffs co-workers had seen the 
incidents of touching of which Plaintiff 
complained. (Def.'s 56.1 Statement 1 56.) 
Plaintiff denied that McDermott began his 
investigation by interviewing her. (PL's 
Response 1 51.) Instead, she claims that he 
started the investigation by interviewing her 
co-workers Jovan Blount, Julie Solis, and 
Darney Rife. (Id.) She also contends that 
McDermott never interviewed Torino Terry 
and that, though Shegog was on a leave of 
absence, there was no reason not to interview 
her. (Id. 11 50, 55.) Additionally, Plaintiff 
points out that no one was present for the two 
incidents of touching that she complained of, 
so none of the witnesses would have seen these 
contacts. (Id. 1 56.) 
McDermott concluded his investigation on 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim 
March 4, 1999. (Def.'s 56.1 Statement 1 60.) 
He concluded that Webster had removed keys 
from Plaintiffs pocket by taking the key ring 
and not by touching her thighs. (Id. 1 61.) 
McDermott then met with Plaintiff and 
Webster. (Id. 1 63.) According to McDermott, 
Plaintiff admitted at that meeting that 
Webster had asked for the key and she had 
turned her hip and back pocket toward 
Webster and indicated that he should take the 
key because she was eating lunch and her 
hands had food on them. (Id.) McDermott also 
said that he found no corroboration for 
Plaintiffs claim that Webster had asked her 
out on a date. (Id. 1 64.) Finally, McDermott 
explained that he asked Plaintiff whether she 
wanted him to transfer Webster or herself but 
she did not request that either be transferred. 
(Id. 1 66.) Plaintiff testified that she felt 
Webster should be terminated from his 
employment at U-Haul, but admits that she 
did not request that either she or Webster be 
transferred. (PL's Dep., at 91.) 
*5 Based on McDermott's investigation, U-
Haul issued a written warning notice to 
Webster on March 4, 1999, informing him that 
any future inappropriate comments or actions 
would subject him to immediate termination. 
(Def.'s 56.1 Statement 1 67.) Webster reviewed 
and signed the notice. (Id. 1 68.) It is 
undisputed that after this incident, Webster 
never again touched Plaintiff, asked her for 
dates, or acted flirtatiously toward her. (Id. 1 
72.) Plaintiff, however, felt that a written 
reprimand was not sufficient, and so in March 
of 1999 she once again called U-Haul's 800 
number and spoke to an employee in Phoenix 
named Cary Kirkland. (PL's Dep., at 90-91.) 
[FN4] Kirkland failed to get back in touch 
with Plaintiff. (Id.) Plaintiff then filed a 
charge of discrimination with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission on 
April 9, 1999. (Def.'s 56.1 Statement 1 85.) 
FN4. Plaintiff was unsure as to Kirkland's official 
job title. (PL's Dep., at 91.) 
D. Plaintiffs Retaliation Claim 
Plaintiff admits that Webster did not touch 
her again once she complained about the 
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harassment, but she claims that Webster 
retaliated against her in a number of ways for 
complaining about him. To begin with, 
Plaintiff testified that from the moment she 
called Jim Cody, Webster imposed harsher job 
duties on her than he imposed on other 
similarly situated employees. (Pl/s Dep., at 
43, 86.) [FN5] As she explained, Webster 
made her job harder by "pilfing] on more 
work" and changing her daily tasks. (Id. at 62, 
85.) Specifically, Plaintiff claims that she was 
required to change oil in the trucks, do many 
more trailer hook-ups, and clean out the 
storage area more often than she had in the 
past. (Id. at 85.) According to Plaintiff "all the 
work the other employees did" was now 
assigned to her. (Id. at 86.) Additionally, 
Plaintiff testified that Webster changed her 
hours, scheduled her for longer days, was 
reluctant to give her days off that she 
requested, and insisted that she open and close 
the store for him when he wasn't there. (Id. at 
62, 99.) Plaintiff estimated that she was 
assigned five or six more hours of work per 
week, though she admitted she was paid 
overtime for those hours. (Id. at 99.) She also 
claimed that she was left doing Webster's job 
and that he came to work less often. (Id. at 
100.) 
FN5. Plaintiff testified that the day aftei she called 
Cody "eveiybody" at work knew that she had called 
him and eveiyone was talking about it (Id at 86 ) 
Because she did not tell anyone about the phone call, 
she assumed that Cody told someone in the company 
about it, who then called Webstei (Id. at 87 ) 
Plaintiffs cousin, Vivian Shegog, 
corroborated Plaintiffs assertion that she was 
given different tasks, but Shegog testified that 
she also was made to do some of those tasks 
along with Plaintiff. (Shegog Dep., at 119.) 
[FN6] For example, Shegog recalled that after 
a conversation in which McDermott told 
Webster about Plaintiffs complaint, Webster 
required both Plaintiff and Shegog to hand 
wash trucks and vans and clean out storage 
areas. (PL's 56.1 Additional Facts 1 58; 
Shegog Dep., at 119.) According to Shegog, she 
and Plaintiff had not previously been called on 
to wash the trucks because U Haul had other 
people to do this work. (Shegog Dep., at 60.) 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim 
Shegog also claimed that after Plaintiff made 
the last phone call and Chris McDermott came 
to speak to Webster, Webster directed Shegog 
and Plaintiff to drive the bigger trucks, sweep 
out the storage areas, and restock the back 
room, even though he had not previously 
asked them to do those things. (Id. at 60 61.) 
Instead, he generally made the male 
employees do such tasks as cleaning out the 
storage areas. (Id at 118.) 
FN6 Both parties agiee that Shegog was on a shoit 
medical leave ot absence during the time of the 
incidents of touching, but, because she provides fust 
hand accounts of what occurred after Plaintiff 
complained of the harassment, the court assumes that 
she was once again back at U-Haul the same week 
that Plaintiff called Jim Cody to complain 
*6 U-Haul points out, however, that none of 
the tasks Plaintiff or Shegog described were 
outside of Plaintiffs job description as a 
customer service representative. (Def.'s 56.1 
Statement ^ 76.) Webster contends that the 
real reason for assigning Plaintiff additional 
job duties was the fact that she was no longer 
pregnant, not the fact of her complaints. 
(Webster Dep., at 272.) As he explains it, from 
August 1998, when Plaintiff was nine months 
pregnant, until three months after childbirth, 
she was not required to do any heavy lifting or 
to pick up hitches. (Id. at 272.) He explained, 
however, that by October or November of 
1998, her duties were once again the same as 
any other U-Haul customer service 
representative, including assisting with the 
cash register, light cleanup, trailer hookup, 
and storage. (Id. at 272-73.) Thus, Webster 
argues that Plaintiffs job duties changed 
before she ever complained of harassment. (Id.) 
Besides giving her additional tasks to 
perform, Plaintiff contends that Webster 
began verbally abusing her, threatening her 
in front of customers, yelling at her at work 
and "just being downright rude" to her. (PL's 
Dep., at 152.) He also used profanity when 
talking to her, including calling her "all types 
of names." (Id. at 202.) Plaintiff explained that 
he mostly used the "A word" but also called 
her "[ejvery other word in the book" including 
"Stupid B. You slow MF. You look like S." (Id 
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at 207.) According to Plaintiff, such incidents 
happened frequently after she made her 
complaint and had not happened before she 
complained. (PL's Dep., at 158.) She also 
testified that she did not see him direct these 
words at anyone else at U-Haul. (Id. at 207.) 
Shegog, however, claimed that Webster called 
both Plaintiff and Shegog "dumb asses, stupid 
bitches, fucking whores," though neither party 
has clarified whether Webster made these 
statements only after Plaintiff made her 
complaint or the entire time that both women 
were at U-Haul. (Shegog Dep., at 60.) 
Without denying Webster's rude behavior, U-
Haul points out that such behavior was doled 
out to others, as well as Plaintiff. For 
example, U-Haul points to Shegog's testimony 
that Webster used similar language and 
exhibited similar "rude" behavior with other 
employees. (Def.'s 56.1 Statement t 78.) In 
addition, Torino Terry, Plaintiffs' boyfriend 
and co-worker, testified that Webster 
regularly raised his voice to all of the 
employees. (Id. 1 78; Terry Dep., at 96-98.) 
As additional evidence of retaliation, Plaintiff 
points to several written reprimands that she 
claims she unfairly received after she 
complained about Webster and later filed her 
EEOC charge. Plaintiff notes that prior to the 
filing, Webster had never given her a written 
warning and had, in fact, given her a raise 
and a promotion to a full time position. (PL's 
56.1 Additional Facts fl 49, 50.) On March 1, 
1999, six days after Plaintiff first complained 
to U-Haul about Webster, Webster issued a 
written warning notice to Plaintiff for failing 
to make the closing bank deposit for February 
28, 1999. (Def 's 56.1 Statement 1 79; PL's 
56.1 Additional Facts 1 46.) On April 6, 1999, 
Plaintiff was given four more warning notices, 
addressing the following violations that 
occurred on April 4, 1999:(1) failure to work to 
the end of her scheduled work shift of 5:30 pm, 
effectively closing the U-Haul center early 
that day; (2) taking a U-Haul vehicle for 
personal use without prior authorization and 
leaving the U-Haul facility understaffed while 
she used the vehicle; (3) using the vehicle 
overnight, after hours; and (4) failing to 
maintain a business atmosphere by allowing a 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim 
non-employee onto the premise to disrupt the 
facility's operations. (Def.'s 56.1 Statement fl 
80, 81.) 
*7 Defendant contends that, though Plaintiff 
began to receive written reprimands after she 
complained of harassment, she herself 
admitted that she deserved some of the 
reprimands. For example, Plaintiff admitted 
that she failed to make the bank deposit. (PL's 
Dep., at 128-129.) She explained, however, 
that she did not do so because she did not have 
a car at the time. (Id.) Plaintiff also explained 
that she did not deserve all of the reprimands 
because it was Julie Solis, not Plaintiff, who 
took the van. (PL's 56.1 Response 1 81.) She 
admits that she went with Solis in the van to 
get lunch but claims that Solis had permission 
to take the van out. (PL's Dep., at 131, 132.) 
Plaintiff also denies that she left early or that 
she had a visitor on the premises. (PL's 56.1 
Response % 81.) She asserts that her visitor, 
Torino Terry (who by this time had been 
terminated from his employment at U- Haul) 
remained outside of the store and only came to 
bring her lunch. (Id. a t 139.) 
Defendant claims, however, that these were 
not the first reprimands Plaintiff ever 
received. To the contrary, U-Haul contends 
that Plaintiff was orally reprimanded by 
Webster prior to her complaint for locking a 
U-Haul customer in a rental storage area and 
for throwing merchandise at a customer in 
response to the customer's complaint. (Def.'s 
56.1 Statement ^ 82, citing Webster Dep., at 
273-76.) Webster admits, however, that he did 
not give Plaintiff a written warning notice at 
that time. (Id.) Nor was Webster sure whether 
or not he contacted U-Haul's Human 
Resources Department regarding those 
incidents. (Id.) Plaintiff denies that she was 
reprimanded for those acts. (PL's 561. 
Response f 82; Webster Dep ., 276.) 
Plaintiff also alleges that, as part of his 
retaliation, Webster accused her of stealing 
different items and relayed these accusations 
to McLaughlin. (PL's 56.1 Additional Facts f 
61.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that on April 
30, 1999, Webster told McLaughlin that 
Plaintiff had stolen furniture from a 
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customer's storage locker, on April 28, 1999, 
Webster accused Plaintiff of stealing some 
uniforms, and on May 3, 1999, Webster told 
McLaughlin that Plaintiff planned to break 
into the storage lockers with a former 
employee. (Id. 11 61, 62, 113.) Plaintiff also 
alleges that, at some point in April 1999, 
Webster told a customer named Omateg 
Barnes that Plaintiff had stolen something 
from Barnes' storage space. (PL's Dep., at 
185.) As a result, the police came and placed 
Plaintiff in a holding cell for almost three 
hours. (Id .) Plaintiff denied that she ever stole 
anything from U-Haul besides some ink pens 
and paper. (Id. at 194-95.) 
For his part, Webster denies that he ever 
accused Plaintiff of theft. According to 
Webster, one of the storage customers had a 
number of pieces of furniture stolen from her 
storage space. It was the customer who 
suspected Plaintiff was somehow involved in 
the theft, (Def.'s 56.1 Response 1 61; Webster 
Dep., at 193-199), resulting in Plaintiff's being 
detained by the police for that incident. (PL's 
56.1 Additional Facts 11 120-121.) 
*8 Sometime in April, close in time to when 
Plaintiff filed her EEOC charge, she spoke to 
Chris McDermott and told him that Webster 
was giving her extra jobs, scheduling her more 
hours, and treating others more favorably. 
(PL's Dep., at 106.) According to Plaintiff, 
McDermott did nothing to change that 
treatment. (Id. at 107) Plaintiff therefore 
decided to leave her job in late May. (PL's 56.1 
Statement Additional Facts 1 40; Karen 
Martinez Dep., at 57; PL's Dep., at 109-110.) 
E. Plaintiff's Defamation Claim 
After Plaintiff left U-Haul, she applied for 
work at four different places: St. James 
Hospital, Rent-A-Center, Ingalls Memorial 
Hospital and one other place whose name she 
could not recall. (PL's Dep., at 16.) Plaintiff 
believes the reason she was not hired was that 
Webster did not recommend her to these 
employers and told them that she was a thief. 
(Id. at 28.) To support her claim that Webster 
defamed her to these employers, Plaintiff 
testified that her cousin, Vivian Shegog, 
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contacted a woman named Maria who had 
interviewed Plaintiff for the position at 
Ingalls Hospital. (Id. at 27.) [FN7] According 
to Plaintiff, Maria told Shegog that she did 
not hire Plaintiff because Webster had told 
her that Plaintiff was a thief. (Id. at 28.) 
Plaintiff claims she never spoke to Maria 
herself, but got this information solely from 
Shegog. (Id. at 28-29.) In addition, Plaintiff is 
certain that Webster told Rent-A-Center she 
was a thief because she "pretty much had [a] 
foot in the door," but then she wasn't hired. ( 
Id. at 155-156.) 
FN7. Neither Plaintiff nor Shegog could recall 
Maria's last name. 
Shegog testified, however, that she never 
called Ingalls Hospital for Plaintiff. (Def.'s 
56.1 Statement % 88; Shegog Dep., at 75.) 
Instead, Shegog testified that Plaintiff was the 
one who was told by a potential employer that 
Webster had called Plaintiff a thief. (Shegog 
Dep., a t 76.) Webster himself denies that he 
ever told any of Plaintiff's prospective 
employers that she was a thief and Plaintiff 
has offered no testimony from anyone at 
Ingalls Memorial Hospital or any other 
potential employer. (Def.'s 56.1 Statement % 
90.) Finally, though Plaintiff claims that 
Webster defamed her to several potential 
employers, she admitted that she did not know 
whether anyone at St. James Hospital ever 
communicated with Webster in connection 
with her application, nor could she say 
whether anyone at Rent-A-Center had ever 
contacted Webster. (PL's Dep., at 18-19.) 
DISCUSSION 
A. Summary Judgment Standard 
Summary judgment is proper when "the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 411 U.S. 
317, 322-23 (1986); Wade v. Lerner New York, 
243 F.3d 319, 321 (7th Cir.2001). In 
determining whether any genuine issue of 
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material fact exists, the court must construe 
all facts in the light most favorable to the non 
moving party and draw all reasonable and 
justifiable inferences in favor of that party See 
Michas v Health Cost Contwls of Illinois, Inc , 
209 F 3 d 687, 692 (7th Cir 2000Xciting 
Anderson v Liberty Lobby, Inc , 477 U S 242, 
255 (1986)) An issue is genuine "if the 
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could 
return a verdict for the nonmoving party " See 
Baton v City of Highland Park 195 F 3d 333, 
338 (7th Cir 1999Xciting Anderson, All U S at 
248) 
B Motion For Leave to File Under Seal 
*9 As an initial matter, the court must rule 
on Defendant U Haul's motion for leave to file 
certain documents under seal U Haul has 
requested leave to file portions of the 
deposition testimony of Defendant Webster, 
Christopher McDermott and Patrick 
McLaughlin as well as U Haul's memorandum 
in support of summary judgment and its 56 1 
statement of fact under seal As U Haul 
explains, these documents contain information 
that is "private to certain employees and 
former employees of U Haul, including 
information regarding the allegations in this 
sexual harassment case, and other private 
matters" and also contain "information that is 
proprietary, non public business information 
of [DJefendant U Haul, including confidential 
policy and procedure documents and other 
business information " (U Haul's Motion for 
Leave to File Certain Summary Judgment 
Papers Under Seal Instanter 1 3 ) U Haul 
contends that disclosing this information 
"would likely have the effect of revealing 
otherwise private matters or otherwise 
causing substantial harm to U Haul and/or its 
current and former employees " (Id ) 
No doubt every party involved in a sexual 
harassment suit would, if given the chance, 
prefer to keep many of the details underlying 
the suit from the public U Haul has presented 
no specific justifications, however, for filing an 
entire memorandum and 56 1 statement of 
facts under seal, nor does this court see any 
justifications for so doing In Illinois, the party 
claiming confidential protection of certain 
Copr © West 2004 No Claim 
documents bears the burden of showing (1) a 
trade secret or confidential business 
information, and (2) good cause Citizens First 
Nat'I Bank of Princeton v Cincinnati Ins Co , 178 
F 3d 943, 944 45 (7th Cir 1999), Culinary Foods 
Inc v Raychem Corp, 151 F R D 297, 300 
(N D 111 1993) It is not enough for U Haul to 
insist that current and former employees 
would prefer these matters remain private 
Such conclusory statements that disclosure 
will result in harm is insufficient evidence to 
support filing these documents under seal See 
Andrew Corp v Rossi 180 F R D 338, 340, 342 
(N D 111 1998Xdeterminmg whether a 
protective order is appropriate requires 
balancing the public interest in the 
information with the possibility that a party 
will be unduly burdened or oppressed by the 
information) 
Additionally, the court is genuinely puzzled 
by U Haul's argument that certain of its 
policies and procedures mentioned in this suit 
are confidential Because U Haul provides no 
specifics about which of its policies are 
confidential, the court is left to wonder why U 
Haul would be concerned about revealing its 
well established (and apparently effective) 
sexual harassment policy U Haul's attempt to 
keep its investigation of the sexual 
harassment policy confidential is also baffling 
in light of the evidence that U Haul handled 
that investigation with deliberate speed and 
thoroughness Because U Haul has been 
unable to provide specific reasons that any 
particular information involved in this case 
must be kept confidential, its motion for leave 
to file certain documents under seal is denied 
The court now turns to the merits of 
Defendant's summary judgment motion 
C Sexual Harassment 
1 Defendant Webster's Conduct 
*10 Sexual harassment is actionable under 
Title VII only if "it is so severe or pervasive as 
to alter the conditions of the victim's 
employment and create an abusive working 
environment " Clark County Sch Dist v 
Breeden, 121 S Ct 1508, 1509 (2001)(quoting 
Faragher v City of Boca Raton, 524 U S 775, 
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786 (1998Xquotation marks omitted), see also 
Hosteller v Quality Dining Inc , 218 F 3d 798, 
806 (7th Cir 2000) The test for determining 
whether harassment is actionable is both 
subjective and objective, the plaintiff must 
establish both that a reasonable person would 
find the harassment created an abusive 
working environment and that she, in fact, did 
perceive it to be so Gentry v Export Packaging 
Co 238 F 3 d 842 (7th Cir 2001) As the 
Supreme Court has explained, in making this 
determination, "[wjorkplace conduct is not 
measured in isolation, instead, whether an 
environment is sufficiently hostile or abusive 
must be judged by looking at all the 
circumstances, including the frequency of the 
discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether 
it is physically threatening or humiliating, or 
a mere offensive utterance, and whether it 
unreasonably interferes with an employee's 
work performance M Clark County, 121 S Ct at 
1510 (quoting Harris v Forkhft Sys , Inc , 510 
U S 17, 23 (1993Xquotation marks omitted) 
To be actionable "the conduct at issue must 
'ha[ve] the purpose or effect of unreasonably 
interfering with an individual's work 
performance or creating an intimidating, 
hostile, or offensive work environment" ' 
Murray v Chicago Transit Auth , No 99 3774, 
F 3d , 2001 WL 493433, at *6 (7th Cir 
May 10, 2001), citing Filipovic v K & R Express 
Sys , Inc 176 F 3d 390, 397 (7th Cir 1999) 
(quoting Saxton v American Tel & Tel, Co , 10 
F 3 d 526, 533 (7th Cir 1993) M[S]imple 
teasing, offhand comments, and isolated 
incidents (unless extremely serious) will not 
amount to discriminatory changes in the 
terms and conditions of employment " Clark 
County, 121 S C t at 1510 (citations and 
quotation marks omitted) 
In the instant case, Plaintiffs allegations of 
harassment center around the two occasions 
where Defendant Webster came up behind her 
and rubbed her thighs, the first time, outside 
of the pockets and for about 30 seconds until 
she told him to stop, the second time, reaching 
inside of her pockets and rubbing her thighs 
for about 5 seconds until she hit him in the 
stomach Webster claims that he never 
touched Plaintiffs person, but instead, only 
took keys out of her pockets after she gave 
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him permission to do so Taking the facts in 
the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, 
however, the court assumes that these touches 
were inappropriate and unwelcome Along 
with the two incidents of improper touching, 
Plaintiff alleges that Webster asked her out on 
dates "just about every day" and acted 
flirtatiously towards her Additionally, 
Plaintiffs cousin, Vivian Shegog, who worked 
along side Plaintiff and Webster, testified to a 
series of harassing incidents to which Webster 
subjected Plaintiff These included moving 
close to Plaintiff and "patting her up," going 
out of his way to brush up against her, staring 
at her, making comments as she bent over, 
and touching her 
*11 Even taking all of these incidents 
together, however, they do not establish 
harassment that is severe and pervasive 
enough to be actionable The two incidents of 
touching may have been inappropriate, but 
isolated instances of unwanted sexual 
advances are not enough to create a hostile 
work environment See, eg , Saxton v American 
Telephone and Telegraph Co , 10 F 3d 526, 534 
(7th Cir 1993) In Saxton, Plaintiffs supervisor, 
Jerome Richardson, placed his hand on her leg 
above the knee several times, rubbed his hand 
along her upper thigh and grabbed her and 
kissed her for two to three seconds while the 
two were out together Id at 528 After 
plaintiff told him to stop, he did so, but three 
weeks later after the two had lunch together 
he came at her from behind some bushes and 
attempted to grab her Id The Seventh Circuit 
found that "although Richardson's conduct 
was undoubtedly inappropriate, it was not so 
severe or pervasive as to create an objectively 
hostile work environment " Id at 534 The 
court recognized that "any employee in 
Saxton's position might have experienced 
significant discomfort and distress as the 
result of her supervisor's uninvited and 
unwelcome advances," but explained that the 
limited nature of the incidents kept such 
behavior from rising to the level of pervasive 
harassment, even where there were "two 
instances of sexual misconduct rather than 
one " Id 
Similarly, Webster touched Plaintiff on only 
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two occasions that Plaintiff could recall and 
both incidents were limited in nature In 
Plaintiffs own version, the first incident 
lasted only about 30 seconds while the second 
incident lasted about 5 seconds Webster 
stopped touching her the moment she told him 
to and never touched her again once he 
received a written warning from U Haul 
against such behavior Thus, taking PlaintifFs 
version of the incidents as true, Webster's 
behavior was inappropriate and offensive but 
neither severe nor pervasive See, e g Koelsch 
v Beltone Electronics Corp , 46 F 3d 705, 708 
(7th Cir 1995Xoffensive remarks and two 
incidents of physical contact by supervisor 
including grabbing plaintiffs buttocks found 
to be nonactionable harassment) 
Nor does Webster's occasional flirting in the 
workplace change the analysis Plaintiff 
explained the flirting only "sometimes" 
bothered her In Robinson v Tiuman College, 
No 97 C 896, 1999 WL 33887, at *2 (N D 111 
Jan 19, 1999), plaintiff claimed that her 
supervisor referred to her as 'honey," 
"sweetie,' or "baby", told her he couldn't 
believe they hadn't slept together yet and told 
her that if he wasn't married he would marry 
her, made frequent telephone calls to her for 
work related matters but spoke to her in a 
romantic tone of voice, and touched her 
buttocks on two separate occasions The court 
found that the remarks, "while 
unquestionably obnoxious and boorish," were 
not "sufficiently severe or pervasive to have 
altered the conditions of Robinson's 
employment or to have made her workplace 
hellish " Id at *5 The court also found that 
the two "seemingly isolated" instances of 
touching "occurring approximately one month 
apart," though inappropriate, did not rise to 
the level of actionable conduct Id, see also 
Weiss v Coca Cola Bottling Co , 990 F 2d 333, 
337 (7th Cir 1993Xno actionable harassment 
where supervisor asked plaintiff out for dates, 
called her a "dumb blond," placed his hand on 
her shoulder several times, placed "I love you" 
signs in her work area and attempted to kiss 
her in a bar and in the office) 
*12 Finally, PlaintifFs claim that Webster 
asked her out on dates on a "daily basis" and 
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Shegog's testimony about further harassing 
acts to which Webster subjected Plaintiff do 
not make this claim an actionable one A 
supervisor is ill advised to ask his subordinate 
out on a daily basis For purposes of Title VII, 
however, a Plaintiff must show not only that 
"a reasonable plaintiff would find [her 
environment] offensive," but also that ' the 
plaintiff actually perceived it as such " Mosher 
v Dollar Tree Stores, Inc , 240 F 3d 662, 668 
(7th Cir 2001), Hostetler v Quality Dining Inc , 
218 F 3 d 798, 807 (7th Cir 2000) Plaintiff 
testified that, though Defendant Webster 
asked her out on dates frequently, these 
requests did not bother her and she did not 
consider them to be sexual harassment 
Because she herself did not find this behavior 
offensive, the court need not consider what 
others may have thought about such behavior 
Similarly, Shegog's testimony concerning all 
kinds of offensive conduct that Plaintiff was 
allegedly subjected to does not meet the 
subjective component of the test Plaintiff 
herself testified that the two incidents of 
touching and Webster's flirting were the only 
acts of harassment she perceived Where 
Plaintiff herself was unaware of Webster's 
additional alleged misconduct, she cannot be 
said to have suffered from its effects Thus, 
Plaintiff has not established an actionable 
harassment claim and summary judgment is 
properly granted to U Haul on this claim 
2 Employer's Liability 
Even assuming that Plaintiff had established 
an actionable harassment claim, Defendant U 
Haul could not be held vicariously liable for 
Webster's harassment in this case An 
employer is subject to vicarious liability to a 
victimized employee for an actionable hostile 
environment created by a supervisor with 
immediate (or successively higher) authority 
over the employee Murray v Chicago Transit 
Authority, No 99 3774, __ F 3d _ , 2001 WL 
493433, at *4 (7th Cir May 10, 2001Xquoting 
Faragher v City of Boca Raton 524 U S 775, 
807 08 (1998) If the supervisor's harassment 
culminates in a tangible employment action, 
such as discharge, demotion, or undesirable 
reassignment, the employer will always be 
vicariously liable for the supervisor's action 
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Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 
807-08. When, however, no tangible 
employment action is taken, a defending 
employer may raise an affirmative defense to 
liability or damages, subject to proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Id. The 
employer must then show: (a) that it exercised 
reasonable care to prevent and correct 
promptly any sexually harassing behavior; 
and (b) that the plaintiff employee 
unreasonably failed to take advantage of 
available preventive or corrective measures. 
Id. 
Plaintiff has offered evidence that she 
suffered some tangible employment action as 
a result of her complaint of harassment, as 
discussed below. There is no evidence, 
however, that she suffered any adverse action 
as a result of the alleged harassment. Indeed, 
Plaintiff herself admits that during the time 
of the alleged harassment, Defendant Webster 
gave her a raise and promoted her to a full 
time employee. Thus, U-Haul is entitled to 
assert an affirmative defense. 
*13 It is undisputed that U-Haul had a 
detailed sexual harassment policy in place 
before Plaintiff began working there. This 
policy was included in a publication given to 
Plaintiff when she was hired and, in fact, it 
was this publication that Plaintiff used to 
ultimately find the 800 number she called to 
complain about Webster. In response to 
Plaintiffs call, U-Haul sent its marketing 
company president Chris McDermott to the 
Park Forest facility to investigate Plaintiffs 
complaint two days later. Plaintiff complains 
that McDermott did not handle the 
investigation according to company policy and 
conducted a poor investigation in a number of 
ways, including failing to talk to the Plaintiff 
first, talking to a witness without telling the 
witness to keep the matter confidential, and 
failing to talk to certain witnesses such as 
Plaintiffs cousin Vivian Shegog. It is 
undisputed, however, that after the 
investigation, McDermott gave Webster a 
written warning stating that any future 
inappropriate comments or actions would 
subject him to immediate termination. 
Webster then reviewed and signed that 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim 
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warning. It is also undisputed that Webster 
never touched Plaintiff again after U-Haul's 
actions. Thus, U-Haul has clearly met the first 
prong of the affirmative defense. 
To support the second prong, U-Haul points 
out that Plaintiff did not report that Webster 
had touched her until the second touching 
incident occurred. U- Haul notes that Plaintiff 
waited more than a month after the first 
alleged touching, more than a week after the 
second alleged touching, and through six 
months of Webster asking Plaintiff out before 
reporting the incidents. (Def/s 56.1 Statement 
|^ 44.) The court is hesitant to characterize as 
"unreasonable" a plaintiff who tries to resolve 
an inappropriate incident herself (by telling 
the harasser never to touch her again) and 
waits until a repeated incident occurs before 
reporting the harassment. Nevertheless, U-
Haul could not be expected to remedy the first 
incident of touching or the alleged flirting 
until Plaintiffs phone call at the end of 
February. Thus, even if Plaintiff had stated an 
actionable harassment claim, U-Haul would 
not be vicariously liable for Webster's 
behavior. 
D. Retaliation 
Plaintiff next claims that Webster retaliated 
against her for complaining to U-Haul about 
him and for filing her EEOC claim. Title VII 
makes it unlawful "for an employer to 
discriminate against any of [its] employees ... 
because he [or she] has opposed any practice 
made an unlawful employment practice" by 
Title VII. Murray v. Chicago Transit Authority, 
2001 WL 493433, at *7 (citing 42 U.S.C.2000e-
3(a)). To state a prima facie case of retaliation 
under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that: (1) 
she engaged in statutorily protected 
expression; (2) she suffered an adverse action 
by her employer; and (3) there is a causal link 
between her protected expression and the 
adverse action. Sweeney v. West, 149 F.3d 550, 
555 (7th Cir. 1998). 
*14 Plaintiff bases her retaliation claim on 
the fact that after she complained of the 
perceived harassment: (1) she received a 
number of written reprimands whereas before 
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this time she had never received any 
reprimand; (2) Webster accused her of 
stealing; (3) Webster made her work longer 
hours and gave her additional tasks that she 
had never been asked to perform before; and 
(4) Webster became verbally abusive to her. 
Defendant U-Haul contends that Plaintiff has 
not established a prima facie case of 
retaliation because none of these actions 
constitute materially adverse employment 
action and, even if they were adverse actions, 
Plaintiff cannot establish the required causal 
link between her protected expression and the 
adverse action, nor can she show that 
Defendant's proffered reasons for the actions 
were a pretext for retaliation. 
Adverse job action is not limited "solely to 
loss or reduction of pay or monetary benefits" 
but can encompass "other forms of adversity 
as well." Smart v. Ball State University, 89 F.3d 
437, 441 (7th Cir.1996). A materially adverse 
change in the terms and conditions of 
employment, however, must be more 
disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an 
alteration of job responsibilities. Crady v. 
Liberty National Bank and Trust Co., 993 F.2d 
132, 135 (7th Cir.1993). Such a change might 
be indicated "by a termination of employment, 
a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or 
salary, a less distinguished title, a material 
loss of benefits, significantly diminished 
material responsibilities, or other indices that 
might be unique to a particular situation." Id,; 
Bell v. EPA, 232 F.3d 546, 555 (7th Cir.2000). 
Plaintiff contends that she received a number 
of written reprimands shortly after she 
complained about Webster's harassing 
treatment, but she admits that those 
reprimands did not lead to any demotions, 
reduced pay or other tangible consequences. 
The Seventh Circuit has already concluded 
that "negative performance evaluations, 
standing alone, cannot constitute an adverse 
employment action," where those evaluations 
were not linked to any tangible job 
consequences. Sweeney v. West, 149 F.3d 550, 
556 (7th Cir.l998Xciting Smart v. Ball State 
University, 89 F.3d 437, 442 (7th Cir.1996) 
("There is little support for the argument that 
negative performance evaluations alone can 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim 
constitute an adverse employment action."). In 
addition, even if such actions could be seen as 
adverse, Plaintiff cannot show that U-Haul's 
proffered reasons for giving the reprimands 
were pretext for retaliation. In fact, Plaintiff 
admits that some of the reprimands were to a 
degree accurate: she admits she did not make 
a bank deposit when she was supposed to, she 
had a visitor come to the store, and she went 
out in a company van. Plaintiff has reasonable 
explanations for all of her actions, but such 
explanations are not relevant to the inquiry at 
hand: whether the employer's reasons for a 
decision were honest, not whether they were 
correct. Sweeney, 149 F.3d at 557. Nor has 
Plaintiff offered evidence that other workers 
guilty of similar misconduct were not subject 
to discipline. Thus, the written reprimands do 
not support Plaintiffs retaliation claim. 
*15 Plaintiff also complains that Webster 
accused her of theft and let U- Haul 
management know about these accusations. 
As with the written reprimands, however, 
Plaintiff does not allege that she suffered any 
adverse employment actions due to these 
accusations. Webster never attempted to fire 
Plaintiff for theft nor did U-Haul, she was 
never suspended pending any investigation, 
and she never lost any pay with regard to 
these accusations. Even assuming Webster 
made such accusations, therefore, they do not 
constitute adverse employment action. 
Finally, Plaintiff complains that she was 
assigned additional tasks immediately after 
she complained about Webster's harassment 
and, during this time, Webster became 
verbally abusive to her. U-Haul argues that, 
even if Plaintiffs testimony is believed, 
Webster was merely requiring Plaintiff to 
perform tasks already in her job description. 
Defendants note, further, that Plaintiff had 
greater responsibility than her co-workers 
because she was the only full time employee 
at the time and was second in command to 
Webster. (Def.'s 56.1 Statement f{ 36, 76.) 
Plaintiff admits that the additional tasks she 
was assigned were always part of the customer 
service representative's job description, and 
that she received overtime pay for the extra 
hours she worked. She insists, however, that 
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Webster did not assign her those undesirable 
tasks until after she voiced a complaint. 
(Def.'s 56.1 Statement 1 77; PL's 56.1 
Response f 76.) 
The Seventh Circuit has found that a change 
in an employee's assigned work tasks may 
constitute material adverse employment 
action even when those tasks are still within 
the scope of her job description. For example, 
in Dahm v. Flynn, 60 F.3d 253, 254 (7th 
Cir.1995), plaintiff, a former employee of the 
Wisconsin State Lottery, claimed that her 
employer retaliated against her after she 
testified about problems in her department in 
front of the Joint Audit Committee of the 
Wisconsin legislature. According to Dahm, 
after she gave this testimony, her job duties 
began to change in a way that she perceived 
as a "de- skilling" of her position. Id. at 255. 
Such changes included, among other things: 
(1) certain tasks that formerly were within her 
purview were delegated to her assistants; (2) 
she was given increased responsibility for 
processing requests, a less skilled job than she 
usually performed; and (3) she was required to 
begin documenting her daily telephone calls 
and her meetings with employees. Id. Despite 
evidence that these shifting responsibilities 
were "within the confines of her job 
description," the Seventh Circuit rejected the 
notion that such changes could not therefore 
be considered a materially adverse change in 
the terms and conditions of employment. Id. a t 
257. Instead, the court found that such change 
in responsibilities from intellectually 
stimulating activities to routine work could 
rise to the level of an adverse employment 
action, "even if the time required to perform 
the duties remains constant." Id. 
*16 Plaintiff claims that after she complained 
of the harassing behavior, she was not only 
given additional work, but also made to 
perform more unpleasant tasks that she had 
not previously been required to perform, 
certain of which were normally left to the 
male employees. For obvious reasons, U-Haul 
insists that everyone, male and female, 
performed all of the tasks as a customer 
service representative. Plaintiff has, however, 
presented enough evidence to call this practice 
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into question. If a trier of fact were to believe 
Plaintiff and her cousin Shegog that there 
were certain, more menial tasks that she was 
not required to perform until after she 
complained about Webster's harassment, this 
change in job assignments would be enough 
for Plaintiff to establish her claim of 
retaliation. See, e.g., Gaser v. Levitt, No. 98 C 
210, 1998 WL 684207, at *4 (N.D.IH. Sept. 23, 
1998Xwhere plaintiff alleged that his 
employer "significantly decreased the quality, 
if not the quantity, of his work assignments," 
by, among other things, assigning him "only 
routine tasks," the alleged change in 
plaintiffs job responsibilities constituted an 
adverse employment action); see also Johnson v. 
Chicago Bd. of Ed., No. 00 C 1800, 2000 WL 
1785311, at *5 (N.D.Ill.Dec. 5, 2000Xplaintiff 
had alleged sufficient facts to show an adverse 
employment action where she was transferred 
to another shift that she did not want and was 
allegedly given an increased work load). 
Nor is the court convinced of U-Haufs 
assertion that Plaintiffs tasks changed after 
the birth of her child, not as a result of her 
complaint. Plaintiff admits that from the time 
she was nine months pregnant, in August of 
1998, until six weeks after giving birth, she 
was not required to do certain tasks at U 
Haul, but both Webster and Plaintiff say she 
was already performing all of her tasks by the 
end of 1998. Thus, by testifying that she did 
not have to do some of these assignments and 
did not suffer verbal abuse until after she filed 
her complaint, Plaintiff establishes a dispute 
concerning the requisite causal connection 
between the adverse action and the 
retaliation. See, e.g., Sweeney v. West, 149 F.3d 
550, 557 (7th Cir.1998) (A "telling temporal 
sequence" can establish the required nexus 
between an employee's protected expression 
and any adverse employment action, as long 
as the action follows soon after the protected 
expression: "One day might do it, so too might 
one week.") 
Although the court concluded that Plaintiffs 
retaliation claim may go forward, a note of 
caution is in order. The court has granted 
summary judgment on the remainder of 
Plaintiffs claims, and she has not alleged 
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constructive discharge. Thus, any damages 
Plaintiff might receive would be limited to 
compensation for the harm she suffered during 
the short period of time (from the end of 
February 1999 until the end of May 1999) 
during which Plaintiff allegedly experienced 
retaliation. 
E. Defamation 
*17 Defamation is "the publication of 
anything injurious to the good name or 
reputation of another, or which tends to bring 
him into disrepute." Howse v. Northwestern 
Memorial Hospital, No. 98 C 4488, 2000 WL 
764952, at *8 (N.D.I11.2000). Under Illinois 
law, words that impute the commission of a 
criminal offense are considered defamatory per 
se. Chisolm v. Foothill Capital Corp., 3 F.Supp.2d 
925, 938 (N.D.I11.1998Xquoting Beasley v. St. 
Mary's Hosp., 200 Ill.App.3d 1024, 1033, 558 
N.E.2d 677, 683 (5th Dist.1990)). To prove a 
claim of defamation, Plaintiff must establish 
that: (1) Defendant made a false statement of 
fact concerning her; (2) there was an 
unprivileged publication of the defamatory 
statement to a third party by Defendant; and 
(3) Plaintiff was, in fact, damaged by that 
publication. Cianci v. Pettibone Corp., 298 
Ill.App.3d 419, 424, 698 N.E.2d 674, 678 (1st 
Dist.1998); see also Chisolm, 3 F.Supp.2d at 
938; Pandya v. Hoerchler, 256 Ill.App.3d 669, 
673, 628 N.E.2d 1040, 1043 (1st Dist.1993). 
Plaintiff claims that after she left U-Haul, 
Webster uttered defamatory statements to 
potential employers, including St. James 
Hospital, Ingalls Hospital, and Rent-A-Center. 
Specifically, Plaintiff claims that when 
potential employers called Webster for a 
reference, he falsely told them that Plaintiff 
was a thief. [FN8] Plaintiff bases her entire 
claim of defamation on the following facts: 
according to Plaintiff, her cousin, Vivian 
Shegog, called a woman, Maria, from Ingalls 
Hospital who told Shegog that Plaintiff was 
not going to be hired because Webster said 
that Plaintiff was a thief. Surprisingly 
enough, Shegog actually denies ever having 
had such a conversation, and instead testified 
that it was Plaintiff who called Maria and 
then told Shegog what Maria said. Other than 
this contradictory evidence, Plaintiff supports 
her claim by offering only her own conviction 
that, with Rent-A-Center, another potential 
employer, she "pretty much had [a] foot in the 
door" but was not hired. (PL's Dep., at 155-56.) 
[FN9] 
FN8. Because Webster denied ever calling Plaintiff a 
thief and denied that he believed she stole anything 
from U-Haul, truth cannot be a defense to this 
defamation claim. 
FN9. Shegog also testifies that at one point she 
called Webster, pretending be a prospective 
employer checking Plaintiffs references. (Shegog 
Dep., at 87-88.) According to Shegog, Webster 
responded that Plaintiff was a thief and had stolen 
money and products from the store and property 
from customers. (Id., at 87-88.) Perhaps because she 
recognizes that this information is unreliable, 
Plaintiff does not mention this incident anywhere in 
her brief or in her lengthy statement of facts. In any 
event, because Plaintiff could not have been 
damaged by Webster's statements to her own cousin, 
the testimony, even if true, would not advance 
Plaintiffs defamation claim. 
Both U-Haul and Webster contend that 
Plaintiff has failed to provide any admissible 
evidence to support her defamation claim. The 
court agrees. Leaving aside the glaring 
problem that Plaintiff and Shegog cannot 
agree on who allegedly called Ingalls Hospital 
and, assuming that Shegog did call the 
hospital as Plaintiff states, any information 
that Maria provided Shegog about what 
Webster said is, nonetheless, inadmissible 
hearsay. To be sure, the testimony of a 
witness that Webster told him or her that 
Plaintiff was a thief would not be hearsay 
because it would be offered to prove that 
Webster made the statement, not that the 
statement was true. See Bularz v. Prudential Ins. 
Co. of Am., 93 F.3d 372, 377-78 (7th Cir.1996) 
(in a defamation case, testimony of a witness 
that an individual defamed the plaintiff is 
never hearsay where it is not being brought in 
for the truth of the matter, but, rather, merely 
to prove the statement was made); Chisolm, 3 
F.Supp.3d at 939 (same). Thus, Maria could 
properly testify that she heard Webster call 
Plaintiff a thief. Absent Maria's testimony, 
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however, her alleged conversation with 
Shegog is inadmissible hearsay, as is Shegog's 
conversation reporting the whole incident to 
Plaintiff. See, e.g., Bularz, 93 F.3d at 377-78 
(where witness testified that a sales manager 
told her that another individual told him that 
yet a fourth individual defamed the plaintiffs, 
such testimony constituted double hearsay). 
Because Plaintiff offers no way around this 
double hearsay, nor does she offer the 
testimony of even one employer who allegedly 
heard Webster call Plaintiff a thief, Plaintiffs 
defamation claim cannot survive summary 
judgment. 
*18 Plaintiffs blanket assertion that her 
inability to get a position at Rent-A-Center 
resulted from defamation is a nonstarter. 
There is no evidence that Webster actually 
spoke to any individual at Rent-A-Center. 
Plaintiff admits that she did not speak to a 
single potential employer to determine 
whether anyone called Webster for a 
recommendation, and Webster denied telling 
any potential employer that she was a thief. 
To prevail on a claim of defamation, mere 
speculation concerning the defendant's words 
is simply not enough; Plaintiff must 
affirmatively establish publication of the 
defamatory statements. See, e.g. Gibson v. 
Phillip Morris, Inc., 292 Ill.App.3d 267, 275, 
685 N.E.2d 638, 644 (5th Dist.1997) 
(publication is an essential element of a cause 
of action for defamation). Because Plaintiff 
has failed to present admissible evidence to 
establish that any defamation occurred, the 
court need not address the problematic 
inconsistencies between Plaintiffs and 
Shegog's testimony, nor need it address 
whether any such information Webster gave 
future employers was protected by a 
conditional privilege. Summary judgment is 
properly granted to Defendants on this count. 
summary judgment papers under seal (Doc. 
Nos.79, 103) is denied. Defendant Arlester 
Webster's motion for summary judgment on 
Plaintiffs defamation count (Doc. No. 75) is 
also granted. Additionally, because Defendant 
Webster has not moved for summary judgment 
with respect to Plaintiffs assault and battery 
claim against him, that claim survives this 
opinion. Because all other federal claims 
against Webster are dismissed, however, and 
because the state law assault and battery 
claim can be severed from Plaintiffs 
retaliation action, that claim is dismissed 
without prejudice to proceeding on that claim 
in state court. 
2001 WL 648637, 2001 WL 648637 (N.D.I11.) 
END OF DOCUMENT 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant U-
Haul 's Motion for summary judgment (Doc. 
No. 77) is granted as to Plaintiffs sexual 
harassment count and defamation count and 
denied as to Plaintiffs retaliation claim. 
Defendant U- Haul 's motion to file certain 
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OPINION 
BURNETT, Justice. 
*1 Dalton W. Davis appeals a summary 
judgment entered in favor of Household 
International, Inc., Household Commercial 
Financial Services, Inc. (a subsidiary of 
Household International, Inc.); H.F.C. 
Commercial Realty, Inc. (a subsidiary of 
Household International, Inc. and Household 
Commercial Financial Services, Inc.), and 
Household Finance Corp. (Household), and 
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Thomas Nolan. Davis, a real estate developer, 
brought this defamation suit alleging that 
Nolan, acting in the course and scope of his 
employment with Household, made 
defamatory statements to Mahmood Wakani, 
a New York loan broker. In three points of 
error, Davis asserts that the trial court erred 
in granting summary judgment on his slander 
per se claims. We overrule Davis's points of 
error. We affirm the trial court's judgment. 
FACTS 
Davis began searching for financing for Quail 
Run, a strip shopping center development, in 
1986. He contacted W.C. Laws about 
obtaining financing for the project. Laws then 
contacted Wakani, a loan broker in New York. 
As a result, Wakani sent the loan package to 
Household in Atlanta, Georgia. Thomas 
Nolan, who worked for Household, reviewed 
the loan package. The record contains a letter 
from Nolan to Wakani dated September 5, 
1986 which states in its entirety "Enclosed is 
the Quail Run package. As we discussed, I 
have no interest in this particular borrower." 
Davis alleges that Nolan made the following 
false statements to Wakani: 
1) that Davis "screwed" a bank in Dallas out 
of over six million dollars; 
2) that he [Nolan] knew of a lending 
institution which had difficulties in a project 
in which Davis was involved; 
3) that he [Nolan] "had known the 
borroweifDavis] from previous transactions, 
and I preferred not to deal with him"; and 
4) that "there was an administration problem 
getting information." 
Davis and Laws met with Wakani in New 
York in September of 1986. In his deposition, 
Laws testified that Wakani repeatedly told 
Laws, in telephone conversations prior to that 
meeting, that he had information that "Davis 
screwed a bank in Dallas out of over six 
million dollars." Laws did not learn that 
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Nolan was the source of the information until 
the September meeting. Wakani denies that 
Nolan made the statement to him, and 
therefore he could not have repeated it to 
Laws and Davis. Wakani admitted that Nolan 
told him that another lending institution had 
a problem with a project in which Davis was 
involved. 
Wakani testified by deposition that he ceased 
efforts to locate financing for Davis after the 
September meeting because Laws requested 
that he return the loan package. He stated 
that he contacted two other lenders between 
his conversation with Nolan and the 
September meeting. Neither lender was 
interested in the project. Laws stated that 
Wakani returned the loan package and 
refused to make further efforts on the project 
after his conversation with Nolan. 
SLANDER PER SE 
In his first point of error, Davis asserts that 
the trial court erred in granting Household 
and Nolan summary judgment on his slander 
per se claim regarding the statement that 
Nolan told Wakani that Davis "screwed" a 
bank in Dallas out of six million dollars. 
Summary judgment may be rendered only if 
the pleadings, depositions, admissions and 
affidavits show (1) that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and (2) that the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); 
Rodriguez v. Nay lor Indus., Inc., 763 S.W.2d 411, 
413 (Tex. 1989). A summary judgment seeks 
to eliminate patently unmeritorious claims 
and untenable defenses, not to deny a party its 
right to a full hearing on the merits of any 
real issue of fact. Gulbenkian v. Penn, 151 Tex. 
412, 416, 252 S.W.2d 929, 931 (1952). 
Household and Nolan, as movants, must 
either (1) disprove at least one element of each 
of the plaintiffs theories of recovery or (2) 
plead and conclusively establish each essential 
element of an affirmative defense, thereby 
rebutting the plaintiffs cause of action. City of 
Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 
671, 679 (Tex. 1979). 
*2 The elements of slander are (1) a 
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defamatory statement, (2) which is orally 
communicated or published, (3) without legal 
justification, and (4) which is actionable per se 
or per quod. Glenn v. Gidel, 496 S. W.2d 692, 697 
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973, no writ). Slander 
is actionable per se if the language is so 
obviously harmful to the plaintiff that it 
requires no proof of its injurious character. 
See Arant v. Jajfe, 436 S.W.2d 169, 176 (Tex. 
Civ. App.-Dallas 1968, no writ) (libel suit). 
Slander per quod is actionable only upon a 
showing of special damages. Fields v. 
Worsham, 476 S.W.2d 421, 426 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1972, writ ref d n.r.e.). Oral words are 
actionable without proof of special damages if 
they impute the commission of a crime or 
affect the plaintiff injuriously in his 
profession, business or occupation. Bayoud v. 
Sigler, 555 S.W.2d 913, 915 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1977, writ dism'd). 
Publication of a defamatory statement means 
to communicate it orally, in writing, or in 
print, to some third person capable of 
understanding its defamatory import. Houston 
Belt & Terminal R. Co. v. Wherry, 548 S.W.2d 
743, 751 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 
1976, writ refd n.r.e.), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 
962 (1977). Davis seeks to establish the 
defamatory statement and its publication from 
Nolan to Wakani through his and Laws's 
testimony of the conversation with Wakani. 
This situation presents a double hearsay 
problem. The first part is the statement from 
Nolan to Wakani, and the second part is the 
statement from Wakani to Laws and Davis. 
Texas Rules of Civil Evidence 805 provides: 
hearsay included within hearsay is not 
excluded under the hearsay rules if each part 
of the combined statement conforms with an 
exception to the hearsay rule provided in 
these rules. 
Nolan's statement to Wakani would not be 
hearsay because it is verbal conduct which 
constitutes an operative fact of Davis's cause 
of action. See Byrd Int 7, Inc. v. Electronic Data 
Systems Corp., 629 S.W.2d 177, 179 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1982, writ refd n.r.e.); Scotchcraft Bldg. 
Materials, Inc. v. Parker, 618 S.W.2d 835, 836-
37 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist] 1981, 
writ refd n.r.e.); Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 801(eX2) 
(Admission by Party-Opponent); McCormick, 
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Evidence § 249 (3d ed. 1987). Thus, if the 
statement were offered by someone who heard 
it, such as Wakani, it would be admissible. 
See Scotchcraft, 618 S.W.2d at 837. The Wakani 
out-of-court statement quoting Nolan, when 
offered by Davis and Laws, is obviously 
hearsay. Davis offers it for the truth of its 
assertion that Nolan published the defamatory 
statement to Wakani. The statement does not 
fall under any recognized exception to the 
hearsay rule. Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 803. 
The summary judgment evidence shows that 
Laws and Davis testified that Nolan made the 
statement "that Davis screwed a bank in 
Dallas out of six million dollars" to Wakani, 
and then Wakani repeated the statement to 
them. Wakani denies ever hearing or 
repeating that statement. The testimony of 
Laws and Davis is inadmissible hearsay. 
Without the testimony of Laws and Davis, 
Davis can not establish publication of the 
statement. Nolan and Household have shown 
that, as a matter of law, Davis cannot 
establish an essential element of his cause of 
action. We overrule Davis's first point of 
error. 
DEFAMATION AS A MATTER OF LAW 
*3 In his second point of error, Davis asserts 
that the trial court erred in granting summary 
judgment as to his alternative claims because 
those claims were not slander per quod 
requiring the pleading and proof of special 
damages. The alternative claims rest on the 
other three statements made by Nolan to 
Wakani: 
1) that he [Nolan] knew of a lending 
institution which had difficulties in a project 
in which Davis was involved; 
2) that he [Nolan] "had known the 
borrowerfDavis] from previous transactions, 
and I preferred not to deal with him"; and 
3) that "there was an administration problem 
getting information." 
The threshold question, which is a question of 
law for the court to decide, is whether Nolan's 
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words are reasonably capable of a defamatory 
meaning. Musser v. Smith Protective Services, 
Inc., 723 S.W.2d 653, 653 (Tex. 1987) (libel 
suit on a letter sent by a company president to 
a client discussing a former company 
employee). Communication is defamatory if it 
tends to harm the reputation of another, to 
lower him in the estimation of the community, 
or to deter third persons from associating or 
dealing with him. Gulf Atlantic Life Ins. Co. v. 
Hurlbut, 696 S.W.2d 83, 96 (Tex. App.-Dallas 
1985), supplemented, 749 S.W.2d 96, rev'd on 
other grounds, 749 S.W.2d 762 (1988) 
(discussing the differences in the burden of 
proof and damages between personal 
defamation and business disparagement); 
Restatement(second) of Torts § 559 (1977). 
Defamatory statements, libelous or 
slanderous, must be construed as a whole in 
light of the surrounding circumstances based 
upon how a person of ordinary intelligence 
would perceive the statement. See Musser, 723 
S.W.2d at 655; Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. 
Tucker, 806 S.W.2d 914, 920 (Tex. App.-Corpus 
Christi 1991, no writ) (applying libel standard 
announced in Musser to slander case). Only 
when the court determines the language is 
ambiguous or of doubtful import should the 
jury then determine the statement's meaning 
and the effect the statement's publication has 
on an ordinary person. See Musser, 723 
S.W.2d at 655. 
In the first statement, Nolan said that a 
lending institution had difficulties with a 
project that Davis was involved in. [FN1] 
Innuendo can only be used to explain, but not 
to extend the effect and meaning of a 
statement. See Arant, 436 S.W.2d at 176. To 
interpret this statement as meaning that a 
previous lending institution had problems 
with a project because Davis was involved in it 
impermissibly expands the meaning of the 
statement. In the second statement, Nolan 
says that he prefers not to deal with Davis. 
That statement does not reflect adversely on 
Davis, but rather reflects Nolan's preference 
in a business relationship. In the third 
statement, like the first, Nolan says that there 
was administration problems on getting 
information on Davis. Once again, that does 
not reflect adversely on Davis or his business 
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dealings. It does not infer that Davis 
prevented the dissemination of information on 
himself. We hold, that as a matter of law, 
these statements are not reasonably capable of 
a defamatory meaning. We overrule Davis's 
second point of error. 
*4 In his third point of error, Davis asserts 
that even if his alternative claims were 
slander per quod, Household and Nolan failed 
in their summary judgment proof and factual 
issues were presented. Because of our 
disposition of Davis's first and second points of 
error, we do not reach Davis's third point of 
error. 
We affirm the trial court's judgment. 
Do Not Publish 
Tex. R. App. P. 90 
FN1 Notably, this is the only statement of the three 
alleged that Wakani admits that Nolan made to him. 
It is also the only statement that Davis specifically 
refers to in his last two points of error. 
1991 WL 110042 (Tex.App.-Dallas) 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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WOLIN, District Judge 
*1 This matter comes before the Court the on 
the motion of defendant, Scott Paper Company 
("Scott"), for summary judgment against 
plaintiff, Daniel M. Glenn ("Glenn"), pursuant 
to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Glenn initially brought a five-
count complaint in the Superior Court of New 
Jersey against Scott and Daniel Schafer 
("Schafer"), Vice President in Charge of Sales 
at Scott Worldwide Foodservice, a division of 
Scott. On grounds of diversity, Scott and 
Schafer then removed the action to this Court, 
pursuant to title 28, sections 1441 and 1446 of 
the United States Code. The Court 
subsequently dismissed all claims with 
prejudice as to Schafer. Scott now brings this 
summary judgment motion on Glenn's 
remaining claims. 
In reference to Glenn's complaint, only 
Counts One, Three and Four are relevant to 
the pending motion. In Count One, Glenn 
alleges age discrimination in violation of New 
Jersey's Law Against Discrimination 
("NJLAD"), N.J.S.A. § 10:5-1 et seq. In 
Counts Three and Four, Glenn sets forth 
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common law claims of slander. At oral 
argument on this motion, Count Five, Glenn's 
common law claim for intentional interference 
with prospective business relations, was 
dismissed. Count Two is applicable only 
against Schafer, who is no longer a defendant 
in the action. 
For the reasons set forth below, Scott's 
motion for summary judgment will be granted 
on all counts. 
BACKGROUND 
A. Glenn's Employment History-The Age 
Discrimination Claim 
Glenn was born on September 24, 1932. In 
March of 1970, Glenn was employed by the 
Hoffmaster Company, a manufacturer and 
seller of tabletop products in the foodservice 
industry. By June of 1985, Glenn was serving 
as Hoffmaster's Eastern Regional Sales 
Representative. At that time, Scott acquired 
the Hoffmaster Company and formed 
Hoffmaster-The Food Service Business of 
Scott Paper. Scott retained the Hoffmaster 
Company's management team to run the 
newly formed division, and Glenn continued to 
work in his regional management position. 
Schafer joined the Hoffmaster Company in 
1977 and held the Western Regional Sales 
Manager position at the time of the Scott 
acquisition. He, too, retained his 
management position within Scott's 
Hoffmaster Division. 
In October of 1988, Scott acquired two other 
manufacturing companies in the foodservice 
industry and reorganized to form a new 
organization-The Worldwide Foodservice 
Business ("WFB"). WFB was comprised of 
two product groups-one making container 
products, the other making tabletop products, 
which included Hoffmaster products. 
As part of the reorganization, WFB Vice 
President and Business Leader, Robert 
Vanderselt ("Vanderselt"), selected a core 
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management team to oversee WFB operations. 
The new team replaced the management 
group previously retained from the original 
Hoffmaster Company. Schafer was named to 
the new management team under the title of 
Vice President, Foodservice Sales. 
Vanderselt had considered Glenn as a 
candidate for this position. 
*2 With the formation of WFB, Glenn was 
appointed Foodservice Regional Sales 
Manager for the East (the "Sales Position"). 
He received a salary increase and a high grade 
position. Glenn's responsibilities included 
selling container and tabletop products and 
managing container and tabletop sales 
representatives. Within the WFB hierarchy, 
Glenn was to report directly to Schafer. 
On June 5, 1989, Vanderselt informed Glenn 
that Schafer was not satisfied with Glenn's 
performance and, in lieu of termination, 
offered Glenn the position of Market/Customer 
Development Manager (the "Development 
Position"). The job was newly created and 
designed to develop and lead the 
implementation of product and customer 
innovations in key domestic and international 
markets. On June 6, 1989, Glenn accepted 
the position at the same annual salary of 
$81,000 and subsequently received a $2,500 
bonus on June 25, 1989. After Glenn's 
transfer, Daniel Rodenbush-31 years old at 
that time-took over the Sales Position. 
By January of 1990, the extent of growth in 
Glenn's area forced WFB to create another 
Development Position-filled by Scott 
employee John Acton. In March of 1990, 
Glenn received a $3,000 increase in his annual 
salary. In July or August of 1990, Sharon 
Robbins ("Robbins") replaced Vanderselt as 
WFB Vice President and Business Leader. In 
December of 1990, Richard Leaman 
("Leaman"), President of Scott Worldwide, 
eliminated Glenn's Development Position and 
terminated Glenn's employment with Scott. 
B. Events Subsequent to Glenn's 
Termination-The Defamation Claims 
Shortly after Glenn's termination, from 
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December 14 through 17, 1990, WFB held a 
sales meeting in Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania, at 
which WFB introduced to its sales force 
several new products, including the Custom 
Easy line. After leaving the Bryn Mawr 
meeting, William Connelly ("Connelly"), WFB 
National Marketing Manager, could not locate 
certain Custom Easy marketing materials-a 
mock order form and brochure-which he had 
used in his presentation to the WFB sales 
force. Connelly telephoned Francis McNamee 
("McNamee"), WFB National Customer and 
Marketing Development Manager, and 
advised him of the missing items. McNamee 
offered that Acton might have taken the 
Custom Easy materials to give to Glenn. 
During January of 1991, rumors were 
circulating throughout WFB that Acton had 
been accused of stealing the Custom Easy 
materials to give to Glenn. At this time, 
Schafer became aware of the rumor, as did 
Glenn by way of Acton. In March of 1991, 
Joan Vissers-Damie ("Vissers-Damie"), Scott 
Senior Creative Liaison, located the missing 
materials in a box in Oshkosh, Wisconsin and 
subsequently informed Connelly and 
McNamee of the discovery. In May or June of 
1991, John Hull ("Hull"), a former Scott 
employee, met McNamee in the Pittsburgh 
airport. McNamee told Hull that Schafer had 
been telling people that Acton and Glenn stole 
the Custom Easy materials. Hull and 
McNamee discussed the matter in subsequent 
conversations. 
*3 Between January and June of 1991, Glenn 
had a number of discussions with David 
Shapiro ("Shapiro"), Senior Vice President of 
Sales at the Marcal Paper Company 
("Marcal"). These discussions culminated 
with Shapiro offering Glenn a position at 
Marcal as Vice President of the Away From 
Home Products Group at an annual salary of 
approximately $100,000. Shapiro 
subsequently decided not to create the new 
Marcal position and withdrew the offer to 
Glenn. 
In early 1992, Glenn was a candidate for the 
position of President at the Network Group. 
Glenn never received an offer. In the middle 
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of 1992, Glenn was a candidate for a job with 
Dennis Ogden. Glenn never received an offer. 
In July of 1992, Glenn commenced to work as 
a broker for Amoco Foam Products Company -
presumably his current employment. 
DISCUSSION 
A. Standard for Summary Judgment 
Summary judgment is appropriate where 
there is no genuine issue of material fact and 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. The party 
moving for summary judgment has the burden 
of showing that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact, and once the moving party has 
sustained this burden, the opposing party 
must introduce specific evidence showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp. 
v. Catrett, Ml U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (1986); 
Williams v. Borough of West Chester, 891 F.2d 
458, 464 (3d Cir. 1989). 
A genuine issue is not established unless the 
evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to 
the nonmoving party, would allow a 
reasonable jury to return a verdict for that 
party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 
242, 248- 49, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510-11 (1986); 
Radich v. Goode, 886 F.2d 1391, 1395 (3d 
Cir. 1989). If the evidence is merely colorable 
or is not significantly probative, summary 
judgment may be granted. Anderson, 477 U.S. 
at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2510-11; Radich, 886 F.2d 
at 1395. Whether a fact is material is 
determined by substantive law. Anderson, 477 
U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510; United States v. 
225 Cartons, 871 F.2d 409, 419 (3d Cir.1989). 
Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary 
judgment against a party who fails to make a 
showing sufficient to establish the existence of 
an element essential to his case, and on which 
he will bear the burden of proof at trial. 
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; Appelmans v. City of 
Philadelphia, 826 F.2d 214, 216 (3d Cir. 1987). 
Rule 56(e) requires the nonmoving party to go 
beyond the pleadings and, by affidavits, 
depositions, interrogatory answers and 
admissions on file, designate specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. 
Celotex, All U.S. at 323-24, 106 S.Ct. at 2553; 
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Cooley v. Pennsylvania Housing Fin. Agency, 830 
F.2d 469, 474 (3d Cir. 1987). 
B. Glenn's Age Discrimination Claim 
The crux of Glenn's age discrimination claim 
is certain disputed remarks made by Schafer 
at a WFB sales meeting in October of 1988. 
During the course of the meeting, Schafer 
allegedly stated that Glenn and some other 
"older, unproductive" Scott employees were to 
be terminated. In later conversations, 
Schafer allegedly referred to these older Scott 
employees as "dinosaurs." 
*4 Glenn contends that Schafer followed 
through on his promise. By December of 
1988, several other older employees accepted 
"voluntary retirement" packages. Then in 
June of 1988, Schafer, motivated by age bias, 
instigated Glenn's transfer to the 
Development Position, which was authorized 
and implemented by Vanderselt. Glenn 
portrays the transfer to and subsequent 
elimination of the Development Position as a 
"two-step" dismissal process unlawfully based 
on age. 
1. Standards Applicable to New Jersey's Law 
Against Discrimination 
Glenn brings his age discrimination claim 
pursuant to New Jersey's Law Against 
Discrimination ("NJLAD"), N.J.S.A. § 10:5-1 
et seq. Age discrimination claims under 
NJLAD are governed by the same standards 
and burden of proof structures applicable to 
the federal Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. See 
Retter v. Georgia Gulf Corp., 755 F.Supp. 637, 
638 (D.N.J.1991), aff'd, 975 F.2d 1551 (3d 
Cir. 1992); Giammario v. Trenton Bd. of Educ, 
204 N.J.Super. 356, 361 (App.Div.1985), cert, 
denied, 475 U.S. 1141 (1986). Cf Erickson v. 
Marsh & McClennan Co.. 117 N.J. 539, 550 
(1990) (applying federal standards to NJLAD 
sex discrimination claim in employment 
context). 
The plaintiff asserting an age discrimination 
claim carries the ultimate burden of proving, 
by a preponderance of evidence, that age was 
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the determinative factor in the adverse 
employment action St Mary's Honor Ctr v 
Hicks, No 92 602, 1993 WL 220265, at *6 
(U S June 25, 1993), Texas Dep't of Community 
Affairs v Burdine 450 U S 248, 252 53, 101 
S C t 1093 94(1981), Billet v CIGNA Corp , 940 
F 2d 812, 816 (3d Cir 1991), Healy v New York 
Life Ins Co , 860 F 2d 1209, 1216 (3d Cir 1988) 
, cat denied 490 U S 1098, 109 S C t 2449 
(1989) The plaintiff may meet this burden by 
presenting either direct or indirect evidence of 
unlawful discrimination See Healy, 860 F 2d 
at 1214 
Direct or "smoking gun" evidence is usually 
unavailable or difficult to acquire In 
McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green, 411 U S 792, 
93 S C t 1817 (1983), the United States 
Supreme Court outlined a detailed method for 
establishing an inference of discrimination in 
the absence of direct evidence See also 
Chipollim v Spencer Gifts, Inc , 814 F 2d 893, 
897 (3d Cir) , cert dismissed 483 U S 1052, 
108 S C t 26 (1987) McDonnell Douglas 
implemented a three step analysis, which is 
applicable in the summary judgment context 
and allocates the burden of production as 
follows (1) plaintiff must come forth with 
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie 
case of discrimination, (2) if plaintiff succeeds 
in establishing a prima facie case, the burden 
then shifts to the defendant, who must 
articulate some legitimate, non discriminatory 
reason for the employee's rejection, (3) if 
defendant is able to meet this burden, plaintiff 
must be given the opportunity to come forth 
with sufficient evidence to show that the 
legitimate reasons offered by the defendant 
should not be believed and that age was the 
determinative factor for the adverse 
employment action See Hicks 1993 WL 
220265, a t *9, Burdine, 450 U S at 252 53, 
101 S Ct at 1093 
*5 The Third Circuit has steadfastly applied 
McDonnell Douglas where a plaintiff seeks to 
prove unlawful discrimination by means of 
indirect evidence See Healy, 860 F 2d at 
1209, Chipollim 814 F 2d at 897 However, 
the Court is aware of the Supreme Court's 
recent decision in Hicks, which clarified step 
three in the McDonnell Douglas framework 
Copr © West 2004 No Claim 
Previously, the plaintiff could meet the 
burden of proof by establishing that the non 
discriminatory reason proffered by the 
defendant was not credible See Burdine, 450 
U S at 253, 101 S Ct at 1094, Anastasw v 
Schenng Coip , 48 Fair Empl Prac Cas (BNA) 
1651, 1653 (3d Cir 1988) Under Hicks, the 
plaintiff does not necessarily meet the burden 
by simply producing evidence that defendant's 
articulated reason is pretextual, but must 
prove that unlawful discrimination was the 
determinative factor underlying the adverse 
employment decision 1993 WL 220265, at *8 
("It is not enough to disbelieve the employer, 
the factfinder must believe the plaintiffs 
explanation of intentional discrimination") 
See also EEOCv MCI Int'l, Inc, No 90 1198, 
1993 WL 294486, a t *7 8 (D N J Aug 2, 1993) 
(applying Hicks in summary judgment context) 
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's 
refinement in Hicks, the McDonnell Douglas 
framework allows a plaintiff to convince the 
court of discrimination where no direct 
evidence is available 
3 Glenn Has Presented No Direct Evidence of 
Age Discrimination 
Direct evidence, when presented to the trier 
of fact, proves the existence of a particular fact 
in question without the need for inference or 
presumption Randle \ LaSalle 
Telecommunications, Inc , 876 F 2d 563, 569 (7th 
Cir 1989) Glenn alleges that Schafer vowed 
to "get rid o f the "older, unproductive 
workers" and, at other times, referred to these 
older employees as "dinosaurs " Scott argues 
that these statements fail as direct evidence of 
discrimination because they are (1) 
inadmissible hearsay, or alternatively, 
irrelevant as against Scott, because Schafer 
played no role in Glenn's termination, (2) too 
equivocal regarding discriminatory intent and 
(3) too attenuated from the decision ultimately 
terminating Glenn 
Glenn argues that the alleged statements are 
admissible against Scott pursuant to the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, which provide that 
a statement is not hearsay when it is offered 
against a party and is made by that party's 
"agent or servant concerning a matter within 
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the scope of his agency or employment..." 
Fed.R.Evid. 801(dX2XD). 
While Schafer denies making the remarks, 
Scott contends that such statements are 
inadmissible hearsay against Scott because 
Vanderselt and Leaman-not Schafer-were 
responsible for the employment decisions 
concerning Glenn in June of 1989 and 
December of 1990. Scott cites a number of 
cases to support its argument that an agent's 
allegedly discriminatory statements are not 
admissible against the defendant employer 
where the agent had no authority to dismiss 
the plaintiff and no involvement in the 
termination decision. See, e.g., Staheli Eudy v. 
BWD Automotive Corp., 51 Fair Empl Prac.Cas. 
(BNA) 724-25 (N.D.Ga.1989); Hill v. Spiegel, 
Inc., 708 F.2d 233, 237 (6th Cir.1983). 
*6 The Court finds the instant case 
distinguishable, as the record indicates that 
Schafer was involved in the employment 
decisions. Glenn concedes that Vanderselt 
and Leaman wielded ultimate authority 
respecting his employment, but proof exists 
that Schafer played a role in both decisions. 
It is undisputed that the disintegration of the 
Schafer-Glenn relationship was the impetus 
for Vanderselt's decision to remove Glenn 
from the Sales Position. See Certification of 
Steven J. Wall ("Wall Certification"), Exhibit 
3. See also Certification of Mark D. Lurie 
("Lurie Certification"), Exhibit B, Schafer 
Deposition at 169-70, 182-83; Exhibit F, 
Robbins Deposition at 62. In addition, 
Schafer provided input on the decision by 
Leaman and Robbins to ultimately let Glenn 
go and the severance package he would 
consequently receive. See Lurie Certification, 
Exhibit F, Robbins Deposition at 32-33. 
Therefore, the Court concludes that otherwise 
admissible proof of the alleged statements 
may be offered against Scott as nonhearsay 
under Rule 801(dX2XD). 
The Court's determination on the hearsay 
question appears also to dispose of Scott's 
irrelevancy argument, in which Scott contends 
that "[t]he biases of one who neither makes 
nor influences the challenged personnel decision 
are not probative in an employment 
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discrimination case." Medina-Munoz v. R.J. 
Reynolds Co., 896 F.2d 5, 10 (1st Cir.1990) 
(emphasis supplied). As noted, Glenn has 
offered evidence suggesting that Schafer did 
influence the employment decisions affecting 
Glenn. Therefore, the Court concludes that 
Schafer's alleged statements would not be 
inadmissible as irrelevant. 
The Court's preliminary determinations on 
admissibility should not impart that the 
alleged remarks constitute direct evidence of 
discrimination. The Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals has found that direct evidence exists 
where the employer states that the employee 
was fired because of a protected characteristic. 
Maxfield v. Sinclair Int'l, 766 F.2d 788, 791 (3d 
Cir.1985), cert, denied, 474 U.S. 1057, 106 S.Ct. 
796 (1986). See also Randle v. LaSalle, 876 F.2d 
563, 569 7th Cir.1989) (" 'direct' evidence 
must not only speak directly to the issue of 
discriminatory intent, it must also relate to 
the specific employment decision in question"); 
Perry v. Prudential-Bache Sec, Inc., 738 F.Supp. 
843, 851 (D.N.J. 1989) (remarks not deemed 
direct evidence where superior did not state 
that employee was to be fired "because of his 
age" and any such conclusion could only be 
inferred from the description of [employee] as 
being 'old' "), ajf'd, 904 F.2d 696 (3d Cir.), cert, 
denied, 498 U.S. 958, 111 S.Ct. 386 (1990). 
The Court is sensitive to the Third Circuit's 
directive that competing inferences as to a 
statement's meaning should not be weighed on 
a summary judgment motion. Siegel v. Alpha 
Wire Corp., 894 F.2d 50 (3d Cir.), cert, denied, 
496 U.S. 906, 110 S.Ct. 2588 (1990) (summary 
judgment improper where trial court should 
have left to jury competing inferences of 
remark "old dogs won't hunt"). However, the 
court in Siegel was dealing with the plaintiffs 
attempt to establish discrimination by 
indirect, not direct, evidence. Therefore, the 
Court concludes that Schafer's alleged 
statements cannot be considered direct 
evidence of unlawful discrimination, as the 
context in which they were made was not 
sufficiently proximate to either Glenn's 
transfer in 1989 or his ultimate termination in 
1990. [FN1] 
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4 Glenn Has Not Established A Prima Facie 
Case of Age Discrimination 
*7 To establish a prima facie case of age 
discrimination the plaintiff must prove by a 
preponderance of evidence that he or she was 
(1) a member of a protected class, (2) qualified 
for the position, (3) dismissed despite being 
qualified, and (4) ultimately replaced by a 
person sufficiently younger to permit an 
inference of age discrimination Healy, 860 
F 2d at 1218 
In view of the record, the Court has serious 
doubts as to whether Glenn can sufficiently 
prove certain of the required elements To be 
sure, Glenn was a member of a protected class 
both when he was transferred from the Sales 
Position and when the Development Position 
was eliminated In addition, the record 
suggests that Glenn was qualified to remain 
in both the Sales Position and the 
Development Position Glenn had received 
satisfactory performance reviews prior to the 
transfer and had been given a raise in the 
Development Position prior to termination 
See Certification of Glenn In Opposition To 
Motion For Summary Judgment ("Glenn 
Certification"), Exhibits 1 7 See also Scott 
Appendix, Exhibit A, Glenn Deposition at 
Exhibit P 6, Exhibit D, Vanderselt Affidavit 
at \\ 18 20 Any contention by Scott that 
Glenn was not qualified merely raises a 
disputed material fact and precludes summary 
judgment against Glenn The Court 
concludes that Glenn has satisfied the class 
and qualification elements for a prima facie 
case 
Glenn's effort to satisfy the other two prima 
facie elements is hampered by his weakly 
supported 'two step ' dismissal theory Glenn 
alleges that Scott accomplished its 
discriminatory goal by transferring Glenn 
from the Sales Position to the Development 
Position, which was created only to be 
eliminated a smokescreen for the unlawful 
dismissal The Court must ascertain whether 
the transfer from the Sales Position or the 
elimination of the Development Position, 
separately or taken together, were adverse 
employment actions taken by Scott Glenn's 
Copr © West 2004 No C 
dismissal after the Development Position was 
eliminated clearly constituted adverse action 
by Scott Conversely, it is not so clear that 
the transfer to the Development Position fits 
into a prima facie case of age discrimination 
under these facts 
Glenn has adduced no evidence that Scott 
implemented the transfer as a means for 
ultimately dismissing Glenn Glenn's two 
step theory rests on three points First, he 
cites the voluntary retirement of three older 
employees occurring contemporaneously to his 
transfer Second, he asserts that the lack of 
documentation regarding the creation and 
subsequent elimination of the Development 
Position raises an inference that the job was 
designed merely as a way station on Glenn's 
journey toward inevitable termination 
Third, Glenn identifies Schafer his comments, 
his role in the transfer and his advice 
respecting Glenn's severance The Court 
concludes that Glenn's theory and allegations 
are not sufficiently supported in fact 
Glenn speculates that his removal and 
transfer were part and parcel of an overall 
effort to terminate older employees The 
Court notes that "the mere offer of an early 
retirement program does not support an 
inference of discrimination " Colgan v Fishei 
Scientific Co , 935 F 2d 1407, 1422 (3d Cir) , 
cert denied, 502 U S 941, 112 S C t 379(1991) 
Beyond the fact that other older Scott 
employees accepted voluntary retirement, 
Glenn offers no personal knowledge or other 
admissible evidence regarding the contents 
and acceptance of the retirement packages 
See Lune Certification, Exhibit A, Glenn 
Deposition at 194 
*8 Glenn's two step dismissal theory connotes 
a constructive discharge claim, which lurks 
within the fact that he had no choice but to 
accept the Development Position in lieu of 
termination When considering a 
constructive discharge claim, the Third Circuit 
employs an objective test to determine 
whether the employer's conduct would have 
foreseeably resulted in working conditions "so 
unpleasant or difficult that a reasonable 
person in the employee's shoes would resign ' 
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" Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 
1079 (3d Cir.1992) (quoting Goss v. Exxon Office 
Sys. Co., 747 F.2d 885, 887-88 (3d Cir.1984)). 
Glenn provides no objective facts to support 
his subjective assertions that the Development 
Position was a make-work, dead-end job, or 
that Scott's "take it or be terminated" offer led 
foreseeably to unbearable working conditions. 
Glenn accepted the Development Position and 
held it for approximately nineteen months, 
notwithstanding his alleged personal 
reservations. While he no longer managed 
sales representatives, Glenn thrived in the 
position and was well compensated. After the 
transfer, Glenn received a $2,500 bonus and 
his same $81,000 annual salary, along with a 
subsequent $3,000 raise. See Scott Appendix, 
Exhibit A, Glenn Deposition at 278, 322-23, 
Exhibit P-6. During Glenn's tenure, the 
Development Position flourished to such an 
extent that Scott was forced to create an 
additional Development Position, filled by 
John Acton. See id., Exhibit D, Vanderselt 
Affidavit at % 20. In contrast to Glenn's 
subjective portrayal, these facts undercut any 
allegation that Glenn was constructively 
discharged by the transfer to the Development 
Position. 
Ultimately, the timing of and circumstances 
surrounding Scott's decision to eliminate the 
Development Position were far too attenuated 
from the decision to transfer Glenn nineteen 
months earlier. Glenn's failure to produce 
evidence impedes his effort to pull together 
the pieces of a discriminatory plot assignable 
to Scott by way of Schafer's comments and 
conduct. Consequently, the Court will not 
consider the transfer-either alone or in 
conjunction with Glenn's ultimate 
termination-in determining whether Glenn 
was dismissed despite his qualifications. In 
short, the record unreservedly indicates that 
Scott did not dismiss Glenn until the 
Development Position was eliminated. 
As to the fourth element, after Glenn was 
transferred, Scott placed Daniel Rodenbush, 
aged 31, in the vacant Sales Position. The 
Court notes that this fact alone, in certain 
circumstances, would raise an inference that 
the employment action was discriminatory. 
However, having concluded that Glenn's 
transfer is not pertinent to the discrimination 
claim, the Court finds no relevancy in the fact 
that Glenn, despite his qualifications, was 
replaced in the Sales Position by a person 
outside the protected class. 
The Court must, however, assess Glenn's 
claim in view of Scott's elimination of the 
Development Position and ultimate dismissal 
of Glenn. The record reveals that Scott came 
to these decisions under the pressure of budget 
constraints and financial duress. See Lurie 
Certification, Exhibits E, H. Where an 
employer dismisses an employee in order to 
reduce the work force, the employer generally 
does not retain a position which can be filled 
by someone outside the protected class. 
Therefore, Glenn must provide evidence that 
Scott, during its alleged downsizing, treated 
persons outside the protected class more 
favorably. Turner v. Schering-Plough Corp., 901 
F.2d 335, 342 (3d Cir.1990); Massarky v. 
General Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111, 118 (3d 
Cir.), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 937, 104 S.Ct. 348 
(1983). 
*9 Glenn has failed to produce to the Court 
such evidence, choosing instead to argue that 
there were no "similarly situated employees, 
as Glenn's position was sui generis." Glenn's 
Memorandum Of Law In Opposition To Scott's 
Motion For Summary Judgment at 36 n. 22. 
Content to rest his prima facie case on the 
unsupported allegation that the Development 
Position was a smokescreen for unlawful 
discrimination, Glenn does not even attempt 
to adduce evidence concerning the scope of 
Scott's downsizing at the end of 1990, 
including a breakdown of the employees 
affected. Conversely, the record indicates 
that forty to fifty salaried employees were 
terminated between September and December 
of 1990, as part of Scott's budget reduction 
plan. See Lurie Certification, Exhibit F, 
Robbins Deposition at 27-28. 
In view of the record presented, the Court, in 
sum, concludes that (1) Glenn was not 
dismissed-constructively or otherwise-when 
he was transferred to the Development 
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Position, (2) Glenn was terminated by Scott 
despite his qualifications in December of 1990, 
and (3) the record is without any evidence that 
younger employees were treated more 
favorably than Glenn when he was released, 
notwithstanding the fact that Rodenbush 
replaced Glenn in the Sales Position in 1989 
Therefore, the Court finds that Glenn has not 
established a prima facie case of age 
discrimination under the recognized 
standards 
The Court acknowledges that, in most 
discrimination actions, the "prima facie case is 
easily made out " Massarky, 706 F 2d at 118 
For the record, the Court notes that many of 
the foregoing problems that obstruct Glenn's 
prima facie case would also serve to defeat 
Glenn's age discrimination claim if the Court 
was required to carry out to completion the 
McDonnell Douglas and Hicks analysis 
Assuming that Glenn could establish a prima 
facie case, the burden would then shift to Scott 
to offer admissible evidence that would "allow 
a trier of fact rationally to conclude that the 
employment decision had not been motivated 
by discriminatory animus " Chipolhni, 814 
F 2d at 898 Scott has articulated legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reasons to rebut a prima 
facie case Regarding the removal from the 
Sales Position, Scott cites Glenn's poor work 
performance and resistance to Schafer's 
directives and policies See Wall 
Certification, Exhibit 3 Regarding Glenn's 
final termination, Scott offers testimony of a 
number of executives concerning the 
company's financial problems and the need to 
make cuts See Scott Appendix, Exhibits E, 
H 
With Scott meeting Glenn's prima facie case, 
all presumptions of discrimination would 
disappear and Glenn would then be required 
to present evidence sufficient to prove that age 
discrimination was the determinative factor in 
Glenn's dismissal See Hicks, 1993 WL 220265, 
at *6 8 Evidence that Scott's articulated 
reasons have been provided merely as a 
pretext for discrimination might but may not 
necessarily be sufficient to withstand Scott's 
summary judgment motion Compare id at *6 
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("proving the employer's reason is false 
becomes part of (and often considerably 
assists) the greater enterprise of proving the 
real reason was intentional discrimination") 
with Chipolhni, 814 F 2d at 898 ("in addition to 
establishing his prima facie case by indirect 
proof, a plaintiff can prevail by means of 
indirect proof that the employer's reasons are 
pretextual without presenting evidence 
specifically relating to age") 
*10 At this stage as in the determination of 
Glenn's prima facie case the survival of 
Glenn's age discrimination claim depends 
upon the extent of proof supporting the two 
step dismissal theory [FN2] While the Court 
does not suggest that an employer never could 
utilize a two step dismissal process to mask a 
discriminatory motive, the Court concludes 
that Glenn's allegations cannot not survive 
summary judgment on the evidence presented 
here, given the nature and circumstances of 
Glenn's employment in the Development 
Position Even if a discriminatory motive 
could be assigned to Schafer, the Court can 
find no evidence in the record raising an 
inference that Scott (1) actually terminated 
Glenn constructively or otherwise based on 
Schafer's recommendation or (2) developed 
and eliminated Glenn's Development Position 
in order to hide a discriminatory motive for 
dismissing Glenn 
To withstand Scott's motion for summary 
judgment, Glenn must produce "more than a 
mere scintilla of evidence" to support his 
claims, and cannot simply recycle factually 
unsupported allegations See Williams, 891 
F 2d at 458 [FN3] On the basis of the record 
presented, the Court will grant Scott's motion 
for summary judgment on Glenn's age 
discrimination claim 
C Glenn's Defamation Claims 
As noted, Glenn's defamation claims are 
based on events that occurred after the 
elimination of the Development Position and 
his release from Scott Glenn asserts that 
Scott employees, McNamee and Schafer, 
published statements falsely accusing Acton 
and Glenn with the theft of the Custom Easy 
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materials, which, in actuality, were 
inadvertently misplaced after the WFB sales 
meeting in Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania, in 
December of 1990. 
Glenn points to the following to support his 
defamation claims: (1) statements allegedly 
made by Schafer to a group at a lunch meeting 
in Oshkosh, Wisconsin, (2) prior to revoking 
Marcal's job offer to Glenn, Shapiro allegedly 
informed Glenn that he had heard rumor of 
Glenn's involvement in the theft of the 
materials, (3) statements made by McNamee 
within one month of the sales meeting, 
suggesting that Acton stole the Custom Easy 
materials for Glenn, (4) the statement made 
by McNamee to Hull, a former Scott 
employee, in the Pittsburgh airport in May or 
June of 1991, indicating that Schafer was 
telling people that Acton and Glenn stole the 
missing Custom Easy materials, and (5) other 
statements made by McNamee and other Scott 
employees to Hull regarding Schafer's 
accusations. 
Scott argues that the Court should summarily 
dismiss Glenn's defamation claims because (1) 
the record contains no evidence of defamation 
that would be admissible at trial, (2) the 
claims are time barred by the applicable 
statute of limitations and (3) any defamatory 
conduct by Schafer or McNamee is not 
assignable to Scott as a matter of law. The 
Court agrees with Scott on all three points. 
1. The Record Contains Insufficient 
Admissible Evidence of Defamation 
To withstand a summary judgment motion, 
the non-moving party must produce evidence 
that can be reduced to admissible form at 
trial. Williams, 891 F.2d at 466 n. 12. 
Hearsay problems plague Glenn's effort to 
adduce evidence that a Scott employee did in 
fact charge Glenn with the theft of the Custom 
Easy materials. In almost every 
circumstance concerning the alleged 
accusation, Glenn offers testimony of 
individuals who attribute the accusations to 
Schafer or McNamee, but never unequivocally 
state they heard either of these individuals 
make an accusation. Weeding through the 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim 
record, the Court is not satisfied that Glenn 
has produced enough admissible evidence to 
withstand Scott's summary judgment motion. 
*11 As discussed above, under the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, a statement is not 
considered hearsay where it is offered against 
a party and is directly attributed to that 
"party's agent or servant concerning a matter 
within the scope of the agency or employment, 
made during the existence of the 
relationship." Fed.R.Evid. 801(dX2XD). The 
offering party must make a threefold showing, 
through evidence independent of the proffered 
statement, that (1) an employment 
relationship existed between the declarant 
and the party, (2) the statement was made 
during the agency or employment relationship 
and (3) the statement concerned a matter 
within the declarant's scope of employment. 
Boren v. Sable, 887 F.2d 1032, 1038 (10th 
Cir.1989) (cited with approval in Lippay v. 
Oiristos, 996 F.2d 1490, 1497 (3d Cir.1993)). 
[FN4] 
Given this evidentiary rule regarding party-
opponent admissions, the Court would 
consider nonhearsay-thus admissible against 
Scott-any statement respecting the Custom 
Easy materials made by Schafer or McNamee 
during their employment relationship with 
Scott. See MCI Communications Corp. v. 
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1143 
(7th Cir.) (documents containing statements 
attributable to high level management 
constitute corporate admission under Rule 
801(d)2(D) even if report is based on hearsay 
or reflects opinion), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 891, 
104 S.Ct. 234 (1983). [FN5] 
While the Court concludes that certain of the 
statements attributed to Schafer or McNamee 
may be admitted as evidence against Scott, 
Glenn's evidentiary problems are only 
beginning. Rule 805 provides that hearsay 
statements contained within hearsay 
statements, also known as double hearsay, are 
not excluded under the hearsay rules if each 
segment of the combined statement, when 
considered separately, falls within a hearsay 
exception. Fed.R.Evid. 805. Although the 
alleged statements by Schafer and McNamee 
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are technically nonhearsay under Rule 
801(dX2XD), Rule 805 provides a useful tool for 
determining whether there exists any 
evidence of defamation admissible against 
Scott 
Utilizing the Rule 805 framework, the Court, 
as noted, would be satisfied that most of the 
alleged statements by Schafer and McNamee 
regarding the theft of materials, when 
considered alone, overcome the first hurdle m 
the double hearsay analysis However, Glenn 
repeatedly attempts to introduce these 
admissible statements via out of court 
declarations of other unidentified declarants 
Reviewing the record, the Court finds too 
many phantom sources, which undermine the 
reliability concerns that pervade the hearsay 
rules See Boren, 887 F 2d at 1036 Regarding 
the lunch meeting in Oshkosh, Glenn testified 
as to "what I had been hearing from several 
people " Lune Certification, Exhibit A, 
Glenn Deposition at 12 In response, Glenn 
then contacted Acton, [FN6] who investigated 
the story through his superior at the time, 
Michael O'Neil ("O'Neif), who according to 
Glenn, told Acton that 'he did know about the 
[accusation], they had heard Schafer say it 
Mr O' Neil did know that Mr Schafer was 
saying i t " Id at 30 31 (emphasis supplied) 
*12 Viewed in a light most favorable to 
Glenn, this evidentiary offering constitutes 
Glenn testifying as to what he was told by 
Acton regarding what Acton was told by 
O'Neil regarding what Schafer was heard to 
have said about the missing materials The 
record does not reveal that Acton, much less 
O'Neil, heard the accusation directly from 
Schafer Respecting the Oshkosh meeting 
and the O'Neil conversation, Glenn is unable 
to direct the Court to any individuals who 
heard Schafer make the alleged accusation 
and whose out of court declarations are 
admissible against Scott [FN7] Where 
declarants are identified as "they' and 
'several people," the Court is simply not 
satisfied that the trustworthiness 
requirements of Federal Rules of Evidence are 
met See Garden v Westinghouse Elec Corp , 
850 F 2d 996, 1003 (3d Cir 1988) (statements 
Copr © West 2004 No Claim 
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of unidentified declarants inadmissible) 
Hearsay problems confound other attempts by 
Glenn to introduce the alleged accusations 
During the investigation into the missing 
materials, Vissers Damie, the Scott employee 
charged with the search, was told by her 
supervisor, Douglas Schommer that 
"McNamee had accused Acton of taking [the 
materials] to give to Glenn " Scott 
Appendix, Exhibit I, Vissers Damie Deposition 
at 13 [FN8] The record does not indicate that 
Vissers Damie heard the accusation directly 
from McNamee In addition, Vissers Damie 
was unable to identify the individual who 
talked to Schommer, and could only offer that 
Schommer told her that McNamee was the 
"source" of the theft rumors Lune 
Certification, Exhibit I, Vissers Damie 
Deposition at 14, 32 In this instance, Glenn 
again offers unreliable evidence based on 
statements not directly attributable to any 
identified individual 
The Court now turns to Glenn's contention 
that Shapiro had been advised of the alleged 
theft and consequently revoked Marcal's offer 
to Glenn Id , Exhibit A, Glenn Deposition at 
69 70 According to Glenn, Shapiro never 
identified the individual who informed him of 
the rumor Id a t 70 In addition to the 
unidentified declarant problem, Shapiro's 
statement, as offered through Glenn's 
testimony, is hearsay and not within any 
hearsay exception [FN9] In addition, Shapiro 
has testified that he did not know of the rumor 
until he became involved in this litigation 
See Scott Appendix, Exhibit N, Shapiro 
Deposition at 39 40 
Finally, the Court reviews Hull's deposition, 
wherein he testified that (1) McNamee, on at 
least three occasions, told him about Schafer's 
accusations and (2) other Scott employees also, 
at various times, had discussed the rumors 
with him In addition to his conversations 
with McNamee, Hull discussed in separate 
instances the alleged theft with Scott 
employees Milt Napper, Penny Amundson, 
Kathy Hable and Steve Gubelman See Lune 
Certification, Exhibit G, Hull Deposition at 
59 The Court finds that unidentified 
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declarants also impede the introduction of the 
statements from Admundson, Napper and 
Gubelman via Hull's testimony. Id. at 76-78, 
83-86. As to Hable's statements, Hull was 
unable to testify regarding the source of her 
knowledge. Id. at 87-88. [FN10] 
*13 Turning to the Hull-McNamee 
conversations, Hull testified that McNamee 
said, "Schafer is going telling everybody that 
Glenn and Acton stole it and tried to sell it to 
Wisconsin Tissue Mills." Id. at 61. Hull 
reported a subsequent conversation, wherein 
McNamee stated that "Schafer says he has 
proof, and he continues to go around telling 
people that Glenn and Acton stole it." Id. at 
70. In addition, Hull asserted that he knew 
"for a fact" that McNamee heard the 
accusation directly from Schafer, because 
McNamee told him so. Id. a t 76. 
The Court concludes that this paltry bit of 
testimony is the only piece of admissible 
evidence against Scott concerning Schafer's 
alleged defamation, despite serious 
reservations regarding its reliability. There 
are no unidentified declarants in the chain of 
reporting which culminates in Hull's 
testimony. On purely technical grounds, 
hearsay rules are not violated when Hull 
testifies that "McNamee said, 'Schafer said, 
"Acton stole the materials for Glenn." ' " 
In segment one of Hull's testimony, Schafer 
allegedly makes the accusation within 
McNamee's presence (the "Schafer 
Statement"). Schafer's out-of-court 
declaration is nonhearsay under Rule 
801(dX2XD)-a party-opponent admission by 
Scott. The Schafer Statement was made 
during Schafer's employment with Scott and 
the theft of the materials was a matter within 
the scope of Schafer's responsibilities as Vice 
President. In addition, the Schafer Statement 
is not hearsay because it is not being offered 
for the truth of its content, but rather, for the 
fact that the statement was made. See, e.g., 
United States v. Cantu, 876 F.2d 1134, 1137 (5th 
Cir.1989). 
In segment two, McNamee relates Schafer's 
accusation to Hull on at least three separate 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim 
occasions (the "McNamee Statements"). 
Certain of these out-of-court declarations to 
Hull are also nonhearsay under Rule 
801(dX2XD). The pertinent question as to the 
McNamee Statements is not whether 
engaging in the discussions with Hull was 
within McNamee's scope of employment. The 
Federal Rules of Evidence merely require that 
the alleged theft and accusations be matters 
within the scope of McNamee's employment. 
See, e.g., MCI Telecommunications, 708 F.2d at 
1143. The Custom Easy materials, their 
disappearance and Schafer's alleged 
accusations were all matters within the scope 
of McNamee's employment as WFB National 
Customer and Marketing Manager and as a 
subordinate to Schafer. See Lurie 
Certification, Exhibit L, Scott's Objections and 
Answers To Glenn's First Set of 
Interrogatories at 23-25; Exhibit B, Schafer 
Deposition at 61. 
In sum, as to admissible evidence, the Court 
agrees, in part, with Scott. The record 
contains second and third-hand accounts of 
Schafer's alleged accusations. The majority 
of these accounts-if not hearsay by 
themselves - are based on unreliable hearsay 
statements made by unidentified declarants 
or, in one instance, rebutted by the declarant 
himself. However, the Court does find 
admissible Hull's testimony regarding the 
McNamee Statements. 
*14 The Court comes to this conclusion with 
certain reservations based on the fact that 
Schafer's statement to McNamee, as revealed 
by Hull, lacks clarity of context and content. 
This only magnifies the reliability problem 
associated with layering out-of-court 
declarations on top of other out-of-court 
declarations. See Boren, 887 F.2d at 1037 
(noting hearsay rule concerns for the accurate 
reporting of facts, the court warned that with 
each additional layer of hearsay, there is a 
corresponding decrease in reliability). 
Nonetheless, the Court concludes that Hull's 
testimony is admissible within the Federal 
Rules of Evidence. 
The Court's inquiry, however, does not end 
with this evidentiary ruling in favor of Glenn. 
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The tenuous admissibility of Hull's testimony 
does not foreclose questions concerning the 
applicable statute of limitations or whether 
Glenn, as a matter of law, can withstand 
Scott's summary judgment motion. The 
Court determines that Glenn fails on both 
grounds. In reaching this conclusion, the 
Court focuses narrowly on Hull's testimony 
alone, given the inadmissibility of the balance 
of Glenn's profferings. 
2. Statute of Limitations and Republication 
Moving beyond evidentiary concerns, the 
Court must, as a preliminary matter, 
determine from which state it is to draw the 
substantive law and statute of limitations to 
be applied to Glenn's defamation claims. 
Sitting in diversity, this Court generally must 
look to New Jersey law to guide the choice of 
law decision. Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 
313 U.S. 487, 61 S.Ct. 1020 (1940). However, 
the Court sua sponte will not challenge the 
application of a particular state's law where 
(1) the parties implicitly agree as to the 
governing law, (2) the state has an interest in 
the litigation and (3) the state's relevant law 
does not significantly conflict with the laws of 
another state with a comparable interest in 
the case. See Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Time, 735 
F.2d 94, 96 (3d Cir.1984); Pierce v. Capital 
Cities Communications, Inc., 576 F.2d 495, 501-
02 (3d Cir.), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 861, 99 S.Ct. 
181 (1978). 
In the instant case, the parties implicitly 
agree that New Jersey provides the applicable 
law. Glenn, the target of the alleged 
defamation is a resident of New Jersey, and 
the Court is satisfied that there are no 
conflicts between New Jersey and 
Pennsylvania defamation law that will 
substantially affect the outcome. [FN11] 
Accordingly, the Court applies New Jersey 
law to assess Glenn's claims. 
New Jersey law provides that defamation 
actions must be brought within one year "after 
the publication." N.J.S.A. 2:14-3. New 
Jersey courts have strictly construed the 
statute 's fixed time period for bringing 
defamation claims. See Lawrence v. Bauer 
Publishing & Printing, Ltd., 78 N.J. 371, 374-75 
(1979). (citing statute's fixed period, court 
rejected the "discovery rule" whereby a cause 
of action in defamation accrues when the 
plaintiff learns the state of facts which 
constitute a claim). Therefore, the plaintiff 
must alleged with specificity the 
circumstances giving rise to the defamation 
action. See Wanamaker v. Columbian Rope Co., 
713 F.Supp. 533, 544 (N.D.N.Y.1989) 
(defamation claim time-barred where 
complaint failed to allege when alleged 
remarks were made); Zoneraich v. Overlook 
Hospital, 212 N.J.Super. 83, 101 (App.Div.) 
(claim dismissed where complaint did not 
allege "when, where, by which defendants and 
by what words ... plaintiff was defamed"), cert, 
denied, 107 N.J. 32 (1986). 
*15 Glenn commenced this suit on March 12, 
1992. Therefore, Glenn must allege and 
consequently adduce evidence that a 
defamatory remark, assignable to Scott, 
occurred sometime after March 12, 1991. As 
Scott contends, the Court finds no record 
evidence that the Schafer Statement-or any 
other alleged accusations charged to Schafer-
occurred within the one-year statutory period. 
Limited to Hull's testimony, Glenn offers 
little proof as to the timing and specific 
content and context of the Schafer Statement. 
Consequently, the Court considers the Hull 
testimony utterly insufficient to withstand 
summary judgment with respect to the statute 
of limitations. [FN 12] Failing the statute of 
limitations as to the Schafer Statement, Glenn 
argues that the McNamee Statements effected 
a republication, resurrecting the Schafer 
Statement and bringing it within the one-year 
statutory period. Hull testified that the 
McNamee Statements occurred sometime after 
April 1, 1991-in May or June of 1991. See 
Lurie Certification, Exhibit G, Hull 
Deposition at 62-67. The McNamee 
Statements were made within New Jersey's 
one-year statutory period for defamation 
actions. 
Glenn's republication argument raises two 
related, but separate issues: (1) whether 
Schafer would be liable as a result any 
republication by McNamee within the 
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limitations period and (2) whether the 
McNamee Statements, in and of themselves, 
are defamatory. Scott contends that the 
McNamee Statements cannot breathe life into 
the Schafer Statement, which considered alone 
would be time- barred. The Court agrees. 
"Publication" occurs where the allegedly 
defamatory statement is communicated to a 
third person "with a reasonable ground to 
suppose that it will become known to others." 
Kramer v. Monogram Models, Inc., 700 F.Supp. 
1348, 1351 (D.N.J.1988), rev'don other grounds, 
875 F.2d 66 (3d Cir.1989). Under New Jersey 
law, where a third person has republished a 
defamatory remark within the limitations 
period, such republication does not operate to 
create a new cause of action against the 
original publisher, where the cause of action 
respecting the original publication would be 
time-barred. See id. Scott argues that a new 
cause of action as to Schafer did not accrue 
when McNamee, the third person, republished 
the Schafer Statement. 
The Court finds Kramer instructive. The facts 
of Kramer could be described as follows. Party 
1 issues to Party 2 a press release containing 
alleged defamatory remarks about the 
plaintiff. Party 2 subsequently publishes 
excerpts of the press release in a market 
report and magazine. Plaintiff sues only Party 
1 for defamation. The issuance of the press 
release to Party 2 occurred outside the statute 
of limitations. The republication by Party 2 
occurred within the statute of limitations. 
The court concluded that the only publication 
chargeable against Party 1 was the issuance of 
the press release. Similarly, the Court holds 
that the only publication chargeable to 
Schafer would be the Schafer Statement. 
[FN13] 
*16 Determining that Glenn cannot reach 
Scott through the Schafer Statement is only 
one piece of the republication puzzle. The 
McNamee Statements do come within the 
limitations period. The survival of Glenn's 
claims rests upon the Court's determination 
whether the McNamee Statements are, as a 
matter of law, defamatory. The Court finds 
against Glenn. 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim 
In New Jersey, "one who republishes 
defamatory matter is generally subject to 
liability as if he or she had originally 
published it. Schiavone, 735 F.2d at 94. In the 
republication context, the defense of truth 
does not mean truthful republication of the 
original statement, but rather that the 
original statement does in fact prove to be 
true. Lawrence, 89 N.J. at 461 ("if defendant 
published that a third person stated that 
plaintiff has committed a crime, it is no 
justification that the third party did in fact 
make that statement"). 
While these rules of law appear to weigh 
against Scott, the Court is dissatisfied that 
McNamee published or republished 
defamatory matter. In New Jersey, the court, 
as a threshold matter, decides whether the 
alleged statement may be construed as 
defamatory. Decker v. Princeton Packet, 116 
N.J. 418, 424-25 (1989). The statement "must 
be taken in context and the publication 
considered as a whole." Id. a t 425. See also 
Nanavati v. Burdette Tomlin Memorial Hosp., 857 
F.2d 96, 107 (3d Cir.1988) (context 
examination covers many factors, including 
"the nature of discussion in which the 
allegedly defamatory statements were made" 
and "the nature of the listener's 
understanding"), cert, denied, 489 U.S. 1078, 
109S.Ct. 1528(1989). 
As to the content and context of the Schafer 
Statement, the Court finds the record so 
insufficient that making a threshold 
determination favorable to Glenn is 
impossible. Through Hull 's testimony, the 
Court gleans little information about what 
McNamee actually heard Schafer say. While 
recognizing that false accusations of theft may 
be defamatory, the Court deems Glenn's only 
admissible evidence insufficient to support his 
claims as to Schafer's conduct. 
Even if the Schafer Statement is assumed to 
be defamatory, the Court cannot construe the 
McNamee Statements as a defamatory 
republication. Republication questions most 
often arise where media publishers report 
stories based on defamatory information 
received from other persons. Generally, the 
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courts are wary of publishers' attempts to 
immunize themselves from defamation claims 
by framing stories as "reports" or "opinions." 
See, e.g., Lawrence, 176 N.J.Super, at 389 
("[s]urrounding the defamatory sting of their 
words with terms such as 'reportedly/ 'may 
b e / or 'could possibly be' will not protect a 
publisher"). 
The instant case is distinguishable. 
McNamee did report information to Hull 
about Schafer's actions, but he did so in a 
manner and context designed to inform and 
refute the accusations. When McNamee met 
with Hull, he knew the Customs Easy 
materials had been found. See Lurie 
Certification, Exhibit L, Scott's Objections and 
Answers To Glenn's First Set Of 
Interrogatories at 24. In addition, Hull's 
testimony indicates that neither McNamee 
nor Hull believed the rumors that Glenn 
attributes to Schafer. See, Lurie Certification, 
Exhibit G, Hull Deposition at 69-70. 
McNamee did not adopt or republish the 
Schafer Statement as his own or report it in a 
manner couched in defamatory "suggestion or 
insinuation." Lawrence, 176 N.J.Super. a t 389. 
Borrowing liberally from the Third Circuit the 
Court concludes that the "facts indicate that 
no one who heard the [alleged] slander 
believed it, and those who repeated the 
[alleged] slander did so only to express outrage 
at the speaker.... [The Court believes] New 
Jersey would not compensate for slander 
under these facts." Nanavati, 857 F.2d at 109. 
3. Scott Cannot Be Liable In Defamation 
Under Principles of Respondeat Superior 
*17 Finally, even if Glenn could adduce 
evidence to adequately support his defamation 
claim, the Court finds that Scott would be 
entitled to summary judgment based on 
respondeat superior principles. In New 
Jersey, an employer may be liable for an 
employee's torts only if the employee was 
acting within his or her scope of employment. 
GNOC Corp. v. Aboud, 715 F.Supp. 644, 649 
(D.N.J. 1989); Gilborges v. Wallace, 78 N.J. 342, 
351 (1978). To determine scope of 
employment questions, New Jersey considers 
whether the conduct (1) is the kind for which 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim 
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the employee was hired to perform, (2) occurs 
substantially within the job's space and time 
limits and (3) is undertaken with a purpose to 
serve the employer. See Aboud, 715 F.Supp. at 
649 (quoting Restatement (2d) of Agency § 228 
The Court undertakes the scope of 
employment question by focussing on the only 
piece of relevant and admissible evidence, the 
Hull testimony, and determining whether any 
liability of Schafer and McNamee could be 
assigned to Scott. The Court's analysis is 
again constrained by the limited evidence as 
to Schafer's statements and actions. The 
evidence leaves too many holes, including to 
whom, and in what context, Schafer published 
the accusation. The Court cannot be sure 
that Schafer, himself, was not merely passing 
on rumors derived from unidentified 
declarants or expressing a bona fide opinion. 
See Scott Appendix, Exhibit B, Schafer 
Deposition at 61-62. 
Nonetheless, the Court recognizes that there 
is evidence that McNamee did hear Schafer 
say something, somewhere about Glenn and 
the Custom Easy material. Using its 
imagination, the Court can envision a 
discussion between Schafer and McNamee, in 
which Schafer makes a direct accusation 
against Glenn under conditions that meet the 
three-pronged scope of employment standard. 
Imagination, however, is not the most 
appropriate juridical tool on motions for 
summary judgment. Glenn simply provides 
no evidence that Scott would be liable for 
Schafer's alleged conduct and comments. 
As to McNamee's actions, Hull's testimony 
does establish context by placing one of their 
meetings in the Pittsburgh airport. Even 
assuming that McNamee was on a business 
trip, and that the subsequent conversation 
with Hull occurred during business hours, the 
Court is not satisfied that any evidence 
suggests that McNamee's conduct should be 
assignable to Scott. With Glenn providing no 
evidence to the contrary, the Court is unable 
to conclude that McNamee's duties 
encompassed discussions with third parties 
about the arguably tortious activities of a 
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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Scott vice pres ident . In addit ion, Glenn offers 
no th ing to prove t h a t M c N a m e e was guided by 
any purpose to se rve Scott w h e n m a k i n g t h e 
disclosures to H u l l 
C O N C L U S I O N 
Glenn ' s en t i re case both t h e age 
discr iminat ion a n d defamat ion c la ims is 
u n a b l e to s t and upon t h e w e a k evident ia ry 
foundat ion s u b m i t t e d to w i t h s t a n d Scot t ' s 
motion. H e cannot oppose a val id motion 
w i t h incompeten t or conclusory a l lega t ions 
a n d the reby cont inue to pu r sue his specula t ive 
charges . Therefore , t h e Cour t will g r a n t 
Scot t ' s s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t mot ion on a l l 
counts . 
FN1 Scott, at length, argues that Schafer's 
statements, if made at all, were in refeience to 
Glenn's obsolete sales philosophy Glenn even 
testified that he understood the lemarks in relation to 
sales philosophy See Appendix to Scott's Statement 
of Undisputed Facts ("Scott Appendix"), Exhibit A, 
Glenn Deposition at 169 70 At this juncture, the 
Court takes no position on the meaning that may be 
assigned to the alleged remarks, but merely 
recognizes that an inference must be drawn to tie the 
statements to the employment actions taken by Scott 
against Glenn 
FN2 Glenn asserts that certain statistical evidence 
supports an inference that Scott unlawfully 
discriminated against Glenn See Abrams v 
Lightoker, Inc , 702 F Supp 509, 511 (D N J 1988) 
(plaintiff asserting age discrimination claim may 
"lely on a discriminatory pattern or practice as 
mdiiect evidence ol discrimination") 
Glenn points to two items to support an inference of 
discrimination (1) a document produced by Scott 
which lists certain Scott employees who reported to 
Schater on December 31, 1988, June 1, 1989. and/ 
or December 31, 1990, and (2) a Wisconsin 
agency's finding ot probable cause in an 
administrative complaint of age discrimination filed 
by a former Scott employee, Donna Wisnoski, who 
was terminated in early 1992 
Regarding the lists produced by Scott, Glenn ofters 
that, ol the employees listed, most are youngei than 
Schatei and those that aie older aie no longer 
employed by Scott See Lune Certification, Exhibit 
M, Scott's Supplemental Answeis To Glenn's First 
Copr. © Wes t 2004 No C la im 
Set Of Interrogatories at Exhibit C, Exhibit B, 
Schafer Deposition at 201-05 The Court is not 
persuaded by this "statistical" evidence Fust, 
respecting Glenn's prima tacie case, these statistics 
leveal nothing about the respective ages ol those 
employees affected and those unaftected by the 
cutbacks instituted by Scott in late 1990-at which 
time Glenn was teimmated Second, even if the 
cited statistics support an inference of disci lmination 
to establish a prima facie case, Scott has sufficiently 
rebutted this inference and may succeed on its 
summary judgment motion See Barnes \ Gencorp 
Inc , 896 F 2d 1457, 1469 (6th Cir ) (employei may 
rebut prima facie case based on statistics by (1) 
showing plaintiffs statistical method is faulty (2) 
attacking presumption that nondisci nninatory reason 
for statistical disparity is unlikely or (3) showing that 
even if bias was a factor somewhere, it did not play 
a role in the action taken against the specific 
plaintiff), cert denied, 498 U S 878, 111 S Ct 211 
(1990) 
Through its proferred expert analysis, Scott 
convincingly argues that the statistics become 
insignificant when reasons tor termination aie 
properly factored See Scott Appendix, Exhibit P 
See also Healy, 860 F 2d at 1217-18 (statistical 
evidence is lelevant to employer s defense and 
supports summary judgment against employee) In 
addition, Glenn simply has produced no evidence to 
counter Scott's work-force-reduction position See 
Barnes, 896 F 2d at 1469 
As to the Wisnoski complaint, the Court deems the 
determination by the Wisconsin Department ot 
Industry, Laboi and Human Relations irrelevant to 
Glenn's discrimination claim Schater was not 
Wisnoski's supervisor nor is there any evidence that 
Leaman was involved in the decision to terminate 
her While an administrative determination of 
probable cause regarding Glenn's claim would be 
relevant, the Couit cannot conclude that the 
Wisnoski action has any relevance heie Compaie 
Morehouse v Boeing Co , 501 F Supp 390, 392-93 
(E D Pa) (in employment discrimination, court 
deemed inadmissible the testimony ot five other 
former employees with seperate discrimination cases 
pending against same employer), aff'd mem , 639 
F 2d 774 (3d Cir 1980) with Abrams, 702 F Supp at 
512 (prehminaiy EEOC finding that employei 
disci lminated against plaintiff was admissible in 
plaintiffs subsequent Title VII action against the 
employer) 
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FN3 Presumably frustrated by a lack of evidence to 
support his claim, Glenn has accused Scott of 
withholding and destroying relevant evidence The 
Couit takes a grave view of such charges, which 
warrant serious sanctions if proven tiue, or 
alternatively, if proven false and made in bad faith 
The Couit is stiuck by the timing of Glenn's 
accusation-fust brought defending a summaiy 
judgment motion attei completion of discovery At 
no time did Glenn raise these concerns during the 
discovery phase or bring them to the attention of the 
magistrate Glenn never biought a proper motion to 
compel, or a motion foi sanctions, pursuant to Rule 
37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
Therefore, the Court finds it too late in the day for 
Glenn to raise these discovery issues and does not 
consider them on the pending motion See 
DesRosiets v Moran, 949 F 2d 15, 22 n 8 (1st 
Cir 1991) (discovery violations waived where 
untimely made), Clinchfield R Co v Lynch, 700 
F2d 126, 132, 132 n 10 (4th Cir 1983) (where 
party objects to discovery, party seeking discoveiy 
must take initiative to request compulsory order) 
FN4 Fedeial common law-not the forum state's 
law—governs a federal court's interpretation of 
"agency" under Rule 801(d)(2)(D) Lippay, 996 
F 2d at 1497 
FN5 The record indicates that at some point after 
McNamee left Scott, he made additional statements 
to Hull respecting the Custom Easy materials See 
Lune Certification, Exhibit G, Hull Deposition at 61 
Because these statements weie made when no 
employment relationship existed between Scott and 
McNamee, they would not be admissible against 
Scott See Boren, 887 F 2d at 1038 
FN6 The Court concludes that Glenn had this 
conversation with Acton, notwithstanding the fact 
that a poition of Glenn's deposition transcript refers 
to this individual as John "Abington " See Exhibit 
A, Lune Certification, Exhibit A, Glenn Deposition 
at 29 The Court notes that a portion of the Glenn 
Deposition was revised by hand, changing 
"Abington" to "Acton " See, Scott Appendix, 
Exhibit A, Glenn Deposition at 51-52 
FN7 Glenn also alleges that two other Scott 
employees informed him of alleged accusations at the 
Oshkosh meeting Barbara Kontos, a secretary at 
Scott, and Barbara Waite, a Scott customer service 
Copr. © Wes t 2004 No C l a i m to 
representative See Scott Appendix, at 46 49 
Kontos did not attend the meeting and hei statements 
are inadmissible because they are based on the 
statements of an unidentified declarant Id at 46 
("several people had told her") Kontos' 
declaration is also hearsay as against Scott-it is not a 
Rule 801(d) party-opponent admission, as the theft of 
the Custom Easy materials was not with the scope of 
her employment 
Accoiding to Glenn, Waite did attend the Oshkosh 
meeting and consequently acquired first-hand 
knowledge of Schafer's accusation While the 
source of Waite's knowledge is not attributed to an 
unidentified declarant, the Couit concludes that her 
statements to Glenn regarding the accusations are 
also hearsay as against Scott While both Kontos 
and Waite may have learned of the alleged theft 
during the course of their employment with Scott, the 
theft of the Custom Easy materials was not a mattei 
within the scope of their employment 
FN8 Scott has admitted that, as the search for the 
missing materials ensued, McNamee did "opine that 
perhaps" Acton had stolen them See Scott 
Appendix, Exhibit J, Scott's Second Set of 
Supplemental Answeis To Glenn's Fust Set of 
Interrogatories at 6-7 The Court addresses the 
consequences of the admission in the discussion 
below regarding the applicable statute of limitations 
See infra, at note 10 
FN9 Shapiro, in effect, leports, "I was told of the 
theft by a Scott employee " Glenn offers Shapiro's 
statement for its ttuth-what Shapiro was told This 
is hearsay as it is not a statement from a Scott 
employee or agent undei Rule 801(d)(2)(D) 
FN 10 Acton also testified that Hable informed him 
of the rumor regarding the alleged theft See Scott 
Appendix, Exhibit G, Acton Deposition at 45, 
Exhibit S, Hable Affidavit at K 3 Hable asserts that 
she never heard the accusation dnectly tiom Schater 
or McNamee Id , Exhibit S, Hable Affidavit at 1 4 
FN 11 The Court acknowledges that Pennsylvania 
may have a significant mteiest in having its 
defamation law applied in the instant case Defendant 
Scott is a Pennsylvania corporation In addition, 
certain of the McNamee Statements occuired in 
Pennsylvania at the Pittsbuigh airport Howevei, the 
Court finds there to be little conflict between 
Pennsylvania and New Jersey law legarding the 
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statute of limitations and issues of republication 
FN 12 The Court also concludes that Glenn's 
detarnation action is time-baned to the extent it is 
based on Scott s admission that McNamee initially 
suggested that Acton stole the material See Lune 
Ceitification, Exhibit L Scott's Objections And 
Answeis To Glenn s Fust Set Ot Interrogatories at 
23-24 Eschewing any discussion of whethei 
McNamee s statement could constitute legal 
defamation, the Court simply notes that McNamee 
made this statement within a month of the December, 
1990, Bryn Mawr meeting, and prior to March 12, 
1991 
FN 13 The Couit notes that the couit in Kiamer 
based its conclusions on the tact that there was "no 
special relationship" between Party 1 and Paity 2 
Kiamer, 700 F Supp at 1351 Had there been an 
agency relationship between Party 1 and Party 2, the 
court would have held that an action could have been 
brought against either Party 1 or Party 2 within one 
year of publication because as between principal and 
agent there is no publication Id There is no third 
person 
In reflecting on the instant case, the Court finds 
these conclusions ol some interest First, Scott 
assumes McNamee is a third person to whom the 
Schater Statement is published However, within 
the WFB hierarchy, McNamee was subordinate and 
lepoited to Schaler See Scott Appendix, Exhibit B, 
Schafer Deposition at 61-62 Given the agency 
relationship between Schaler and McNamee, and the 
subject matter of the Schafer Statement, Kramer 
would suggest that the Schafer Statement did not 
constitute a publication, but that Glenn could bring 
his claims against either Schater or McNamee based 
on McNamee's publication within the statute of 
limitations See Kramer, 700 F Supp at 1351 (given 
the agency relationship, plaintiff may sue the author 
or the mass media publisher within one yeai ot 
publication) 
The Court finds this portion of Kiamer unhelpful to 
the instant case First, Kramer's discourse on agency 
concerned the application of the single publication 
rule, which is generally utilized in cases with mass 
produced materials The rule provides that a 
plaintiff will have only one cause of action against a 
media publisher, accruing on the date the publication 
was fust circulated to the public Kramer, 700 
F Supp at 1351 The single publication rule is 
simply inapplicable to the tacts underlying Glenn's 
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defamation claims-the statements by Schafer and 
McNamee must be considered separately 
Consequently, the Court treads carefully around the 
Kramer court's focus on the agency relationship 
between an author and the mass media publisher 
The instant case does not involve a mass media 
publisher, but concerns the agency and employment 
relationship between a supenoi and a subordinate 
The Court hesitates to conclude that the Schater 
Statement, made to McNamee, did not constitute a 
publication Defamation may occur dunng a 
principal-agent communication, even where such 
communications have a qualified privilege See 
generally Coleman v Newark Morning Ledger Co , 
29 N J 357, 375 (1959) (a bona fide communication 
on any subject mattei between parties with a 
common interest or duty respecting the mattei is 
privileged even if it contains actionable defamatory 
content), Sokolay v Edltn, 65 N J Supei 112, 125-
28 (App Div 1961) (common interest to sustain 
privilege where employees were mfoimed that co-
worker stole from employer) 
1993 W L 431161 (D.N.J.) 
E N D O F D O C U M E N T 




1995 WL 708660 
(Cite as: 1995 WL 708660 (D.Mass.)) 
< KeyCite Citations > 
Only the Westlaw citation is currently 
available. 
United States District Court, D. 
Massachusetts. 
Richard HUMISTON, Plaintiff, 
v. 
ATOTECH USA, INC., Defendant 
Civ. A. No. 94-40002-NMG. 
Nov. 28, 1995. 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
GORTON, District Judge. 
*1 Plaintiff Richard Humiston ("Humiston") 
brought this action against defendant Atotech 
USA, Inc. alleging two counts of breach of 
contract and one count of defamation. 
Pending before this Court is defendant's 
motion for summary judgment on all three 
counts. For the reasons stated below, 
defendant's motion will be allowed. 
I. BACKGROUND 
In 1990, plaintiff Humiston was hired by 
Chemcut Corporation, an American subsidiary 
of a foreign corporation, Schering AG, as a 
regional manager in Chemcut's chemistry 
sales and service department. 
In or about August, 1992, Schering 
announced that Elf Atochem would be 
acquiring Chemcut and other Schering 
affiliated divisions. Notice of the merger was 
provided to Chemcut employees, including 
Humiston, and two days later, on August 21, 
1992, a Purchase and Sale Agreement ("P & S 
Agreement") between Schering and Elf 
Atochem was signed. The P & S Agreement 
contained the following language in Article 
("Art") 24: 
(b) The relevant Buyers will pursue the policy 
of promoting stable and long term 
employment opportunities for Transferred 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim 
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Employees Abroad and subject to local law 
and practices. Buyers will respect local 
standards and practices of employment 
protection. For a period of six months from 
Closing, Buyers may under no circumstances 
institute operational dismissals affecting the 
Transferred Employees Abroad. 
The acquisition was completed in February, 
1993. Soon thereafter, Chemcut Corporation 
changed its name to Atotech USA, Inc. 
("Atotech"). 
One month after the closing, in March, 1993, 
Humiston was terminated by Atotech for 
"insubordination." Humiston alleges in 
Counts I and II, respectively, that his 
termination constituted a breach of his 
employment contract and the P & S 
Agreement between Schering and Elf 
Atochem. Humiston further alleges in Count 
III that Atotech published defamatory 
statements relating to his termination that 
caused injury to his reputation and standing 
in his professional community. 
In response to Count I, defendant Atotech 
maintains that Humiston was, at all times, an 
at-will employee and could be terminated at 
any time, with or without cause. With 
respect to Count II, Atotech argues that 
Humiston was not an intended beneficiary of 
the P & S Agreement between Schering and 
Elf Atochem and thus was not entitled to 
contractual protection under the Agreement. 
Atotech further argues that Humiston's 
defamation claim in Count III is unfounded 
because Humiston failed to present admissible 
evidence to support his defamation claim and 
employers enjoy a conditional privilege to 
speak to prospective employers about former 
employees. 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Summary Judgment Standard 
Summary Judgment shall be rendered where 
the pleadings, discovery on file and affidavits, 
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if any, show "there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and ... the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The Court must view the 
entire record in the light most favorable to 
Humiston, the nonmoving party, and indulge 
all reasonable inferences in his favor. 
O'Connor v. Sleeves, 994 F.2d 905, 907 (1st 
Cir.1993). 
*2 With respect to a motion for summary 
judgment, the burden is on the moving party 
to show that "there is an absence of evidence 
to support the non- moving party's case." 
FDIC v. Municipality of Ponce, 904 F.2d 740, 742 
(1st Cir.1990), quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 
202 (1986). If the movant satisfies that 
burden, it shifts to the non-moving party to 
establish the existence of a genuine material 
issue. Id. In deciding whether a factual 
dispute is genuine, this Court must determine 
whether "the evidence is such that a 
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 
nonmoving party." Andersen v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., All U.S. 242, 248 (1986); accord Aponte-
Santlago v. Lopez-Rivera, 957 F.2d 40, 41 (1st 
Cir.1992) (citing Andersen ). The nonmovant's 
assertion of mere allegation or denial of the 
pleadings is insufficient on its own to establish 
a genuine issue of material fact. Fed.R.Civ. P. 
56(e). The nonmovant must set forth specific 
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial. The Court must view the entire record 
in the light most hospitable to the non-moving 
party and indulge all reasonable inferences in 
its favor. O'Connor, 994 F.2d at 907. 
B. Analysis 
1. Count I-Breach of Employment Contract 
Count I of Humiston's complaint alleges that 
Atotech breached its employment contract 
with Humiston by terminating Humiston for 
"gross insubordination." Plaintiff has 
admitted in his deposition, however, that he 
was an at-will employee of Atotech (Vol. II, p. 
103-5; Vol. Ill, p. 133). Under Massachusetts 
law, "[t]he general rule is that an employment 
at-will contract can be terminated at any time 
for any reason or for no reason at all." 
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Folmsbee v. Tech Tool Grinding & Supply, Inc., 
417 Mass. 388, 394 (1994); see also Fortune v. 
National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 100-01 
(1977); Fenton v. Federal St. Bldg. Trust, 310 
Mass. 609, 612 (1942). According to the 
general rule and plaintiffs own admission, 
then, Atotech was free to terminate Humiston 
with or without cause. 
Massachusetts courts have recognized narrow 
exceptions to that general rule. Employers 
may be held liable for terminating at-will 
employees in violation of a clearly established 
public policy. See Hobson v. McLean Hosp. 
Corp., 402 Mass. 413, 416 (1988); Smith-Pfeffer 
v. Superintendent of the Walter E. Fernald State 
Sch., 404 Mass. 145, 149-50 (1989). 
Terminating an employee for "gross 
insubordination", however, is not contrary to 
any public policy recognized by Massachusetts 
courts as an exception to the at-will 
employment rule. 
In some at-will terminations, Massachusetts 
courts have implied a covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing to impose liability on the 
employer. Fortune, 373 Mass. at 100 05. 
Massachusetts courts have narrowly construed 
this exception, however, holding that the 
discharge of an at-will employee without cause 
is not, by itself, a violation of an employer's 
obligation of good faith and fair dealing. Gram 
v. Liberty Mutual, 384 Mass 659, 671 (1981). 
Because plaintiff has failed to present 
evidence that even suggests improper motive 
or bad faith by Atotech in its discharge of 
Humiston, the Court finds that this narrow 
exception is not applicable. 
*3 Defendant's motion for summary judgment 
on Count I, therefore, will be allowed. 
2. Count II-Breach of Contract 
Humiston further alleges that he was an 
intended beneficiary of the P & S Agreement 
between Schering and Elf Atochem and, as 
such, claims that he can enforce the 
contractual provision in Art. 24 of the P & S 
Agreement forbidding dismissals within the 
first six months of Elf Atochem's acquisition of 
Schering and its subsidiaries. Under 
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Massachusetts law, it is the contracting 
parties' intent that determines whether a 
third party is an intended or incidental 
beneficiary. Market Service Ins. Agency, Inc. v. 
Tifco, Inc., 403 Mass. 401, 405 (1988). 
In support of his claim that he was an 
intended beneficiary, Humiston points to 
specific language in Art. 24(b), which states: 
"For a period of six months from Closing, 
Buyers may under no circumstances institute 
operational dismissals affecting the 
Transferred Employees Abroad." Based on 
that language, Humiston argues that there 
exists a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether he was an intended or incidental 
beneficiary of the P & S Agreement. 
Atotech maintains that Art. 24(b) was 
intended "to prevent the immediate post-
acquisition dismantling of the Schering 
divisions or the wholesale lay-off of that 
entity's former employees." Atotech has 
submitted an affidavit from the Vice 
President/General Counsel of Elf Atochem, 
who reiterates that this was the intent of the 
parties in negotiating the P & S Agreement 
and states that the contract was not intended 
to shield individual employees from adverse 
employment decisions. Furthermore, Art. 24 
clearly states that previous employees would 
continue to be governed by "local standards 
and practices" in effect prior to the 
acquisition. If Humiston was an at-will 
employee prior to the acquisition by Atotech, 
his at-will employment continued after the 
acquisition by Atotech. 
In viewing the record in the light most 
favorable to plaintiff, the only evidence this 
Court has located in support of Humiston's 
claim that he was an intended beneficiary is 
the second to last paragraph of the notice 
allegedly sent to all Schering employees on 
August 19, 1992. That notice states that "Elf 
Atochem will not be allowed to give notice to 
employees during the first 6 months after 
their transfer." A reasonable jury could not, 
however, return a verdict for Humiston on the 
basis of the August 19, 1992 memo by itself. 
The preceding paragraph of the notice clearly 
states that "Atochem accepts the present local 
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personnel and social policies of Schering's 
subsidiaries ..." Furthermore, pursuant to 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e), Humiston "may not rest 
upon the mere allegations or denials of the 
[defendant's] pleading, but ... must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine 
issue for trial." The Court concludes that 
plaintiff has failed to establish a genuine issue 
of material fact as to whether he was an 
intended beneficiary of the P & S Agreement. 
Because plaintiff has failed to do so, 
defendant's motion for summary judgment on 
Count II will be allowed. 
3. Count Ill-Defamation 
*4 Count III alleges that an Atotech 
representative made defamatory statements to 
Humiston's subsequent employer, LeaRonal, 
in response to an inquiry from LeaRonal. 
In his deposition, Humiston refers to 
statements made to him by a Mr. Schaefer at 
LeaRonal (Vol. I, p. 37-46). These statements, 
in turn, were relayed to Mr. Schaefer by a Mr. 
Kessler, based on phone conversations that 
Mr. Kessler had with a Mr. Hanlon, an 
executive vice-president at Atotech. This is 
the only evidence that plaintiff has presented 
concerning the nature or content of the 
allegedly defamatory statement. This 
evidence, however, is double hearsay and 
inadmissible at trial. On that basis alone, 
Humiston fails to show the existence of a 
genuine issue of material fact on his 
defamation claim. 
Furthermore, regardless of the content of Mr. 
Hanlon's statements to representatives at 
LeaRonal and the truth or falsity of such 
statements, Mr. Hanlon had a conditional 
privilege as an official of Atotech to disclose 
defamatory information concerning an 
employee in the employment context as long 
as he did not abuse his privilege or act with 
actual malice, recklessness or ill will. Burns v. 
Barry, 353 Mass. 115, 119 (1967). Plaintiff 
bears the burden of proving that Mr. Hanlon 
abused his privilege or acted maliciously. Foley 
v. Polaroid Corp., 400 Mass. 82, 95 (1987). 
There has been no such showing by plaintiff in 
this case. 
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Defendant's motion for summary judgment on 
Count III, therefore, will be allowed. 
ORDER 
For the foregoing reasons, the motion of 
defendant for summary judgment on Counts I, 
II and III is ALLOWED. 
So Ordered. 
1995 WL 708660, 1995 WL 708660 (D.Mass.) 
END OF DOCUMENT 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
ADDENDUM F 
Wfestlaw 
Not Reported in S.W. 3d 
31 Media L. Rep. 1833 
(Cite as: 2003 WL 21338696 (Tenn.Ct. App.)) 
< KeyCite Citations > 
SEE COURT OF APPEALS RULES 11 AND 
12 
Court of Appeals of Tennessee. 




Jan. 6, 2003 Session. 
June 10, 2003 
Appeal from the Circuit Court for 
Montgomery County, No. 50000474; John H. 
Gasaway, III, Judge. 
Rodger N. Bowman, Clarksville, Tennessee, 
for the appellants, Donita Piper and Lori 
Turner. 
Christopher J. Pittman, Clarksville, 
Tennessee, for the appellee, Curtis Mize. 
WILLIAM B. CAIN, J., delivered the opinion 
of the court, in which BEN H. CANTRELL, 
P.J., M.S., and STELLA HARGROVE, SP. J., 
joined. 
OPINION 
WILLIAM B. CAIN, J. 
*1 Plaintiffs in this case are citizens of 
Montgomery County. Defendants, Paul 
Avallone, Wayne Gill, Curtis Mize and 
Yvonne Van Der Touw are also citizens of 
Montgomery County who, in varying degrees, 
were alleged to be involved in the printing 
and distribution of a newspaper known as The 
Rattler. Defendant Avallone was the sole 
writer, publisher and editor of each issue of 
The Rattler. Defendant Mize is a businessman 
who allowed copies of the October 5, 2000 
edition of The Rattler to be placed on the 
counter at his place of business for free 
distribution. The trial court granted summary 
Page 1 
judgment in favor of Defendant Mize and 
finalized the judgment as to Mize under 
Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 54.02. 
Plaintiffs appeal, and we affirm the judgment 
of the trial court. 
At the time of the events involved in this 
defamation suit, Johnny Piper was Mayor of 
the City of Clarksville, Tennessee. Plaintiff/ 
Appellant, Donita Piper, was his wife. 
Plaintiff/Appellant, Lori Turner, was a former 
candidate for Mayor of Clarksville and was 
the Grants Writer for the City of Clarksville. 
On or about February 1, 2000, a person or 
persons not enamored with the merits of the 
Piper administration began distribution of an 
underground newspaper called The Rattler. 
Referring to itself as a "slander sheet" this 
publication proclaimed itself to be "the first in 
venomous gossip." To say that the various 
issues of The Rattler were uncomplimentary of 
Mayor Piper, his wife Donita Piper and Grants 
Writer Lori Turner would be a most charitable 
understatement. This appeal, however, does 
not provide a proper forum for a full 
adjudication of the issues between those who 
wrote, edited and published the various issues 
of The Rattler on the one hand, and Plaintiffs, 
Donita Piper and Lori Turner, on the other. 
The record shows that Defendant/Appellee 
Curtis Mize neither wrote, edited nor 
published any issue of The Rattler, but such was 
the handiwork of Defendant Paul Avallone. 
The issues drawn between Plaintiffs on one 
hand and Paul Avallone and the other 
Defendants on the other remain before the 
trial court. Pursuant to the finality 
designation entered by the trial court under 
Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 54.02, only 
the Curtis Mize case is before this Court, and 
only such acts as the record shows to be 
attributable to Defendant Mize are at issue in 
this appeal. 
While the Complaint filed in this case is 
extensive and does not distinguish the relative 
degrees of alleged culpability of Defendants, 
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the record before the Court establishes that 
the participation of Defendant Curtis Mize in 
The Rattler saga is limited to his action in 
allowing a single edition of The Rattler, to wit, 
the October 5, 2000 edition, to be placed on 
the counter at his place of business, along with 
other free publications, for his customers to 
take if they so chose. 
The meat of the October 5, 2000 issue of The 
Rattler, as it relates to this case, is an article 
entitled "Sex Scandals Still Rock City Hall." 
Under this eye catcher is said, "Loud mouths 
and gossips had a field day earlier in the year 
when rumors of Mayor Piper's infidelity with 
his grants gal, the vivacious and every spunky 
Ms Lori Turner, spread like a Montana 
wildfire through the nooks and crannies of this 
otherwise quiet mini metropolis on the 
Cumberland River." The article continues 
with a recitation that, "as the story goes," the 
Mayor's wife, Donita Piper, catching him in 
the act with Ms. Turner the previous January, 
"clobbered him with a nine iron." [FN1] 
FN1 The October 5, 2000 issue ot Tfie Rattler 
contains the disclaimei, "Vie Rattler is a miracle 
blend ot tact, fiction, tiuth, opinion and satue It 
uses inventive names in all its stories, except in 
cases where public figures are being satirized Any 
other use ot real names is accidental and 
coincidental It you aie a thin-skinned public official 
and don't like being satirized, give up the easy 
money and the perks ot power and get out of the 
spotlight " The effect ot this caveat, if any, addresses 
itselt pnmai lly to the issues between and among the 
parties still before the trial couit. 
*2 Curtis Mize answered the Complaint with 
general denials and, after discovery, filed a 
Motion for Summary Judgment. The trial 
court granted the Motion holding: 
On November 15, 2001, the defendant, Curtis 
Mize, filed a motion for summary judgment. 
In support of his motion, the defendant 
simultaneously filed a memorandum of law, a 
statement of undisputed material facts and 
ten (10) exhibits consisting of publications, 
correspondence, portions of depositions, 
requests for admissions and an affidavit by 
the defendant. On December 18, 2001, the 
plaintiffs filed a brief in response to the 
defendant's motion. On December 18, 2001, 
the defendant filed his reply to the plaintiffs' 
brief. 
The Court has considered all of the above, 
deems the facts asserted by the defendant to 
be undisputed, and finds that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and 
further finds that the defendant is entitled to 
summary judgment as a matter of law. 
Plaintiffs timely appealed. 
In granting the Motion for Summary 
Judgment filed by Defendant Curtis Mize, the 
trial court had before it undisputed facts 
establishing: 
1. Paul Avallone, is the sole writer, publisher 
and editor of each issue of the newspaper 
known at (sic) "The Rattler " except the 
October 10, 2000 alleged edition of "The 
Rattler " which was not written, published, or 
distributed by Avallone. 
2. Paul Avallone talked to no one about his 
planned newspaper before he began 
publishing "TheRattler." 
3. Paul Avallone, alone, distributed the 
various issues of "The Rattler." 
4. Paul Avallone printed and distributed 
thousands of copies [of] various issues of "The 
Rattler." 
5. No one except Yvonne Van Der Touw knew 
prior to Paul Avallone's deposition in this 
lawsuit that Paul Avallone was the writer, 
publisher, and editor of "The Rattler." 
6. Curtis Mize did not print any issue of "The 
Rattler." 
7. Curtis Mize did not write any story found 
in any issue of "The Rattler." 
8. Curtis Mize did not take any pictures used 
in any issue of "The Rattler " 
9. Curtis Mize did not pay any printing costs 
of any issue of "The Rattler." 
10. Curtis Mize did not tell Paul Avallone to 
publish any issue of "The Rattler." 
11. Curtis Mize did not give Paul Avallone 
any story idea to use in any issue of "The 
Rattler" 
12. Neither of the plaintiffs ever requested, 
either orally or in writing, that Curtis Mize 
retract any of the statements contained in 
any edition of "The Rattler." 
13. The plaintiffs' complaint specifically 
asserts that the February 1, 2000, October 5, 
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2000 and October 10, 2000 editions of "The 
Rattler" contain defamatory statements 
concerning the plaintiffs 
14 Among the "stones" contained in the 
February 1, 2000 edition of "The Rattler " are 
stories asserting the following that the 
Republican National Convention would be 
held in Clarksville in 2004 and that an 
additional 18,673 parking spaces had been 
located in downtown Clarksville 
*3 15 Among the "stories" contained in the 
October 5, 2000 edition of "The Rattler " are 
stories asserting the following that God 
announced that one local politician was going 
to win an upcoming election, and that Mayor 
Johnny Piper's head exploded on television 
during the taping of a program 
16 Paul Avallone did not write, publish or 
distribute any copies of the document 
purporting to be the October 10, 2000 edition 
of "The Rattler " 
17 Curtis Mize did not write, publish or 
distribute any copies of the documents 
purporting to be the October 10, 2000 edition 
or'The Rattler " 
18. The plaintiffs cannot identify any harm 
suffered by them due to the actions of Curtis 
Mize 
19 There were rumors in the community of 
Clarksville, Tennessee, before February 1, 
2000, that Mayor Johnny Piper had allegedly 
had an affair and that the plaintiff, Donita 
Piper, caught her husband in such an affair 
and hit him with a golf club 
20 Plaintiff Lori Turner is a former 
candidate for Mayor of the City of 
Clarksville 
21 Plaintiff Lori Turner has been the subject 
of numerous articles in both the "Our City " 
newspaper and "TheLeaf Chionicle " 
newspaper 
22 Plaintiff Lori Turner has been the 
featured speaker at various civic groups in 
the past 7 years 
23 Plaintiff Lori Turner has hosted a local 
radio talk show 
24 Plaintiff Donita Piper is married to the 
Mayor of Clarksville, Tennessee 
25 Plaintiff Donita Piper has traveled out of 
the state and country as the spouse of the 
Mayor of Clarksville, Tennessee 
26 Plaintiff Donita Piper has written stories 
and has been a guest commentator for "The 
Leaf-Chronicle " newspaper 
27 Curtis Mize did not distribute any copies 
of the February 1, 2000 edition of "The Rattler 
28 Paul Avallone anonymously left several 
copies of the October 5, 200[0] edition of "The 
Rattler " at the front door of Curtis Mize's 
business before Curtis Mize arrived at work 
one day in early October 2000 
29 Along with the October 5, 2000 edition of 
"The Rattler," Curtis Mize also has allowed 
other free publications, such as "Out City " to 
be placed on his counter at work for 
customers to take if they choose [FN2] 
FN2 These undisputed facts are taken verbatim 
from the Defendant's Rule 56 03 Statement of 
Undisputed Material Facts filed with his Motion toi 
Summary Judgment The Statement ot Undisputed 
Facts is indeed, undisputed by Plaintiffs/Appellants 
DEFAMATION 
Certain near universal rules of law form a 
backdrop for our consideration The law of 
defamation consists of the twin torts of libel 
and slander Lara v Thomas, 512 N W 2d 777 
(Iowa 1994), Batt v Globe Engineering Co , 774 
P 2d 371 (Kan Ct App 1989) "It is reputation 
which is defamed, reputation which is injured, 
and reputation which is protected by the law 
of defamation " 50 Am Jur 2nd Libel and 
Slander § 2 (1995), see also Gobin v Globe PubVg 
Co , 649 P 2d 1239 (Kan 1982) 
As regards a private person, "To establish a 
prima facie case of defamation in Tennessee, 
the plaintiff must establish that 1) a party 
published a statement, 2) with knowledge that 
the statement is false and defaming to the 
other, or 3) with reckless disregard for the 
truth of the statement or with negligence in 
failing to ascertain the truth of the statement 
See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 580 B 
(1977), Press, Inc v Verran, 569 S W 2d 435, 
442 (Tennl978)" Sullivan v Baptist Mem'l 
Hosp , 995 S W 2d 569, 571 (Tenn 1999) 
*4 As regards a public official or public 
figure, Tennessee follows section 580(a) of the 
Restatement of Torts providing 
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§ 580 A. Defamation of Public Official or Public 
Figure. One who publishes a false and 
defamatory communication concerning a 
public official or public figure in regard to his 
conduct, fitness or role in that capacity is 
subject to liability, if, but only if, he 
(a) knows that the statement is false and that 
it defames the other person, or 
(b) acts in reckless disregard of these matters. 
Press, Inc. v. Verran, 569 S.W.2d 435, 442. 
" 'Publication' is a term of art meaning the 
communication of defamatory matter to a 
third person." Sullivan, 995 S.W.2d at 571-72 
(citing Quality Auto Parts Co. v. Bluff City Buick 
Co., 876 S.W.2d 818, 821 (Tenn.1994). "This 
being a civil and not a criminal suit for libel, 
it is essential that there be publication; that 
is, a communication of the defamatory matter 
to a third person. This is so for the reason that 
the gravamen of the act is the pecuniary 
damage to the character or credit of the party 
libeled. No such damage can arise, of course, 
without publication." Freeman v. Dayton Scale 
Co., 19 S.W.2d 255, 256 (Tenn.1929). There is 
a difference between civil and criminal actions 
for liable where publication is concerned. "In 
the former, publication must be made to some 
third person, or in such public manner as to 
reach third persons; but, in criminal 
proceedings, publication may be made by 
communicating the printed matter alone to 
the party libeled." Fry v. McCord, 33 S.W. 568, 
571 (Tenn. 1895). 
If the person allegedly libeled is a "public 
official or public figure," only clear and 
convincing proof of actual malice on the part 
of the defendant will survive a motion for 
summary judgment. Trigg v. Lakeway Publishers, 
Inc., 720 S.W.2d 69, 75 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1986). 
The defamation action at bar is a libel action, 
as opposed to one for slander. Three questions 
are dispositive of the case: 
1. Did Curtis Mize "publish" the October 5, 
2000 issue of "The Rattler"? 
2. Are Donita Piper and Lori Turner "public 
figures"? 
3. If so, does the record disclose sufficient 
evidence of actual malice on the part of 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim 
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THE STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL 
As to the questions of whether or not 
Defendant Mize published the October 5 issue 
of The Rattler and whether or not Donita Piper 
and Lori Turner are "public figures," the 
standard of review of a grant of summary 
judgment is well settled by Byrd v. Hall, 847 
S.W.2d 208 (Tenn. 1993) and Evco Corp. v. Ross, 
528 S.W.2d 20 (Tenn.1975). The trial court, 
and this Court on appeal, must look at all the 
evidence and take the strongest legitimate 
view of it in favor of the opponent of the 
motion allowing all reasonable inferences in 
favor of the opponent and discarding all 
countervailing evidence. If, after doing so, 
there is any dispute as to any material fact or 
any doubt as to the conclusion to be drawn 
from the evidence, the motion must be denied. 
*5 As to the third question, assuming 
Plaintiffs are actually "public figures," 
Defendant can be held liable only if actual 
malice is supported by clear and convincing 
evidence. A different, and rather 
controversial, standard of review is applicable 
on summary judgment. In addressing this very 
issue, the Supreme Court of the United States, 
in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242, 
106 S.Ct. 2505; 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 255-56 (1986), 
held: 
In sum, we conclude that the determination 
of whether a given factual dispute requires 
submission to a jury must be guided by the 
substantive evidentiary standards that apply 
to the case. This is true at both the directed 
verdict and summary judgment stages. 
Consequently, where the New York Times 
"clear and convincing" evidence requirement 
applies, the trial judge's summary judgment 
inquiry as to whether a genuine issue exists 
will be whether the evidence presented is 
such that a jury applying that evidentiary 
standard could reasonably find for either the 
plaintiff or the defendant. Thus, where the 
factual dispute concerns actual malice, 
clearly a material issue in a New York Times 
case, the appropriate summary judgment 
question will be whether the evidence in the 
record could support a reasonable jury finding 
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either that the plaintiff has shown actual 
malice by clear and convincing evidence or 
that the plaintiff has not. 
In sum, a court ruling on a motion for 
summary judgment must be guided by the 
New York Times "clear and convincing" 
evidentiary standard in determining whether 
a genuine issue of actual malice exists-that 
is, whether the evidence presented is such 
that a reasonable jury might find that actual 
malice had been shown with convincing 
clarity. 
This holding by the Court evoked two of the 
most vigorous dissenting opinions in print 
with Justice Brennan observing: 
The Court today holds that "whether a given 
factual dispute requires submission to a jury 
must be guided by the substantive 
evidentiary standards that apply to the case," 
ante, at 255. In my view, the Court's analysis 
is deeply flawed, and rests on a shaky 
foundation of unconnected and unsupported 
observations, assertions, and conclusions. 
Moreover, I am unable to divine from the 
Court's opinion how these evidentiary 
standards are to be considered, or what a trial 
judge is actually supposed to do in ruling on a 
motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, I 
respectfully dissent. 
In my view, if a plaintiff presents evidence 
which either directly or by permissible 
inference (and these inferences are a product 
of the substantive law of the underlying 
claim) supports all of the elements he needs 
to prove in order to prevail on his legal claim, 
the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case 
and a defendant's motion for summary 
judgment must fail regardless of the burden 
of proof that the plaintiff must meet. In other 
words, whether evidence is "clear and 
convincing," or proves a point by a mere 
preponderance, is for the factfinder to 
determine. As I read the case law, this is how 
it has been, and because of my concern that 
today's decision may erode the 
constitutionally enshrined role of the jury, 
and also undermine the usefulness of 
summary judgment procedure, this is how I 
believe it should remain. 
*6 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257-58, 268 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
Justice Rehnquist observed: 
The Court, apparently moved by concerns for 
intellectual tidiness, mistakenly decides that 
the "clear and convincing evidence" standard 
governing finders of fact in libel cases must 
be applied by trial courts in deciding a 
motion for summary judgment in such a case. 
The Court refers to this as a "substantive 
standard," but I think it is actually a 
procedural requirement engrafted onto Rule 
56, contrary to our statement in Calder v. 
Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), that 
"[w]e have already declined in other contexts 
to grant special procedural protections to 
defendants in libel and defamation actions in 
addition to the constitutional protections 
embodied in the substantive laws." Id., at 
790- 791. 
The Court, I believe, makes an even greater 
mistake in failing to apply its newly 
announced rule to the facts of this case. 
Instead of thus illustrating how the rule 
works, it contents itself with abstractions and 
paraphrases of abstractions, so that its 
opinion sounds much like a treatise about 
cooking by someone who has never cooked 
before and has no intention of starting now. 
Id. a t 268-69 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
Tennessee echoed to follow the Anderson 
majority in Trigg v. Lakeway Publishers, Inc., 
wherein this Court held: 
Plaintiff also contends that summary 
judgment was inappropriate even if he was a 
public figure because there is a genuine issue 
of fact of whether the Times and Thompson 
were guilty of "actual malice." 
... New York Times Co. v. Sullivan [376 U.S. 254, 
84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964) ] makes 
actual malice a constitutional issue to be 
decided in the first instance by the trial judge 
applying the Times test of actual knowledge or 
reckless disregard of the truth [and][u]nless 
the court finds, on the basis of pretrial 
affidavits, depositions, or other documentary 
evidence, that the plaintiff can prove actual 
malice in the Times sense, it should grant 
summary judgment. 
Wright, J., concurring, Wasserman v. Time, 
Inc., 424 F.2d 920, 922 (D.C.Cir.), cert, denied, 
398 U.S. 940, 90 S.Ct. 1844, 26 L.Ed.2d 273 
(1970). 
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"[A] public figure cannot resist a newspaper's 
motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 
by arguing that there is an issue for the jury 
as to malice unless he makes some showing, 
of the kind contemplated by the Rules, of 
facts from which malice may be inferred." 
Thompson v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 394 
F.2d 774, 776 (D.C.Cir.1968). 
Whether there is "actual malice" is a proper 
question to be decided on motion for a 
summary judgment. 
On motion for summary judgment where 
plaintiff, as in this case, is a "public figure," 
it is incumbent upon him to show "actual 
malice" with "convincing clarity." See New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285-286, 
84 S.Ct at 729, 11 L.Ed.2d at 710. 
Trigg, 720 S.W.2d at 74; see also Tomlinson v. 
Kelley, 969 S.W.2d 402 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1997). 
*7 It is, therefore, incumbent upon this Court, 
in reviewing this grant of summary judgment 
as to the issue of actual malice, to determine, 
not whether there is material evidence in the 
record supporting Plaintiffs, but whether or 
not the record discloses clear and convincing 
evidence upon which a trier of fact could find 
actual malice. 
PUBLICATION 
"Publication" as used in the tort of 
defamation has no relationship to the ordinary 
meaning of the term as used in everyday life. 
In the law of defamation, it is a term of ar t 
meaning the communication of defamatory 
matter to a third person. Quality Auto Parts, 876 
S.W.2d at 821; Sullivan, 995 S.W.2d at 571-72. 
"Publication" is an element of the tort which 
the plaintiff must prove or suffer his 
complaint to be dismissed. 
The term "publication" causes some confusion 
in a libel case such as this because it is both a 
business term meaning printing and 
distribution of written materials and a legal 
term meaning communication of libelous 
matter to a third person. Painter, 
"Republication Problems in the Law of 
Defamation." 47 Va.L.Rev. 1131 (1961); 62 
Harv.L.Rev. 1041 (1949). Moreover, 
"publication" used as a legal term in the 
Isenberg case and in T.C.A. § 39-2702 does not 
determine how many causes of action are 
created by printing and distribution of a 
libelous book. Rather, use of the legal term in 
those instances merely indicates that 
publication is an essential element of a libel 
action without which the complaint must be 
dismissed. 
Applewhite v. Memphis State University, 495 
S.W.2d 190, 192-3 (Tenn.1973). 
A distinction must, likewise, be drawn 
between the use of the term "publication" in a 
criminal indictment and its use as an element 
of the civil tort. 
It is proper to state that there is a marked 
difference between civil and criminal actions 
for libel,-so far, at least, as the question of 
publication is concerned. In the former, 
publication must be made to some third 
person, or in such public manner as to reach 
third persons; but, in criminal proceedings, 
publication may be made by communicating 
the printed matter alone to the party libeled. 
The reason for this difference is that in a civil 
action of libel the gravamen of the action is 
the pecuniary damage to the character or 
credit of the party libeled, but in a criminal 
action the ground of the offense is the 
liability of the words written to provoke a 
breach of the peace. In the civil action the 
only publication that could injuriously affect 
the credit and character is that made to third 
persons, as no damage to credit or character 
could result from a letter or writing known 
only to the party to whom it is sent, and not 
communicated to others. 
Fry, 33 S.W. at 571-72 (citations omitted); see 
also Insurance Research Service, Inc. v. Associates 
Financial Corp., 134 F.Supp. 54, 61 
(M.D.Tenn.1955). 
While the undisputed facts show that 
thousands of copies of all editions of The Rattler 
were freely distributed in the Clarksville 
community by its publisher, Paul Avallone, 
and others, the case before the Court as to 
Curtis Mize is limited to what the undisputed 
facts show to be his individual conduct. He is a 
political opponent of the Piper administration 
and makes no secret in deposition that his 
sympathies lie with the writer, publisher and 
editor of The Rattler. The same undisputed facts 
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show, however, that his participation in any 
distribution of The Rattler was limited to 
allowing a number of copies of the October 5, 
2000 issue to be placed on the counter of his 
place of business, along with other free 
newspapers, for his customers to take if they 
elected to do so. There is no evidence in the 
record that any copy of the October 5, 2000 
edition of The Rattler ever reached the hands of 
a third party by any action of Curtis Mize, or 
that any third party ever took a copy of The 
Rattler from the counter in his place of 
business. Donita Piper testified: 
*8 Q. Okay. How many copies of the Rattler 
did Mr. Mize give out? 
A. Again, I have no knowledge of that. 
Q. Okay. To whom did Mr Mize give copies of 
the Rattler? 
A. Again, I don't know who his employees 
are. I don't know who his clients are. I don't 
know who his friends are. They would 
probably be able to answer that better than I, 
but I don't have any knowledge of who. 
When asked in deposition what third party 
had received a copy of The Rattler from either 
Curtis Mize or his place of business, Lori 
Turner could name no person, save a single 
individual named Roger Freeman, and as to 
this person, she testified: 
Q. Well, didn't you say Mr. Freeman didn' t-
he tried to give him a copy and Mr. Freeman 
or Pastor Freeman didn't take it? 
A. Correct. 
Q. So do you have the names of anybody who 
can corroborate that they received a copy of 
the Rattler from Mr. Mize? 
A. No. 
An unsuccessful effort to deliver an alleged 
libelous document to a third person will not 
suffice to establish "publication." 
There appears to be no question in the law of 
defamation that liability is not established 
unless the allegedly defamatory statement is 
in fact understood by a third person as 
referring to plaintiff. Restatement of the 
Law, Torts, Sec. 564 and comments; 53 
C.J.S., Libel and Slander, § 82a, p. 133; 33 
Am. Jur., Sec. 89, p. 102; Annotation 91 
A.L.R., p. 1171; Tompkins v. Wisener, 33 Tenn. 
458. 
" * * * It is necessary that the recipient of the 
defamatory communication understand it as 
intended to refer to the plaintiff * * *. If, 
however, the recipient does not understand 
that the plaintiff is intended thereby, the fact 
that the defamer intended to refer to him is 
immaterial." Restatement of the Law, Torts, 
Sec. 564, Comment, paragraph a. 
Insurance Research Service, Inc., 134 F.Supp. at 
61. In this same Restatement of Torts context, 
the Court of Appeals of Georgia held: 
"In order to effect the publication of a libel 
there must be a reading of it. Not only that, 
there must be an understanding of its meaning by 
the person reading it... Since the gravamen of 
civil libel is injury to reputation, where the 
evidence demands a finding that the libel was 
not read by those to whom it was alleged to 
have been communicated, and there is no 
evidence authorizing an inference that it was 
communicated to anyone else who read it, or 
will be presumed to have read it, the case 
must fall." (Emphasis supplied.) Allen v. 
American Indem. Co., 63 Ga.App. 894, 895-896, 
12 S.E.2d 127 (1940). "It is not enough that 
the language used is reasonably capable of a 
defamatory interpretation if the recipient did 
not in fact so understand it." Restatement of 
the Law, Torts 2d, § 563, Comment c, p. 163. 
Sigmon v. Womack, 279 S.E.2d 254, 257 
(Ga.CtApp.1981). 
We are not dealing, in this appeal, with a 
publisher of a newspaper or magazine where 
mass distribution would authorize a finding 
that the publication was read and understood 
by some third party within the context of 
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 563, but 
rather with a very limited posting of the 
October 5, 2000 issue of The Rattler, by one who 
had no part in the writing, publishing, editing 
or actively disseminating the scandal sheet. 
No competent material evidence has been 
offered that Curtis Mize "published" the 
October 5, 2000 issue of The Rattler within the 
meaning of the "publication" element of the 
tort of defamation. Summary judgment was 
properly granted by the trial court. 
PUBLIC FIGURES 
*9 The "actual malice" requirements of the 
landmark case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
V\M:law 
Not Reported in S W 3d 
(Cite as: 2003 WL 21338696, *9 (Tenn.Ct. App.)) 
Page 8 
do not apply to Donita Piper and Lon Turner 
unless it is first determined that they are 
'public figures' within the meaning of New 
York Times Tennessee adopted standards in 
sections 580A and 580B of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts (1977) in establishing the 
distinction between defamation as to a public 
official or public figure and defamation of a 
private person As to a public official or public 
figure, one can only be held liable if he knows 
that the statement is false and that it defames 
another person, or if he acts in reckless 
disregard of such matters As to a private 
person, he may be held liable if he knows that 
the statement is false and that it defames the 
person, acts in reckless disregard of these 
matters, or acts negligently in failing to 
ascertain them Press, Inc , 569 S W 2d 435 
The disparity in treatment of these two 
classes of citizenry is inextricably interwoven 
with freedom of the press as defined in the 
First Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States and in Article 1, section 19 of 
the Constitution of Tennessee The right of the 
news media to criticize official conduct is the 
basis for the distinction between public figures 
and private persons In the colorful words of 
Chief Justice Henry 
From the days of the lonely pamphleteer 
operating clandestinely in Colonial America 
and crying out against the usurpations of the 
Crown, we have elected to reap the benefits 
and bear the burdens of a free and courageous 
press It may disturb our tranquility, i[t] may 
vex our peace of mind, it may outrage our 
sensibilities, it may shock our conscience, and 
it may even momentarily shake our beliefs in 
the right of freedom of the press, but so 
deeply grounded is our national commitment 
to a free press that we as a nation tolerate its 
abuses The Quid pro quo is that we profit by 
the very freedom that sometimes causes us to 
squirm 
Press, Inc , 569 S W 2d at 442 
The heart of the New York Times' rule says, 
"The constitutional guarantees require, we 
think, a federal rule that prohibits a public 
official from recovering damages for a 
defamatory falsehood relating to his official 
conduct unless he proves that the statement 
was made with 'actual malice' that is, with 
knowledge that it was false or with reckless 
disregard of whether it was false or not New 
York Times, 376 U S at 279 80 [FN3] 
FN3 The Rule was extended to public figures by 
Curtis Publishing Co v Butts 380 U S 130 (1967) 
and by Gertz \ Robett Welch Inc 418 U S 323 
(1974) 
In determining the "public figure" status of 
Appellants, the Tennessee Supreme Court 
gives guidance 
The term "public figure" has been defined 
variously by the courts as reference to the 
above cases will indicate Included within 
this classification must be those who have 
thrust themselves into the vortex of 
important public controversies, those who 
achieve such pervasive fame or notoriety that 
they become public figures for all purposes, 
and in all contexts, those who voluntarily 
inject themselves, or are drawn into public 
controversies, and become public figures for a 
limited range of issues, and those who 
assume special prominence in the resolution 
of public questions There, no doubt, are other 
involvements that would invoke the * public 
figures" designation 
*10 Finally, we think that a critical concern 
must be the nature and extent of the 
individual's participation in the particular 
controversy See Gertz, supra The status of 
the individual and the nature and extent of 
his involvement must be considered in those 
cases wherein the defamed party is involved 
in an activity affecting the public, but may 
not precisely fit into the pattern of a public 
official or public figure It is a fact of life that 
one may be a public official today, a public 
figure tomorrow and a nonentity the next 
His status must, in the last analysis, be 
dependent not only upon title or some 
convenient nomenclature, but also upon the 
character, nature, purpose, intent and extent 
of his participation in the particular 
controversy 
Press, Inc , 569 S W 2d at 441 
The undisputed facts show that Donita Piper, 
at the time of the events involved in this case, 
was the wife of the Mayor of the City of 
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Clarksville, that she traveled extensively out 
of the state and out of the country as the 
spouse of the Mayor, and that she has written 
stories and has been a guest commentator for 
The Leaf-Chronicle newspaper. Lori Turner was 
the incumbent Grants Writer for the City of 
Clarksville. She had been a candidate for 
Mayor of the City of Clarksville; had been the 
subject of numerous articles in both the Our 
City newspaper and The Leaf-Chronicle 
newspaper; had been a featured speaker at 
various civic groups in the past seven years; 
and had been host of a local radio talk show. 
Both Donita Piper and Lori Turner are "public 
figures" within the parameters laid down by 
Press, Inc. v. Verran . 
ACTUAL MALICE 
In this case, the Complaint does not allege, 
and the record does not contain, any evidence 
of a conspiracy. While the Complaint alleges 
joint and several liability as to all Defendants, 
the proof offered does not establish joint 
activity, at least as to Defendant/Appellee 
Curtis Mize. He must, therefore, be judged on 
this Summary Judgment Motion on the basis 
of his individual activity. 
Evidence of "actual malice" within the New 
York Times-Verran standard is, at best, weak as 
to Mize and certainly does not rise to the 
dignity of "clear and convincing evidence." 
Summary judgment for Mize is mandated by 
Tomlinson v. Kelley. 
Public figures who desire to pursue 
defamation actions bear a heavy burden of 
proof because of our society's commitment to 
the principle that "debate on public issues 
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
254, 270, 84 S.Ct. 710, 721, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 
(1964). In order to recover damages, they 
must prove with convincing clarity that the 
defendant acted with actual malice. See Press, 
Inc. v. Verran, 569 S.W.2d 435, 551 
(Tenn.1978); Moore v. Bailey, 628 S.W.2d 431, 
433 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1981). 
The concept of actual malice in defamation 
cases connotes more than personal ill will, 
hatred, spite, or desire to insure. See Masson v. 
New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 510, 
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111 S.Ct. 2419, 2429, 115 LEd.2d 447 (1991); 
McCluen v. Roane County Times, Inc., 936 
S.W.2d at 939; Windsor v. Tennessean, 654 
S.W.2d 680, 688 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1983). Rather, 
it is limited to statements made with 
knowledge that they are false or with 
reckless disregard to their truth or falsity. See 
Press, Inc. v. Verran, 569 S.W.2d at 441; Cloyd 
v. Press, Inc., 629 S.W.2d 24, 27 
(Tenn.Ct.App. 1981); Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 580A (1977). Determining whether a 
defendant acted with reckless disregard 
requires the finder of fact to determine 
whether the defendant "in fact entertained 
serious doubts as to the truth of his [or her] 
publication." Trigg v. Lakeway Publishers, Inc., 
720 S.W.2d at 75 (quoting St. Amant v. 
Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 
1325, 20 L.Ed.2d 262 (1968)). 
*11 Tomlinson, 969 S.W.2d at 405-06. 
It is admitted by Plaintiffs that rumors of an 
affair between Mayor Piper and Lori Turner 
were rampant in the community long before 
the October 5, 2000 edition of The Rattler. The 
best that can be said of the proof is that it 
establishes that, Mize did not subjectively 
believe the rumors, that he did not investigate 
the validity of the rumors, and that he was a 
political opponent of Mayor Piper. These facts 
fall considerably short of being "clear and 
convincing evidence" of actual malice on the 
part of Curtis Mize. Summary judgment was 
properly granted. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254; 
Gertz, 418 U.S. 323; Liberty Lobby, Inc., All 
U.S. 242; Press, Inc., 569 S.W.2d 435; Trigg, 
720 S.W.2d 69; Tomlinson, 969 S.W.2d 402. 
As to the allegations of outrageous conduct 
and false light invasion of privacy, no proof is 
offered that the conduct of Curtis Mize "has 
been so outrageous in character, and so 
extreme in degree, as to go beyond the pale of 
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and 
utterly intolerable in a civilized society." 
Major v. Charter Lakeside Hosp., Inc., 1990 WL 
125538, at * 3 (Tenn.Ct.App. Aug. 31, 1990). 
The rumors contained in the October 5, 2000 
issue of The Rattler were already prevalent in 
the Clarksville community long before 
October 5, 2000. No basis exists for a claim of 
false light invasion of privacy. Langford v. 
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works ^ _ 
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Vanderbilt University, 287 S.W. 2d 32 
(Tenn.1956); Fann v. City of Fairview, 905 
S.W.2d 167 (Tenn.Ct.App.1994); West v. Media 
Gen. Convergence, Inc., 53 S.W. 3d 640 
(Tenn.2001). 
CONCLUSION 
Whatever may be the rights and 
responsibilities between and among parties 
still before the trial court is not material to 
this appeal. On this Rule 54.02 designation of 
finality and the appeal of the Plaintiffs as to 
Curtis Mize, we are called upon to adjudge 
whether or not the trial court correctly 
granted summary judgment to Curtis Mize. 
We find summary judgment to have been 
properly granted and, in all respects, affirm 
the judgment. 
Costs of this cause are assessed to the 
Appellants. 
2003 WL 21338696 (Tenn.Ct.App.), 31 Media 
L. Rep. 1833 
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